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This study of the workers' compensation system in 
Michigan, initiated in 1978, has already achieved one of its 
major objectives: to provide a needed data base for analyz 
ing the complex and often controversial workers' compensa 
tion issues. The data gathered for this study were frequently 
utilized during the period of reform activity which resulted in 
the 1980 and 1981 amendments.
While the amendments enacted in 1980 and 1981 have 
substantially altered Michigan's system, this study provides 
an empirical overview of workers' compensation cases in the 
state that has not been available before. As a quantitative 
picture of the system in 1978, a point prior to any statutory 
changes, it may prove useful as a benchmark for assessing 
the impact of amendments to the statute.
Facts and observations presented in this monograph are 
the sole responsibility of the author. The viewpoints do not 
necessarily represent positions of the W. E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research.





The Michigan Closed Case Survey consists of data 
abstracted from 2,200 litigated and unlitigated workers' 
compensation cases closed in the Fall of 1978. This 
monograph is a description of that data base. It attempts to 
accomplish three major objectives: (1) to provide a com 
parative analysis of the workers' compensation experience of 
the insured and self-insured employer populations; (2) to 
provide an empirical description of the workers' compensa 
tion system in Michigan; and (3) to examine the differences 
between litigated and unlitigated cases with the goal of 
understanding the role of litigation in the Michigan workers' 
compensation system.
Perhaps the study's greatest contribution is the com 
parative analysis of workers' compensation cases from in 
sured employers and self-insured employers, further divided 
into the big three auto manufacturers and all other self- 
insureds. The basic finding is that these three employer types 
have very different workers' compensation experiences. It 
was not possible to document this before the Michigan 
Closed Case Survey since no single data base included both 
insured and self-insured employers.
These differences are demonstrated most dramatically in 
the proportion of cases litigated. Among the workers' com 
pensation cases from employees of the big three auto pro 
ducers, 48 percent are litigated. Other self-insured employers 
experience 19 percent and insured employers a 22 percent
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litigation rate. The differences in proportion of cases 
litigated in turn produce vast contrasts in claimant 
characteristics, the type and amount of compensation paid, 
and the timeliness of payments by insurer type.
The importance of the litigation process was also 
demonstrated in the magnitude of lump-sum payments in 
Michigan's workers' compensation system. Some 60 percent 
of all indemnity payments to this sample of closed cases were 
made in the form of lump-sums. Proportions by insurer type 
varied from 67 percent for the big three to 54 percent for 
other self-insurers. The insured population fell in between, 
with 61 percent lump-sums. Retired claimants were 
estimated to be receiving 10 percent of all indemnity for the 
insured population, 40 percent for the big three, and 20 per 
cent for other self-insurers. Lump-sum indemnity payments 
were shown to vary directly with earnings level and weekly 
compensation payments. They also were related to the 
number of periods of disability, hospitalization, back in 
juries, and the type of insurer.
This study also provides an empirical overview of workers' 
compensation cases in the State of Michigan that has not 
been available before. Simple descriptive facts such as the 
weekly benefit levels, durations of disability, characteristics 
of claimants, and many others are discussed. These data are 
organized by insurer type, so this general description also has 
a comparative flavor. Thus, when lump-sum payments and 
weekly payments are considered together, it is demonstrated 
that the big three and the insured employers have very 
similar average disability durations, but other self-insured 
employers enjoy average durations some 30 percent lower.
Analysis of the weekly benefit levels also proved very in 
teresting. The wage replacement formula operates in such a 
way that only 20 percent of beneficiaries actually received
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the two-thirds gross replacement rate specified by statute. 
This reflects the maximum and minimum benefit levels, 
dependency allowances, and other administrative factors. 
The result is that 15 percent of Michigan's workers' compen 
sation claimants received less than 40 percent gross wage 
replacement, while 3 percent received over 100 percent and 
another 10 percent received between 70 and 100 percent gross 
wage replacement rates.
The review of the role of litigation in Michigan's workers' 
compensation system led to the general conclusion that the 
litigated and unlitigated cases should be regarded as 
operating in two separate systems. They operate with dif 
ferent procedures, on different time schedules, with different 
outcomes, and to a surprising extent with different 
claimants. While the unlitigated system operates as a wage- 
loss replacement mechanism for disabled workers, the 
litigated system does not appear to operate on the same set of 
principles.
The evidence presented in the study suggests that 
Michigan's workers' compensation litigation system has 
grown into a miniature replica of the tort liability system of 
70 years ago, the system that workers' compensation was 
supposed to replace. The major difference is that disputes 
over who is at fault have been replaced by disputes over what 
is at fault. The lump-sum settlement system is seen as en 
couraging claims from retirees while driving out other, more 
timely, disputed cases. A general overhaul of the litigation 
system in workers' compensation is urged.
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MICHIGAN CLOSED CASE SURVEY
ORIGINS and TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
Introduction
This study was conceived in 1978 as an attempt to bridge 
the very serious information gap inhibiting discussion of 
workers' compensation reform in Michigan. While the issues 
were acknowledged to be intensely controversial, discussion 
of specific reform proposals was made even more difficult by 
the absence of an acceptable data base for analysis of 
workers' compensation issues in Michigan.
Unfortunately, the Michigan Department of Labor's 
Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation had never 
developed this capability. This was due to a combination of 
budget stringency and the laissez-faire philosophy of the 
Michigan statute. Michigan relies primarily on the private 
parties involved in a workers' compensation case to look 
after their own interests. The Bureau does require reports 
from the employer or insurer at the time of the injury, when 
compensation begins, when compensation is terminated, and 
other significant dates. But aside from notifying the worker 
of the earnings reported by his or her employer (for 
calculating the weekly benefit level) and checking the ac 
curacy of the benefit calculation, there is little agency in 
volvement in the typical uncontested workers' compensation 
case in Michigan.
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One result is that there are very few statistics available on 
the Michigan case population. 1 The Bureau of Workers' 
Disability Compensation publishes an annual report which 
summarizes the year's case activity (in one table); they also 
conduct a Pay Lag Study which measures the promptness of 
payment of benefits by individual carriers and self-insurers. 2 
In addition, the Statistical Information Division of the 
Bureau of Safety and Regulation uses the Employer's Basic 
Report of Injury to analyze compensable accidents in 
Michigan. 3 But none of these efforts provides the informa 
tion on durations of disability, weekly compensation 
amounts, or the other case details required for a well inform 
ed discussion of the impact of various reform proposals. It 
was an attempt to fill this gap that motivated the Michigan 
Closed Case Survey (MCCS).
For some purposes the MCCS has been successful in filling 
the gap, for others less so. It is fair to say that the workers' 
compensation system in Michigan proved much more com 
plex than anticipated. In some cases, the system itself affects 
behavior so profoundly as to make it impossible to deter 
mine what is stimulus and what is response. This will be 
shown to be particularly vexing for the contested or litigated 
cases in Michigan. Since they are observed through the eyes 
of the official system itself, it is impossible to do more than 
repeat what is reported, with the appropriate caveats about 
the sources of the information.
Fortunately for the State of Michigan, the actual reform 
efforts quickly overtook the attempt to complete and publish 
this analysis. During the period of reform activity, from 
mid-1979 through late 1981, the data base described herein 
was repeatedly tapped for answers to questions which ranged 
from the prosaic to the arcane. Hopefully, the MCCS was a 
useful source of information in the process of overhauling 
Michigan's workers' compensation system; that, after all, 
was the major objective of the data collection effort.
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To the extent this objective was achieved, the present 
volume describes a workers' compensation system that no 
longer exists. The amendments enacted in 1980 and 1981 
have substantially altered Michigan's system. 4 Nevertheless, 
the publication of this volume was judged to be worthwhile. 
It provides a quantitative picture of the system in 1978, a 
point prior to any statutory changes. This may prove useful 
in assessing the impact of amendments to the statute. It also 
contributes in a minor way to filling the information gap 
about specific workers' compensation systems.
It is important not to promise too much, however. This 
volume does not constitute an introduction or guide to the 
Michigan workers' compensation system of 1978. It 
describes a data base derived from that system, but provides 
only a very imperfect reflection of the richness of detail pre 
sent in the original.
This study also registers a substantial comment about the 
methodological difficulties of studying workers' compensa 
tion cases in general. It is submitted with the hope that 
someone else will find the inspiration to expand the frontiers 
of knowledge a little farther. If this can be accomplished, the 
Michigan Closed Case Survey and this description of it will 
be judged even more successful.
Sampling Design
The technical description of a sample is not very exciting, 
but it is very important. An understanding of the way in 
which the data were accumulated is crucial to comprehend 
ing the significance of particular results. This is especially 
true in the case of research on workers' compensation.
There is no standard accepted method of representing a 
workers' compensation case population. Because of the in 
credible variety of statutory provisions and administrative 
arrangements in state workers' compensation programs,
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there probably is no possibility of creating such a standard. 5 
But owing to the significance of the issues and the lack of 
discussion of the alternatives elsewhere in the workers' com 
pensation literature, the presentation of the empirical issues 
in this chapter is even more involved than usual.
This discussion is offered in the hope that it will contribute 
to an understanding of the conceptual difficulty of repre 
senting a dynamic workers* compensation population and 
the way in which the type of representation elected shapes 
the results. The reader who has little patience with such 
technical matters can omit this material. Where the sampling 
design has critical implications for the interpretation of em 
pirical results later in the monograph, the problems raised 
here will be reiterated in terms that are directly relevant to 
the issue at hand.
A workers' compensation case population can be thought 
of in either static or dynamic terms, that is, either as a stock 
or a flow. On any given day there are a specific number of 
cases receiving weekly benefit payments, awaiting a hearing 
before an administrative law judge, pending appeal from a 
decision, or in any other status. It is theoretically possible to 
inventory the case population in any such state on any par 
ticular day and derive a measurement of this sub-population.
The Michigan Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensa 
tion conducts one such measurement of the stock of cases 
receiving weekly benefits as of December 31 each year. For 
each case in weekly benefit payment status, the employer is 
required to report the date of the injury, the insurer carrying 
liability for the injury, the weekly rate of compensation, the 
total amount of weekly compensation paid in the past calen 
dar year to this individual, and the period for which such 
payments were made. This information is very useful for 
some purposes, but ultimately it is the underlying flow of 
workers' compensation cases through the system that is 
needed to assess what is happening in the program.
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While it is interesting to know how many cases are in cur 
rent payment status right now, it is more interesting to ask, 
How long have they been there? or, How long did it take to 
get there? or, What route did they follow to get there? or 
even, How long will they be there? Therefore, the essence of 
a workers' compensation case population is dynamic rather 
than static, a flow rather than a stock concept. The issue for 
the observer is how best to represent this dynamic population 
in a sample of cases for detailed analysis.
Since the population is dynamic, the sampling strategy 
must include a "slice-in-time" element; it is necessary to ar 
tificially interrupt the continuous flow of cases through the 
system to derive a sample. Thus the time signature of the 
cases from which a sample will be drawn must be carefully 
specified. Conceptually, there are three slice-in-time sam 
pling designs that could be employed. One could accumulate 
a sample of cases (1) as they enter the system, (2) as they 
leave the system, or (3) somewhere in between. The bulk of 
the available statistics in Michigan have been based on the 
first approach.
The Employer's Basic Report of Injury (Form 100) must 
be filed for any occupational injury or disease involving 
seven or more lost workdays, or for a fatality, or any 
scheduled injury. It includes information about the injured 
employee, the nature and cause of the injury, and in addition 
identifies the employer and the insurance carrier. This form 
initiates a case in the Bureau of Workers' Disability Com 
pensation files. It is subsequently coded for machine process 
ing by the Injury Analysis Division of the Michigan Bureau 
of Safety and Regulation, which uses these data to study the 
pattern of industrial injury in Michigan in order to target 
safety education and inspection resources in an optimal man 
ner. They also are reported to the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics' Supplementary Data System (SDS), a data bank 
providing comparable information on a number of states. 6
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This new SDS resource is expected to be valuable in guiding 
federal decisions about occupational safety and health policy 
as well.
The fundamental flaw in these data for describing the 
functioning of the Michigan workers' compensation system 
lies in the fact that only about three-fourths of the claims 
begin with a Form 100. In a great many cases there is no ob 
vious accident implying worker disability and hence no 
reason for an employer to file Form 100. Many occupational 
disease disabilities, for instance, cannot be traced to a par 
ticular incident, identifiable as to time and place, but rather 
arise gradually over a period of time. The same would be 
true in situations where subsequent disability develops as a 
consequence of an incident that seemed relatively harmless at 
the time, as in infectious disease or even cumulative trauma 
cases.
Since these cases present the greatest evidentiary problems 
for workers' compensation, and frequently involve the most 
serious disabilities, an examination of compensation in only 
those cases that commence with Form 100 would be seriously 
flawed. This is confirmed by the fact that among the litigated 
workers' compensation cases in Michigan (those that involve 
an application for hearing), the MCCS reveals that two- 
thirds have never had a Form 100 filed.
There is an additional problem with a common case origin 
date as a sampling strategy, particularly in litigated cases. If 
a claim is contested, a hearing is scheduled. But it took an 
average of 468 days for disposition of a case by the Bureau's 
Hearings Division in 1978. 7 Thus, to get a relatively complete 
picture of the compensation experience for cases originating 
in one slice-in-time, it would be necessary to wait two or 
three years just to be sure that decisions are reasonably cer 
tain in contested cases. If one wanted to also observe a 
substantial period after resolution of the dispute to deter-
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mine how the case was proceeding, even longer delays would 
be necessary. 8
The problem is that workers' disabilities have continuous 
histories just like the workers, and to rush to judgment on 
the compensation system before the full consequences of an 
injury became apparent would be to bias the results in favor 
of the adequacy of the system. The really tough test comes in 
the difficult, involved cases that may take many years to 
draw to a conclusion. While these cases may not be very 
numerous, they are important to the social judgment of the 
efficacy of the workers' compensation system.
This difficulty is compounded by the necessity of working 
with public sector data. Insurance carriers have to make pro 
vision for future claims and for future developments in cur 
rent claims well in advance; but they are not required to 
report reserves on individual claims, so these data are not 
available in the public sector.
To illustrate the problem, consider the experience of the 
insurance industry with the Michigan Special Call sponsored 
by the Michigan Workers' Compensation Rating and Inspec 
tion Association. They gathered data on a sample of claims 
filed in the months of March and October of 1976. Carriers 
were asked to evaluate these claims as of April 1,1979, either 
two-and-one-half or three years after initiation. While only 
4.3 percent of these claims were still open at the observation 
point, they accounted for 35 percent of the incurred indem 
nity costs. 9 These are clearly the most expensive cases; they 
may also be the most difficult cases to resolve. The perfor 
mance of the workers' compensation system in these cases 
could not be reviewed with any sense of finality by anyone in 
1979. Lacking information about reserves, all one could 
report is that these cases are still open.
Another sampling design which might be adopted would 
be a cross-section sample of all cases in the workers' com-
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pensation system at one point in time. This is the stock ap 
proach mentioned briefly earlier, a static representation of 
the case population flow at one "moment." Of course, all of 
these cases would be "unresolved" in the same sense as the 
difficult cases just discussed. One could not be sure what was 
going to happen in these cases; only what was happening at 
the time of the survey.
This second major conceptual approach is represented by 
the present Bureau of Workers* Disability Compensation 
Form 103, Annual Report on Payment of Compensation. 
These reports are to be filed by January 31 for each case be 
ing paid weekly benefits at the end of December of the 
preceding year. There are a given number of cases being 
compensated under the law at any point in time, and one 
might be interested in examining the compensation ex 
perience of these cases. This would be a relevant way to 
estimate the total weekly benefits being paid, for instance. 10
However, this is not a useful approach to describing the 
performance of the system as a whole unless the stock of 
cases at a point in time can be related precisely to the 
underlying flow of cases through the system. This flow could 
be estimated for Michigan if Form 103 contained a complete 
retrospective compensation history, but since it is directed 
only at payments during the previous calendar year, it can 
not yield accurate case population parameters.
There is also potential trouble with litigated cases under 
this design. It is not obvious when, or if, an insurer would 
file Form 103 in such a case. If a case is being contested, the 
insurer is generally not under any obligation to pay until and 
unless some resolution is reached. So it would not be ex 
pected that Form 103 would be filed while the case is being 
contested. On the other hand, once the dispute is resolved, 
the payments, if any, may also obviate the need for Form 
103. Many of these cases are compromised and payment is
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made in a lump-sum which redeems the employer* s liability 
forever, thereby closing the case. Form 103 would not be re 
quired in these cases either. Thus with this sampling design it 
would seem possible to reach only those contested cases 
where periodic benefits are eventually paid. Results to be 
reported later show that in Michigan this is only about 10 
percent of all contested cases.
In addition, this design would impose severe problems in 
obtaining the sampling frame in the State of Michigan. 
There is no available listing of active cases, there are only ac 
tive case files. It has been estimated that there are well over 
100,000 workers' compensation cases active at any time, and 
it is not possible to freeze these files while a sample is 
drawn. 1 ' Thus there is little hope of obtaining a cross-section 
sample of all cases in the system in the straight cross-section 
sampling design.
We come finally to the closed case sampling design. In this 
instance, the sample consists of all cases closed in a given 
period of time. The chief strength of this approach lies in the 
fact that every case opened must be closed. Whether com 
pensation is paid or not, whether the case is contested or not, 
regardless of the outcome, the case will eventually be closed. 
Sometimes closed cases will be reopened in the future as cir 
cumstances change, but a sample of cases closed during any 
particular period should also contain the appropriate 
number of these cases from earlier periods, so this factor 
could be measured as well.
The second advantage to a closed case design is that it 
minimizes uncertainty. The maximum amount of informa 
tion is available about the case. Not only the probability of 
contention, but the fact of contention and its outcome will 
be known at closure. Not simply the compensation rate, but 
aggregate compensation paid over the life of the case is 
known at closure. Thus more and better information can be 
secured than with any other design.
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The drawback is that this information may not be timely. 
To illustrate this problem, consider an accident occurring 20 
years ago which led to permanent disability and which trig 
gered the commencement of income maintenance and 
medical and rehabilitation benefits at that time. If there has 
been no substantive change in the circumstances of the 
disabled worker, benefits are still being paid (absent an 
agreement to redeem the employer's liability). Turning up 
such a case in a sample has the desirable aspect that it aids in 
establishing estimates of the actual population of such cases 
coming through the system; but it is doubtful that the com 
pensation system of today bears close resemblance to the one 
of 20 years ago. Hence the compensation experience of this 
claimant cannot tell much about the performance of the cur 
rent system.
The problem is that there are three reasons why a case may 
be old (i.e., many years since injury) at time of closure. The 
case may have been processed rapidly, compensation 
established without serious contention, and benefits paid for 
many years before recovery, or perhaps death, of the clai 
mant. On the other hand, the case may have been littered 
with delays and contention for years, then finally redeemed 
with a lump-sum payment and it is all over in a matter of 
weeks. The third possibility is one where the disability is not 
manifest for some years and a claim is not entered until con 
siderable time has passed, as in a latent occupational disease 
case. The closed case survey approach tolerates the first of 
these types, even though little useful information is gleaned 
from such cases, in order that the possibility of including the 
last two shall be maintained.
A closed case sample is representative of the underlying 
population, but, in a sense, it represents the workers' com 
pensation case populations at the times the cases originated 
rather than at the time of closure. The 12-year-old disability 
cases that closed during the sample period represent not to-
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day's cases, but rather the cases of 12 years ago with a 
12-year disability duration. Since the number of cases tends 
to grow through time, the less serious short duration cases 
are "representative" of a more recent (and generally larger) 
case population cohort than are the long duration cases. 
Therefore, the number of long duration cases in the sample 
understates the number of similar length disability cases in 
the current population, other things equal.
This problem, referred to by one insurance executive as 
the "small potatoes" effect, cannot be overcome with a clos 
ed case data base. If the case population is growing through 
time, a closed case sample will underestimate the incidence 
of long term disability claims, and overemphasize the short 
term, relatively routine cases. When one combines this 
underrepresentation of long term cases with the fact that 
these cases will not be representative of current policy by vir 
tue of their distant origins, the closed case design is revealed 
to have significant failings as well.
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, a closed case design 
was judged to be preferable for the descriptive tasks that are 
the objective of this effort. It is the most workable sampling 
design, given the type of access to the population provided 
by the Michigan workers' compensation administrative 
system. No other claims will be made for the superiority of a 
closed case sampling design. Later in this chapter, however, 
the durations of disability from the MCCS will be compared 
to those from the Michigan Special Call to assess empirically 
the actual magnitude of the bias introduced.
MCCS Sampling Procedure
The Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation case 
closure, or retirement, process was the focal point of the 
sampling design employed for this study. Since all workers' 
compensation claims, regardless of compensation status or 
litigation status, come through the case closure procedure in
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much the same way, it was the logical place to look for a 
handle on this dynamic case population. 12
Case files at the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensa 
tion are divided into uncontested (called "flats") and con 
tested (called "folders") according to their administrative 
treatment. The flats generally consist simply of the Bureau 
forms reporting the injury itself (Form 100, Employer's 
Basic Report of Injury), the commencement of weekly com 
pensation payments (Form 101, Notice of Commencement 
of Compensation Payments), and the termination of those 
payments (Form 102, Notice of Stopping of Compensation 
Payments). As mentioned earlier, the contested cases fre 
quently do not have the Employer's Basic Report of Injury, 
but they do have Bureau Form 104, Petition for Hearing, 
which initiates a folder containing all the other papers atten 
dant to a litigated claim. This paper trail can be quite 
voluminous in a case with a full hearing and transcript, or it 
can be minimal in a case that was redeemed without weekly 
compensation payments.
Active cases are maintained in a common file in 
alphabetical order according to the claimant's name. Upon 
retirement, or closure, the flats and folders are separated and 
accumulated in temporary storage space within the Bureau 
offices. As the temporary storage space is filled, the flats or 
folders are boxed and shipped to the state records center at 
another physical location. Litigated cases are shipped ap 
proximately once a month, unlitigated about three times a 
year.
The funneling of all cases through this closure procedure 
was judged to provide the most efficient way of ac 
cumulating the slice-in-time samples from the continuous 
flow of cases through the workers' compensation system. 
The separation of litigated and unlitigated cases at that point 
also facilitated different sampling ratios from the two
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populations. This was thought to be desirable because it was 
anticipated that there would be more variety within the 
litigated case population, and a higher sampling ratio for 
litigated cases would provide a more rational allocation of 
case abstracting resources. 13
The litigated sampling frame was one shipment lot, 
litigated cases that were retired between October 9 and 
November 9, 1978. A sampling ratio of 0.50 was used within 
that lot to achieve a completed litigated sample of 1,224 
cases for analysis. Since the closure period was exactly one 
month, the sampling ratio for the slice-in-time litigated sam 
ple relative to the annual flow of litigated cases would be 1 in 
24.
The unlitigated sampling frame consisted of 3,085 flats 
retired from November 1 through November 7, 1978. This 
was a fairly large batch, as the average had been 1,667 
closures per week up to November 1. It had been planned to 
sample every other case here too, but due to the unexpectedly 
large frame, a sampling ratio of 1 in 3 was employed. After 
elimination of the cases with no lost time (i.e., not compen- 
sable), this procedure yielded a completed sample of 954 
unlitigated cases for analysis. This slice-in-time sample is 
estimated to represent a 1 in 86 sample of all compensated 
unlitigated workers' compensation cases closed in 1978 in the 
State of Michigan. 14
A copy of the instruments used for data collection in the 
two samples is included as an appendix. It also contains the 
set of instructions given to the case abstractors, who were 
retired Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation 
employees. 15 The instruments were oriented to Bureau forms 
and sought to collect most of the significant case elements 
that could be quantified.
14 Michigan Closed Case Survey
Are the Samples Representative
Using the slice-in-time sampling ratios, it is possible to in 
flate the completed samples of the Michigan Closed Case 
Survey to represent the population. This estimate can then be 
compared to official figures from the Bureau on the 1978 
case population to help assess the representativeness of the 
samples. Table 1-1 presents these results for the estimated 
population (MCCS) and the actual population (Bureau) by 
type of case.
There are a number of discrepancies between the two 
distributions. First, since the official total of "Voluntary 
Payment" cases is on the basis of cases accepted for pay-
Table M
1978 Case Population Estimated
from the Michigan Closed Case Survey
Compared to Actual













(contested and uncontested) 


















 As reported in LABORegister, July 1979, pp. 203-204. Voluntary payments are 
estimated on an accepted case basis. Other categories are actual counts of case determina 
tions in 1978.
' Estimated 1978 closures based on samples of 954 unlitigated cases closed November 1 
through November 7, 1978 and 1,224 litigated cases closed October 9 through November 9, 
1978. Sampling ratios of 1 in 86 for the unlitigated sample and 1 in 24 for the litigated sam 
ple were used to inflate the sample to represent the entire 1978 closed case population. It 
should be noted that "closure" in the samples refers to the date the Bureau filed the cases 
for permanent storage, not the date the insurer closed the case.
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ment, it would be expected to differ somewhat from the 
number of cases closed in a like period just because of the 
gradual expansion in the number of cases. The growth in the 
case population should bias the MCCS estimate upward as 
well, since the sample cases closed come from later in the 
year. Assuming the number of cases closed grows month by 
month, the true population for the entire year should be 
overestimated by a late-year sample. Table 1-1 shows that 
the number of voluntary payment cases is overestimated 
slightly by the MCCS.
A more serious sample problem revealed by table 1-1 is the 
deficit in "Judges' Opinions" and in the "Withdrawn or 
Dismissed" categories. While it is impossible to say for cer 
tain, this could be due to an unanticipated seasonality in 
litigated case closures. As reported earlier, the sample 
litigated cases were retired by the Bureau between October 9 
and November 9, 1978. But the hearings for over three- 
fourths of these cases took place in July and August, prime 
vacation months. It may be that the number of hearings was 
lower than normal due to summer vacations.
The number of redemptions appears to be estimated close 
ly by the samples, but the proportion is slightly higher due to 
the deficits in other categories. Given these various 
discrepancies, the very close estimation of the total workers' 
compensation case population for 1978 by the Michigan 
Closed Case Survey should not be taken too seriously. To 
some degree, it reflects the ex post method of calculating the 
sampling ratio for unlitigated cases, and to some degree it is 
a result of offsetting errors. There is no way to verify the 
representativeness of the samples within each case type due 
to the lack of any official data.
Tables 1-2 and 1-3 address the issue of representativeness 
of the insurers in the MCCS unlitigated sample. The 
Michigan Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation con-
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ducts an annual Pay Lag Study on the routine cases that 
come through the administrative process. The time between 
notification of injury and issuance of first check is measured 
for each case. These distributions are reported for each 
authorized insurer in Michigan. The total number of cases 
listed for each insurer should approximate the number of 
compensable cases accepted voluntarily during 1978. This 
figure can be compared to the proportion of cases in the
Table 1-2 




Michigan State Accident Fund ..............
Liberty Mutual ..........................
Michigan Mutual Liability .................
Travelers ................................
Aetna Casualty & Surety ..................
Employers Mutual Liability of Wisconsin ....
Insurance of North America ...............
Home Indemnity .........................
Citizens of America. ......................
C.N.A. .................................
Hartford Accident & Indemnity ............
Associated Indemnity .....................
American Insurance Co. ...................





Royal Indemnity & Royal Globe ............
National Union Fire of Hartford. ...........
Total 20 largest insurance carriers .........
All insurance companies .................
All cases (including self-insurers) .........
Twenty largest insurance carriers as



































































































a. Reported in LABORegister, July 1979, pp. 205-212. 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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Table 1-3 







City of Detroit .......................






Gulf & Western Ind. Inc. ..............
Detroit Tooling Association ............
School Employers Group ..............
Chatham Supermarket, Inc. ...........
Michigan Municipal Fund .............
Detroit Board of Education ............
Keeler Brass .........................
Sears Roebuck .......................
Michigan Bell Telephone ..............
Eaton Manufacturing Co. .............
Total 20 largest self-insurers .........
All self-insurers ....................
All cases (including carriers) .........
Twenty largest self-insurers as



































































































a. Reported in LABORegister, July 1979, pp. 205-212. 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
MCCS unlitigated sample for each insurer as a rough test of 
the representativeness of the insurer distribution in the 
MCCS.
Table 1-2 presents this comparison for the 20 largest 
workers' compensation insurance carriers in Michigan, ac 
cording to the 1978 Pay Lag Study. The MCCS figures are 
subject to sampling variability, especially since the slice-in-
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time sampling period was so short. However, the proportion 
of large carriers in the MCCS sample looks quite good, and 
the distribution among the 20 largest carriers appears 
satisfactory. Table 1-3 repeats this comparison, but for the 
20 largest self-insurers reported in the 1978 Pay Lag Study. 
The results generally confirm the belief that the MCCS 
unlitigated sample adequately represents the self-insurer 
distribution in the population.
In summary, it appears from the very limited comparisons 
that can be made with the official statistics on the popula 
tion of workers' compensation cases in Michigan, that the 
Michigan Closed Case Survey does represent that population 
fairly well. The proportions of various types of outcomes 
show some discrepancy, particularly those requiring a 
judge's opinion, but overall, the samples seem sound. As 
always when dealing with sample data, specific statistics are 
subject to sampling variability. Tests of significance will be 
reported in each table to reflect the influence of this factor.
The Closed Case Bias
As a rough check on the degree of distortion introduced by 
a closed case design, the disability duration distribution from 
the Michigan Closed Case Survey can be compared to that 
derived from the unpublished 1979 Michigan Special Call as 
analyzed by the National Council on Compensation In 
surance. This was a special data collection effort sponsored 
by the Workers' Compensation Rating and Inspection 
Association of Michigan to provide input for the workers' 
compensation reform discussions in Michigan. The survey 
covered the 23 largest workers' compensation insurance car 
riers in Michigan, doing approximately 80 percent of the 
workers' compensation insurance business in the state. These 
carriers were asked to report as of April 1, 1979 the status of 
claims filed in the months of March and October of 1976, 
either two-and-a-half or three years earlier. In the conceptual
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terms employed here, this constitutes a slice-in-time sample 
based on the date of entry to the system.
The evaluation of the status of these cases must in some 
cases be based upon anticipation, since not all will have been 
finally resolved in two-and-a-half or three years. In fact, of 
the 5,355 claims sampled, 5,124 or 95.7 percent had been 
closed by the evaluation date of April 1, 1979. Data reported 
on the unresolved claims reflect the judgment of the claims 
processors in the various insurance companies as to the 
ultimate disposition of the case. While this is their profes 
sion, and the estimates are undoubtedly done as well as 
possible, they will not be precisely correct. Still, a com 
parison of results from the two different sampling strategies 
at roughly the same time is illuminating.
Table 1-4 compares the duration of disability distributions 
from the two data sources. It should be mentioned that the 
MCCS figures are for the insurance carrier segment of the 
workers' compensation case population; self-insurers are ex 
cluded. Cases are weighted so as to provide the correct pro 
portion of litigated and unlitigated cases. In addition, the 
lump-sum settlements in the MCCS were given imputed 
durations of disability using the average weekly compensa 
tion rates for carrier cases observed in the samples rather 
than the claimant's specific weekly compensation rate. Given 
the restricted range of weekly compensation rates in 
Michigan, this should not introduce much bias, but it 
depends on the average date of injury. If the lump-sum cases 
are considerably older than the weekly benefit cases on the 
average, the imputed durations for these cases will be 
systematically biased downward. This is because their weekly 
compensation rate will be overestimated. The broad dura 
tion categories of table 1-4 should minimize such distortions, 
however.
The four columns of table 1-4 illustrate a number of points 
discussed earlier. The second column demonstrates the effect
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of truncating the sample at the two-and-a-half to three-year 
experience point. Since these cases were assessed either two- 
and-a-half or three years after claims were initially filed, 
among closed cases only lump-sum settlements could show 
more than three years duration. The other cases would not 
yet be closed. The effect is that only about one case in five 
anticipated to show a duration of over four years (as in 
dicated by column 1) is actually counted in column 2. Col 
umn 2 shows a systematic bias with the degree of the bias 
varying directly with duration.
Column 3 shows the duration distribution of weekly 
payments for only those cases in the MCCS that were paid 
weekly compensation. It is quite similar to column 2, 
although the deficiency in the longest duration category is 
only about half as severe when compared to column 1. This 
column does not include any imputed durations for lump- 
sum cases, but does include all weekly payments made to 
those cases before settlement. Thus it represents only part of 
the compensation experience.
Table 1-4
Estimated Durations of Disability 




MCCS   carrier 
segment only
All cases Closed cases Weekly cases All cases 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Up to 26 weeks
26 to 52 weeks
1 year to 2 years



























n = 5,335 n = 5,124 n = 2,125 n = 2,419 
(weighted) (weighted)
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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The fourth column presents the distribution of durations 
in the MCCS, including imputed durations for lump-sum 
cases. It does not reveal the expected deficiency of long term 
cases; in fact, it seems to show an excess of such cases when 
compared to the NCCI distribution in the first column. 
Whereas the Michigan Special Call suggested that about 11 
percent of compensable cases exceeded, or were expected to 
exceed, 26 weeks in duration of disability, the MCCS in 
dicates nearly 17 percent had experienced this duration at 
closure. While these results must be taken as somewhat 
speculative, they certainly are interesting. In a direct inter 
pretive sense, they mean that sampling variability may be 
greater than any systematic bias introduced by a closed case 
sampling design. Whether this conclusion would hold under 
other conditions is impossible to say.
In summary, the MCCS samples do not appear to have 
failed any of the tests of representativeness. There is a short 
age of actual judges' decisions in the sample but, on the 
whole, the samples appear to represent the workers* compen 
sation case population in Michigan fairly well. In addition, 
the theoretical bias introduced by a closed case design does 
not appear to be as serious in practice as anticipated, at least 
for the Michigan environment.
The data base has proved its viability in a technical sense. 
In chapter 2 it is used to describe Michigan's workers' com 
pensation population in order to provide an empirical over 
view of the workers' compensation experience in Michigan. 
Chapter 3 focuses particularly on the litigation issue in the 
Michigan system. The correlates of litigation are explored 
and the outcomes are described in as much detail as is pos 
sible, given the quality of data available on litigated cases. 
Chapter 4 concentrates on indemnity benefit payments, 
reviewing both the adequacy and timeliness of indemnity 
payments in Michigan. The summary and conclusions of the 
study are presented in chapter 5.
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NOTES
1. This is not just a Michigan failing. See Monroe Berkowitz and 
Stephen McConnell, "Uniform Data Systems and Related Subjects in 
Workers' Compensation," Research Report of the Interdepartmental 
Workers' Compensation Task Force, Volume 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1979), for a description of the general 
problem and a suggested solution.
2. These are published in the Michigan Department of Labor's monthly 
journal LABORegister. Annual reports of the Workers' Compensation 
Appeals Board and the Funds Administration are also published in this 
journal.
3. The results are published annually by the Michigan Department of 
Labor under the title Compensable Injury and Illness Tabulations. These 
data are used for diagnosing the nature of the safety problem and 
prioritizing areas for public attention.
4. Both sets of amendments have been briefly outlined in LABORegister. 
The changes introduced by the 1980 enactments were described in 
LABORegister, February 1981, pp. 28-30. The 1981 amendments were 
described in LABORegister, February 1982, pp. 22-23. There was also an 
overview of all the reforms in the Spring 1982 edition of IAIABC Jour 
nal, published by the International Association of Industrial Accident 
Boards and Commissions. See also H. Allan Hunt, "Reforms in 
Michigan's Workers' Compensation System," Business Conditions in 
the Kalamazoo Area, Second Quarter 1982, Vol. XXV, Number 2, pp. 
19-23.
5. The most notable efforts to produce an overview of workers' compen 
sation procedures are those of Monroe Berkowitz. See "The Processing 
of Workmen's Compensation Cases," Bureau of Labor Standards, 
Bulletin 310 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, 1967). More 
recently, Monroe Berkowitz and John Burton reviewed ten state systems 
to determine the procedures and criteria used for permanent disability 
benefits. These results were reported as Part II of "Permanent Disability 
Benefits in the Workers' Compensation Program" (mimeo, October 
1979), the final report to the National Science Foundation. An updated 
version of this study will be published by the W. E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research in 1983.
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6. See Norman Root and Michael Hoefer, "The First Work-Injury Data 
Available from New BLS Study," Monthly Labor Review, January 
1979, pp. 76-80 and Norman Root and David McCaffrey, "Providing 
More Information on Work Injury and Illness," Monthly Labor Review, 
April 1978, pp. 16-21.
7. Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation Annual Report, 
LABORegister, May 1979, p. 203.
8. It can safely be assumed that no policymaker would be willing to wait 
the additional two to three years for an appealed decision to be processed 
by the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board.
9. NCCI unpublished tabulations. Unfortunately, there is no published 
description of this valuable data base.
10. See H. Allan Hunt, Inflation Protection for Workers' Compensation 
Claimants in Michigan: A Simulation Study (Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Up 
john Institute for Employment Research, 1981), for an example of the 
way in which a dynamic element can be extracted from these static data.
11. At least it was not possible in 1978. The computerization of a case 
management data base may change this situation.
12. It is important to note that this description is of the process at the 
time of sampling in the Fall of 1978. It is not necessarily representative of 
current Bureau practice.
13. This turns out to have been insufficient to maximize the analytical 
potential of the sample. In retrospect, the sample should have been 
stratified by type of resolution but that was not appreciated at the time.
14. The sampling ratio was estimated by comparing the completed sam 
ple to official case management statistics. This differs considerably from 
the theoretical sampling ratio of 1 in 156 (one-third of the cases from one 
week) due to the variability in the weekly case closure rate.
15. Thanks are due to Jo Walker of the Bureau staff for the suggestion 
that some former Bureau employees might be available for this work. It 
improved the quality of data immeasurably.

AN EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW 
of WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
in MICHIGAN
Introduction
It is very difficult to describe a workers' compensation 
system, regardless of the approach that is used. This is 
because of the number and diversity of cases and their 
specificity. Each case is special in that it represents an inter 
ruption, possibly a permanent disruption, in the normal 
routine of the injured worker. Each case is also unique, at 
least from the claimant's point of view. But because of the 
volume of workers' disability claims in Michigan, some 
generality is required to describe the workings of the com 
pensation system overall.
Thus it is necessary to look for the broad trends and 
similarities among these diverse cases. While this leads to a 
perspective which tends to minimize the human aspects of 
these disability cases, it should not be taken to imply that the 
unique personal aspects of each disability claim are unimpor 
tant. Reaching a broader judgment of the facts does 
necessitate reducing the amount of detail retained on each 
observation. It is these details, however, that matter most to 
the injured worker and ultimately to the social judgment of 
the performance of the workers' compensation system.
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As reported in chapter 1, the data for this study were 
abstracted from the official record of the case by people who 
knew what they were looking for. But one has only to read 
through a handful of the litigated case folders to see that the 
official record does not contain a very complete story. This 
problem is particularly acute for redemptions, where the 
record is very thin indeed. Even where a transcript of the 
hearing is available, it is difficult to assess the "facts" as 
presented in an intensely adversarial procedure. The most 
disappointing aspect is the medical expert testimony as to the 
nature and extent of the disability. Oftentimes it is hard to 
believe that the medical examinations put forward by the two 
sides were carried out on the same person.
This is not to be taken as a criticism of the administration 
of the workers' compensation system. Michigan's system 
was designed to be self-administering, with a relatively small, 
passive role for the state to play. But the effect is to leave the 
outside observer, dependent on official sources, with the 
task of trying to describe a very complex and bewildering ar 
ray of disability cases with a sketchy and sometimes 
unreliable set of facts.
Nevertheless, this descriptive effort will concentrate on 
those facts. The attempt will be to present the numbers as 
they emerge from the Michigan Closed Case Survey to try 
to construct an empirical description of workers' compensa 
tion in Michigan. For this purpose it is necessary to work 
with an integrated sample that combines the litigated and 
unlitigated samples described in chapter 1. Only by 
weighting the two samples appropriately can the entire 
workers' compensation system be addressed simultaneously.
Since unlitigated cases were sampled at a 1 in 86 rate and 
litigated cases were sampled at a 1 in 24 rate, the unlitigated 
cases will be inflated by a factor of 3.583 (86:24) to bring 
them into proper balance with the litigated. The integrated 
sample will therefore represent approximately one-half the
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number of cases closed in one month. 1 Thus in the presenta 
tion of weighted data to follow, there will be a maximum of 
1,224 litigated cases and 3,418 unlitigated cases included. 
For hypothesis testing, the unweighted sample size will be us 
ed to avoid biasing the test statistics; but all tables will report 
weighted sample results. The reader should not be misled, 
however; the results reported here are based on the actual 
samples of 1,224 litigated and 954 unlitigated cases as 
reported in chapter 1.
The results of the data analysis will generally be reported 
separately for cases insured by workers' compensation in 
surance carriers and for the self-insured. The self-insured 
sector will be further divided into two groups: the big three 
automobile producers (General Motors, Ford, and 
Chrysler), and other self-insurers. This analytical treatment 
represents the most fundamental hypothesis of this study: 
that the Michigan workers' compensation experience is very 
different for these three insurer types. It also serves to 
highlight the major contribution of the MCCS over any 
other Michigan data base the capability of comparing the 
insured sector to the self-insured.
In each table organized by insurer type, the chi-square 
statistic reported at the bottom of the tables gives the result 
of a test of the hypothesis that there are no differences be 
tween the three insurer types (the null hypothesis). The rejec 
tion of that hypothesis is indicated by the asterisk(s), with 
one asterisk indicating the hypothesis can be rejected at the 
95 percent confidence level, two asterisks indicating the 99 
percent confidence level. Thus the appearance of the 
asterisks after the chi-square statistic indicates that the dif 
ferences among the insurer types in the sample are sufficient 
to reject the hypothesis that they are the same in the general 
case population. While this hypothesis may not always be the 
most critical, it provides a useful organizational device for 
the presentation. It should also help to remind the reader
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that these are sample data and are always subject to sampling 
variability. With these preliminary comments in place, the 
empirical description of the workers' compensation system 
in Michigan can proceed.
The Claims and the Claimants
The most fundamental administrative distinction among 
workers' compensation cases in Michigan is between 
litigated and unlitigated cases (also referred to as contested 
and uncontested). Table 2-1 shows that about one-fourth of 
Michigan's workers' compensation cases are litigated. Either 
the claimant or the employer can file a Petition for Hearing 
(Form 104), although when the employer files it is frequently 
called a "petition for determination of rights." This form in 
itiates an administrative process whose major elements are: 
(1) serving a notice of dispute on the opposing parties and 
their counsels, (2) setting the case for pre-trial conference, 
and (3) a hearing of the dispute before an administrative law 
judge. Almost all of the petitions in Michigan are filed by 
claimants, nearly always with representation by an attorney.
Table 2-1 also reveals that the litigation rate among 
workers' compensation cases in Michigan is much higher for 
the automobile industry (big three) than for either the in 
sured sector or other self-insured employers. Based on the 
MCCS, it appears that nearly half of the big three's workers' 
compensation cases are litigated. In contrast, only about one 
case in five is litigated by other insurers. The chi-square 
statistic shows that this difference is statistically very signifi 
cant; that is, the difference among insurer types cannot be 
attributed to sampling variability alone (at a 99 percent level 
of confidence). The conclusion is that the litigated propor 
tion does vary systematically across insurer types in 
Michigan. This phenomenon will be addressed more fully in 
the next chapter where the determinants of litigation will be 
probed.
Table 2-1 







Chi-square (unweighted) = 121
Insurer type
Total Carrier Big three Other self-insurers
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
3,347 73.9 2,046 77.9 437 52.3 864 81.0
1,179 26.1 579 22.1 398 47.7 202 19.0
4,526 100.0 2,625 100.0 835 100.0 1,066 100.0
117
4,642
.23** with 2 degrees of freedom.
Unlitlgated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.




As interesting as the fact of litigation is the method of 
resolution of workers' disability claims in Michigan. Table 
2-2 shows that an estimated 18 percent of all Michigan 
workers' compensation cases are settled with a 
"redemption" of liability, more widely known as a com 
promise and release settlement. While the name redemption 
seems to be unique to the State of Michigan, the form of the 
agreement is not. It is a standard compromise and release in 
which the claimant agrees, in exchange for some considera 
tion, to sign a release in favor of the defendant. In Michigan 
parlance, the insurer "redeems" his or her liability for the 
disability in exchange for a negotiated cash payment.
It is important to understand that this agreement, after 
cursory review by an administrative law judge, amounts to a 
permanent release of liability for the injuries specified. The 
claimant is relinquishing any future claim, not only for in 
come maintenance, but also for medical or rehabilitative 
treatment that may be required as a consequence of the acci 
dent or illness. This is the reason why some states have 
chosen to forbid this form of agreement. Such a prohibition 
does not reflect a judgment that the attorneys cannot ade 
quately bargain for their clients. Rather, it is a statement that 
no one can foresee the ultimate consequences of an occupa 
tional injury or illness, and that under these circumstances 
there is justification for denying the parties the right to enter 
into such an agreement.
Analysis by insurer type reveals that the proportion of 
redemptions is more than twice as high among the big three 
auto producers, with approximately one-third of all their 
cases redeemed. Carriers redeem just under 16 percent and 
self-insurers other than the big three about 13 percent of 
their workers' compensation cases. Once again, the chi- 
square statistic indicates that the sample evidence is strong 
enough to conclude that the method of resolution does vary 
systematically by insurer type.
Table 2-2 


















































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 116.14** with 10 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.






Another category of resolution in table 2-2 is the propor 
tion of cases withdrawn before the scheduled hearing. 
Generally this means the petition was withdrawn without 
prejudice, i.e., it can be filed again in the future. The 
dismissed category refers to cases that the administrative law 
judge finds unworthy; usually they are dismissed for lack of 
prosecution by the applicant. The accepted cases are those 
that the employer or carrier accepts "voluntarily" after a re 
quest for hearing but before the dispute has been fully ad 
judicated. In other words, something that arises in the course 
of litigation persuades the insurer that the claim is worthy 
after all.
The next category represents the actual decisions by the 
administrative law judge. These are in addition to the pro- 
forma approval of redemption agreements which constitute 
the other significant burden on the hearings process. For 
purposes of the analysis here, the decision category includes 
both those where benefits were awarded and where they were 
denied. Based on this closed case sample, formal decisions 
are required in less than 2 percent of all Michigan workers' 
compensation cases.
The final category in table 2-2 is for the cases paid volun 
tarily by the insurer. It represents the unlitigated majority of 
the workers' compensation case population. The variations 
in the proportion of cases paid voluntarily reflect the 
likelihood of litigation as presented in table 2-1. Since the big 
three experience the highest proportion of litigated cases, 
they are shown in table 2-2 with the lowest proportion of 
claims paid voluntarily.
Table 2-3 shows the geographic origins of workers' com 
pensation cases in the MCCS broken down by insurer type. 
The sample is not large enough to estimate these proportions 
very precisely, but it is noteworthy that almost 55 percent of 
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Detroit SMSA. Nearly two-thirds of the self-insured cases 
come from Detroit. Detroit's employment in 1978 was 48 
percent of the State of Michigan as a whole, so Detroit is 
somewhat overrepresented in the workers' compensation 
system.
Tables 2-4 and 2-5 show the nature of the injury and the 
injured part of the body, respectively, for closed Michigan 
workers' compensation cases. These data were coded accord 
ing to the American National Standards Institute Z-16 stan 
dard and then collapsed into larger groupings for tabular 
presentations. The most common type of injury is the sprain 
or strain, with nearly 40 percent of all cases falling into this 
group. The large representation of multiple injuries and 
multiple body parts in the tables reflects the influence of the 
litigation procedure. When applicants file petitions for hear 
ings, they or their attorneys frequently list multiple injuries. 
In fact, sometimes the petition reads like an index to the 
parts of the body. This inclusive approach to definition of 
injury is presumably helpful to the claimant during the litiga 
tion process, but it makes a realistic description of the injury 
very difficult in these cases. 2
During the data collection for the MCCS, coders were in 
structed to record up to three specific injuries, particularly if 
they showed different injury dates. For analytical purposes, 
however, it seemed preferable to code such cases simply as 
multiple injuries. It should be pointed out that the result may 
not accurately represent the true nature of the injury. But 
there is no alternative to viewing these claims through the 
veil of the litigation process itself. Thus any distortions are 
introduced by the litigation process, not the reporting of the 
data per se.
This problem is also reflected in the comparisons among 
insurer types in nature of injury and part of body injured. 
The differences in proportions by insurer type seem to be a
Table 2-4 










































































































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 146.28** with 22 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.





































































































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 102.22** with 20 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.







consequence primarily of the number reporting multiple in 
juries. This in turn is a function largely of the proportion of 
all cases that are litigated. So while the chi-square statistic 
shows that the distribution of injuries does differ 
systematically by insurer type, this does not appear to be an 
important result analytically.
Table 2-6 shows the level of disability reported for weekly 
benefit cases by insurer type in Michigan. The bulk of claims 
are for temporary total disabilities. The overwhelming ma 
jority of these involve only one spell (or period) of disability. 
However, there are a significant number of cases reporting 
multiple spells. If the multiple total disability spells are com 
bined with the total disability followed by a partial disability 
group, the sample indicates that about 5 percent of all 
Michigan cases do involve more than one period of weekly 
disability compensation payments.
It should be pointed out that this tabulation is oriented 
very strongly to the receipt of weekly benefits. This is il 
lustrated by the other major category in table 2-6, "no week 
ly compensation." This group includes uncompensated 
cases, of course, but it is dominated by redemptions. Most of 
these never received any weekly indemnity payments at all; 
they are simply lump-sum settlements of disputed cases.
This reflects the practice in Michigan, but it also com 
plicates the description of Michigan's disability cases in 
terms of the traditional disability categories. Michigan 
statute does not distinguish between temporary and perma 
nent disabilities (except for defining "total and permanent 
disability" as a special group). Thus there is no need to cer 
tify the expected duration (or severity) of disability when a 
case is redeemed. All that appears in the record is a disputed 
allegation of a work-related disability, some contradictory 
medical testimony as to the condition of the claimant, and a 
lump-sum payment. The true nature and extent of disability
Table 2-6 



































































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 141.80** with 12 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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is generally not apparent. For this reason, table 2-6 is not 
comparable to an outwardly similar tabulation for other 
states.
It does introduce a fundamental distinction between week 
ly indemnity payments and lump-sum payments which will 
be maintained throughout this volume, however. Because of 
the confusion over what is a permanent and what a tem 
porary disability, it seems preferable in a Michigan context 
to focus on the form of indemnity payment rather than the 
duration of disability. 3 This will occasionally produce some 
confusing results. For instance, table 2-6 indicates that only 
0.1 percent of closed cases are fatalities. But this really 
means that 0.1 percent of closed cases were paid weekly sur 
vivor's benefits. Excluded from this figure is a much larger 
group of fatality claims that were redeemed and, hence, in 
cluded in the no weekly compensation classification. Similar 
ly for the partial disability category in table 2-6, only those 
cases that were paid partial weekly benefits under the wage- 
loss principle are included. Other partial disabilities that 
were redeemed are included in the no weekly compensation 
category.
The distortions resulting from these unusual factors in 
Michigan have been very troublesome in a number of ways. 
The National Council on Compensation Insurance, in 
analyzing Michigan loss data, groups together all permanent 
injuries that are not totally disabling, all temporary total 
disabilities with a duration in excess of one year, and lump- 
sum settlements of all cases other than permanent total 
disabilities. They call this amalgam "other permanent 
disabilities," and find that about 60 percent of indemnity 
losses arise from this category. It is clear that these are very 
different types of cases from a policy perspective, however, 
and it causes considerable confusion to lump them together. 
Whether the attempt to separate weekly payments and lump- 
sum payments, as done here, will prove more successful re-
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mains to be seen. It does provide an alternative way of look 
ing at Michigan workers' compensation cases.
Continuing with the emphasis on weekly benefit 
payments, table 2-7 shows the reason the insurer reported for 
the termination of weekly benefits. Obviously, this table on 
ly includes closed cases that received some weekly benefit 
payments. Those cases that were redeemed without any 
weekly payments are represented among the missing cases in 
table 2-7. The message of this table is that the overwhelming 
majority of weekly payment cases in Michigan, nearly 90 
percent, culminate in the claimant's return to work. This is 
as it should be, since a recovery from disability and return to 
work is always the primary goal of workers' compensation.
Turning to the characteristics of the claimants, table 2-8 
indicates that about one-fourth of the workers' compensa 
tion claimants in Michigan are female, with a slightly lower 
proportion for the big three auto producers. Table 2-9 shows 
the age distribution of claimants by insurer categories. The 
most noteworthy features of this table are the elevated pro 
portion of claims from older workers at the big three and the 
higher proportion of young workers in the insured sector. 
The former reflects the high incidence of litigated claims 
from auto industry retirees while the latter presumably 
reflects the younger workforce associated with smaller 
employers in the insured sector. Note that while the propor 
tion of workers under 21 is twice as high for the carrier sec 
tor, the average age of claimants is not much different than 
that for other self-insurers. The big three claimants, on the 
other hand, do have a noticeably higher average age, 41 
years compared to just over 36 for the carrier sector.
These differences are also reflected in tables 2-10 and 2-11, 
which show the reported number of dependents and average 
weekly earnings, respectively, by insurer type. According to 
table 2-10, about one-third of workers' compensation 
claimants in Michigan have no dependents. Furthermore,
Table 2-7 




























































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 25.65* with 12 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.
























































Chi-square (unweighted) = 20.94** with 2 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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Chi-square (unweighted) = 54.45** with 10 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.






















































































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 75.25** with 14 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.
Columns may not add to total due to Founding.
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Chi-square (unweighted) = 207.21** with 10 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.





this proportion varies substantially by insurer type with 
slightly over 20 percent of big three cases, 30 percent of other 
self-insurer cases, and 40 percent of carrier cases reporting 
no dependents. It is difficult to say how accurate this infor 
mation may be, but these proportions do seem high. The 
number of dependents is reported by the claimant for 
litigated cases on the Petition for Hearing. However, if the 
case ends up being redeemed there is not likely to be any 
review of the number of dependents since it does not figure 
directly in the settlement. For cases that receive weekly com 
pensation payments, the insurer reports the number of 
dependents, together with the average weekly wage and the 
calculated weekly benefit, on the form that notifies the 
Bureau of the commencement of weekly payments. The 
Bureau, in turn, notifies the disabled employee of this infor 
mation and urges the worker to advise if it is incorrect.
This would seem to give the claimant an incentive to make 
sure the number of dependents is accurate. However, it is 
always possible that it is not taken seriously; or that some 
unknown reporting bias slips in. In particular, it could be 
that the employer reports the number of dependents claimed 
for tax withholding purposes, which could systematically 
understate the actual number. If the worker is not eligible for 
the maximum benefit, or is not well-informed on how 
benefit levels are figured, it is likely that no correction would 
be forthcoming.
Similar distortions could be present in table 2-11, weekly 
earnings by insurer type, since these data were gathered from 
the same sources. The average reported weekly wage for the 
entire sample was $256.49. But this measurement is for cases 
closed in 1978. The weekly earnings reported pertain to the 
time of the injury or origin of the case, not to the time of 
closure. Thus the wages reported in the MCCS do not repre 
sent one point in time, but a complex mixture of recent
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wages and older wages, according to the length of time the 
cases have been in the workers* compensation system.
Nevertheless, it is apparent from table 2-11 that there are 
very substantial differences in wage levels between insurer 
types in Michigan. A high proportion of injured low-wage 
workers are in the carrier insured sector. While 45 percent of 
the carrier sector claimants earned less than $200 weekly 
before being disabled, this was true for only 10 percent of the 
big three and 25 percent of other self-insurers' claimants. 
About 10 percent of claimants from each insurer type earned 
over $400 per week before their injury. This is a very surpris 
ing level of similarity, given what is known about auto in 
dustry wage levels.
Michigan's statute provides a maximum benefit at two- 
thirds of the state average weekly wage at the time of the in 
jury; less if full dependency allowances are not claimed. So 
there is little incentive to accurately report earnings if they 
are greater than the state average weekly wage. The benefit 
formula would prevent recovery of such amounts anyway. 
Thus it is probable that the wages of high-earnings level 
claimants are systematically understated. For instance, the 
big three claimants are reported in table 2-11 as having earn 
ings that are 18 percent more than the average for the whole 
sample. According to published figures, the weekly earnings 
of workers covered by unemployment insurance in the 
transportation equipment industry were about 58 percent 
higher than the statewide average in 1977. 4 The MCCS 
results would be biased downward by the incidence of litiga 
tion delays, long duration disabilities, retiree claims, and 
other influences; but the differential still appears 
unreasonably small. It is probably safe to conclude that the 




These wage differences are also reflected in table 2-12, 
which shows the weekly compensation rate by insurer type. 
The extent of wage loss (total or partial) and the number of 
dependents also affect the weekly compensation payment, 
but it is primarily a function of the level of earnings. Table 
2-12 shows that two-thirds of the cases closed in October and 
November of 1978 had received weekly payments between 
$100 and $150. A substantial minority of 25 percent received 
payments of over $150 per week and a small number received 
less than $100 weekly (about 9 percent). The differences 
among insurer types are substantial and statistically signifi 
cant. This is true even though the distribution of weekly 
compensation rates is truncated at both ends by the max 
imum and minimum benefit levels. 6
Table 2-13 demonstrates the actual significance of the 
minimum and maximum benefit levels in Michigan. Almost 
64 percent of all weekly payment cases received the max 
imum benefit for their injury year and dependency classifica 
tion; virtually every case for the big three employees. At the 
other end of the scale, about 15 percent of all closed weekly 
compensation cases received the minimum benefit. Reflect 
ing the wage distribution results presented earlier, the bulk 
of these minimum benefit cases occur in the carrier sector.
Only one case in five actually received the statutory two- 
thirds of gross weekly earnings as the weekly benefit pay 
ment. It should perhaps be pointed out that this result is not 
affected substantially by the litigation process, nor by the in 
cidence of lump-sum payments. These measurements pertain 
only to the cases that actually received weekly payments and 
refer to the maxima and minima in effect at that time. It is 
clear from this evidence that large wage level differences, 
filtered through a benefit structure which severely restricts
Table 2-12 


































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 64.60** with 6 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.
































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 197.07** with 4 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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the scope of the wage level in determining benefits, still pro 
duces widely varying weekly compensation experience.
This becomes very apparent when discussing possible 
legislative changes in the maximum and minimum benefit 
levels. Increasing the maximum benefit level would have a 
tremendous impact on the self-insured employers; much less 
on the insured sector. On the other hand, changes in 
minimum benefit levels would be of major concern to in 
sured employers, and of little value to the self-insured. This 
was one of the reasons reform of the Michigan benefit for 
mula was so difficult. The tradeoff among different provi 
sions varied substantially by employer and/or insurer type.
It is time now to turn attention to the duration of disability 
issue. However, before presenting any data it is important to 
reiterate the bias, discussed in chapter 1, that is introduced 
with a closed case design. This potential bias is at its max 
imum when examining duration of disability. In the first 
place, the closed cases that involve long durations of disabili 
ty represent an earlier, generally smaller case population. 
Thus they would tend to be outnumbered by short duration, 
more recent cases simply as a consequence of the growth of 
the labor force.
In addition, since lifetime benefits were only extended to 
the general disability category in Michigan in 1965, the case 
population may not yet be mature enough to have reached an 
equilibrium. This would lead to a further distortion in the 
number of long term cases relative to short term cases in a 
closed case survey. This concept can be explained with the 
aid of a few simplifying assumptions. Suppose it was possi 
ble to observe a workers' compensation system as it was go 
ing into operation for the first time. Suppose also that all 
cases with disability durations greater than one year would 
not close until exactly 10 years after the injury date. Assume 
that the same number of cases originate in each year. Any
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sample consisting of one month's closed cases drawn during 
the first ten years of system operation would not contain any 
long term cases, but would contain only cases with disability 
durations of less than one year. Thus a closed case sampling 
design would lead to the incorrect conclusions that there 
were no cases with disabilities lasting over one year.
Now, suppose instead of exactly a 10-year duration for 
long term disability cases, they were characterized by a 
distribution of durations. Assume that distribution was rec 
tangular, so that the average duration of long term cases was 
10 years, but they ranged from 1 year to 19 years with a cons 
tant number closing in each year. If a slice-in-time closed 
case sample was drawn in year two, a few long term cases 
would be represented, but they would be seriously under- 
represented relative to the short term cases. This is because 
the long term cases would be from only one cohort. As time 
passes and the case population "matures" so that cases are 
closing from a number of earlier cohorts, the relationship 
between long term closures and short term closures would 
change substantially. This change is an artifact of the 
measurement technique, not a change in the underlying 
dynamics of case duration. Under the stated assumptions, it 
would take 20 years for the population to reach an 
equilibrium or steady state condition.
When this dynamic distortion phenomenon is imposed on 
a fluctuating case population with a very complex duration 
distribution, it becomes difficult even to describe the nature 
of the problem. However, it is a fact that a closed case survey 
tends to yield a distorted view of disability durations. It 
systematically underestimates the incidence of long duration 
disabilities. The magnitude of the error is a function of the 
frequency of long term cases and their duration distribution.
The empirical analysis of the closed case bias in chapter 1 
showed that, for Michigan at least, this problem is not as big
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as it would seem. When the durations of disability from the 
MCCS were compared to those from another sample with a 
different sampling design, the closed case samples appeared 
to contain about one-third fewer cases with actual paid dura 
tions of one year or more. In chapter 1 it was shown that this 
was more than offset when the redemptions were given im 
puted durations based on the size of the lump-sum 
payments. These results should be treated with caution, 
however, by anyone whose focus is estimating the actual 
durations of disability as opposed to comparing the ex 
perience of different insurer types.
Table 2-14 shows a detailed distribution of compensation 
durations by insurer type. This table includes only the actual 
number of weeks paid; no lump-sum payments are included. 
The most striking feature of this table is the small number of 
cases with paid durations of one week to two weeks. This 
reflects the benefit waiting period provision in Michigan 
statute. Compensation for wage loss begins after one week 
of disability, but if the disability lasts two weeks or more, 
benefits are paid retroactively from the data of injury. The 
effect of this provision is that benefits are paid for either less 
than one week or more than two weeks, since the accumula 
tion of one full week of compensated disability triggers pay 
ment for the first unpaid week as well. 7
The other noteworthy element of table 2-14 is that the dif 
ferences among the insurer types in the distribution of dura 
tion are not statistically significant. Even though the means 
are quite different, with a range of 10.1 weeks for other self- 
insurers to 16.7 weeks for the big three, the hypothesis that 
the distributions are the same cannot be rejected in this in 
stance. 8 Because of this fact and because the sample numbers 
are very small, it is unwise to draw any conclusions about the 
apparent differences in the tails of the distribution for the 
three insurer types.
Table 2-14 
Duration of Weekly Compensation Payments by Insurer Type
Insurer type
Duration
Up to 1 week
1 to 2 weeks
2 to 4 weeks
4 to 8 weeks
8 to 13 weeks
13 to 26 weeks
26 to 52 weeks
1 to 2 years


















































































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 17.00 with 18 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.






The table does show the predominance of short duration 
disabilities in Michigan's workers' compensation system, 
however. Over 20 percent of the cases receiving periodic 
compensation payments are paid for one week or less. Over 
50 percent of the cases involve no more than four weeks of 
disability. Furthermore, this experience holds for all insurer 
types. Even though the long duration cases are under- 
represented in table 2-14, this conclusion is firm since dou 
bling the long duration cases would not change the overall 
distribution very much.
Table 2-15 shows the distribution of total weekly compen 
sation paid by insurer type. It is closely related to table 2-14, 
since total weekly compensation is simply the product of the 
duration of benefits and the weekly compensation rate. The 
differences among insurer types in table 2-15 are statistically 
significant. This represents the contribution of the dif 
ferences in weekly compensation rates reported in table 2-12. 
In this case, also, the major conclusion is that the system is 
dominated by small cases. Over 70 percent involve weekly in 
demnity of less than $1,000.
According to table 2-15, only about 3 percent of weekly 
payment cases show more than $8,000 in aggregate weekly 
indemnity. This number should be treated with some cau 
tion, however. Since the subject is weekly compensation 
payments only, the expensive cases are necessarily old cases 
with low weekly compensation rates (appropriate to earning 
levels at the time of the injury). Therefore, the realized cost 
of those cases is considerably less than a comparable dura 
tion case arising at the present time.
This whole discussion might be regarded as misleading by 
some, since all lump-sum payments have been omitted thus 
far. It was shown in table 2-2 that over 18 percent of 
Michigan's workers' compensation cases are redeemed, so 
discussing only weekly payment cases could introduce a very
Table 2-15 


















































































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 26.52* with 16 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.







serious bias. In fact, table 2-16 shows that the weekly pay 
ment cases and lump-sum payment cases can be treated as 
separate populations. Less than 5 percent of all cases receive 
both weekly and lump-sum indemnity payments. Nearly 74 
percent of all closed cases received weekly indemnity 
payments only, and about 15 percent received only lump- 
sum payments. These proportions are somewhat similar for 
the carrier sector and the other self-insured sector. The big 
three auto manufacturers pay about three times as many 
lump-sum cases relatively; but it is still true that there is very 
little overlap with the weekly compensation cases.
Tables 2-17 and 2-18 address the other group of compen 
sated cases: lump-sum payment cases. The vast majority of 
these are redemptions, but there are a few scheduled loss 
cases and lump-sum advance cases included as well. As in 
dicated in table 2-16, 20 percent of the closed case sample 
had received lump-sum payments. The cases receiving week 
ly compensation only and those receiving no indemnity at all 
are counted as missing in tables 2-17 and 2-18.
Table 2-17 reports the size of gross lump-sums, whereas 
table 2-18 covers net lump-sums. The difference between the 
two is made up of the costs of litigation: namely, attorney's 
fees, other legal costs, and medical costs. This issue will be 
examined in chapter 4, but for now it is sufficient to point 
out that the gross lump-sum is what the insurer pays and the 
net lump-sum is what the claimant actually receives. Thus 
when talking about the cost of lump-sum cases, it is ap 
propriate to use the gross amount, but when discussing ques 
tions of benefit levels, net lump-sums are more appropriate. 
The major focus here is on table 2-17, i.e., gross lump-sum 
payment amounts.
The distribution of lump-sums is not at all similar to the 
distribution of weekly payments. There are relatively few 
small lump-sum payments, only 5 percent are under $1,000.
Table 2-16 
Type of Compensation by Insurer Type
Chi-square (unweighted) = 141.12** with 6 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.








































































































































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 78.87** with 12 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the Unlitigated sample.






























































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 59.54** with 10 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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There are even fewer really large lump-sums, although clear 
ly they account for a significant proportion of the total 
lump-sum costs. Roughly 10 percent of lump-sum indemnity 
dollars go to the 2 percent of the lump-sum cases that receive 
over $32,000 in indemnity.
There are also considerable differences among the three 
insurer types in the size of lump-sum payments. This is borne 
out by the chi-square statistic, which shows that the null 
hypothesis of identical distributions can be rejected at a very 
high level of confidence. The distribution for the big three 
auto producers appears to be the most unique. It is very com 
pact, with two-thirds of the cases falling between $2,000 and 
$8,000 in lump-sums. Presumably this reflects the "routine 
retiree redemptions" in the auto industry. It is said that there 
is an organized market for retiree redemptions in the auto in 
dustry. At any rate, the variance in size of lump-sum 
payments is considerably less for the big three than for other 
self-insurers or the carrier sector.
While table 2-16 showed that three times as many big three 
closed cases received lump-sum payments, table 2-17 in 
dicates that the average lump-sum is much lower for the auto 
industry than for carriers or other self-insurers. This is 
noteworthy since the weekly compensation rate was shown 
to be significantly higher for the big three. It is hypothesized 
that this fact reflects the incidence of retiree redemptions in 
the auto industry also. These questions will be addressed 
more thoroughly later.
Table 2-19 presents the analysis of duration of disability 
payments when lump-sum payment cases are assigned im 
puted durations. After the deduction of legal costs and 
medical costs, each net lump-sum payment was divided by 
the average weekly indemnity payment to cases from the 
same insurer type to get a rough estimate of the number of 
weeks represented by the lump-sum payment. These imputed
Table 249 




Up to 26 weeks
26 to 52 weeks
1 year to 2 years







































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 51.90** with 8 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.






durations were then added to any actual weekly payment 
durations for the individual claimant to yield a total 
estimated duration of disability. 9
There are a number of interesting results shown in table 
2-19. The dominance of short duration cases presented in 
table 2-14 is reduced. The inclusion of imputed durations for 
lump-sum cases has doubled the relative frequency of cases 
with more than 26 weeks disability duration, from 8 percent 
to 17 percent. There are also strong contrasts by insurer type 
apparent in table 2-19. The carrier segment experiences 
roughly twice as high a proportion of cases with more than 
two years estimated duration when compared to all self- 
insurers. The big three auto producers demonstrate the 
lowest relative incidence of long duration cases. They also 
show the lowest incidence of cases with less than 26 weeks 
estimated duration. This is accounted for by the fact that the 
bulk of the big three redemptions end up with imputed dura 
tions of between 26 weeks and two years.
The final point to be made about the estimated durations 
in table 2-19 is that the other self-insurers clearly 
demonstrate the lowest durations overall of any insurer type. 
The advantage they enjoyed in actual weekly payment dura 
tions (shown in table 2-14) has increased with the addition of 
the imputed durations from lump-sum cases. Table 2-19 
shows that the average paid duration for self-insurers other 
than the big three is only 16.9 weeks, about 30 percent less 
than for other insurer types.
The last comparison to be presented is total indemnity for 
each closed case. Tables 2-20 and 2-21 show these results by 
insurer type. Table 2-20 reports the total indemnity paid to 
each closed case by insurer type. It adds the gross lump-sum 
amounts to total weekly compensation payments to arrive at 
the total indemnity paid to each closed case. Table 2-21, on 
the other hand, reports the total indemnity received by the
Table 2-20 
Total Indemnity Paid by Insurer Type
Insurer type



































































































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 124.79** with 20 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
Table 2-21 
Total Indemnity Received by Insurer Type
Insurer type

































































































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 92.08** with 20 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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claimants; it adds the net lump-sum payments and total 
weekly compensation payments. Both tables are presented 
for comparative purposes.
It is noteworthy that the big three and the carrier sector 
each come out with an average total indemnity payment of 
about $2,900, even though the distributions are quite dif 
ferent. The big three pay about twice as many claims in the 
$2,000 to $8,000 range as do other insurers. But they also 
show significantly more uncompensated cases. These facts 
presumably reflect the redemption policy of the auto in 
dustry. Other self-insurers have an average total indemnity 
level about 20 percent lower than either the carriers or the big 
three.
These figures represent the composite influence of the 
weekly compensation rates, the durations of weekly 
payments, the size of lump-sum payments, and the incidence 
of lump-sum payments. To simplify the comparisons, table 
2-22 draws together all these elements in summary form. It is 
apparent that the three insurer types have widely differing 
workers' compensation experiences. The big three are clearly 
unique. They experience a very high litigation rate and a very 
high incidence of lump-sum payments, more than one-third 
of all closed cases according to the MCCS. They also have 
the highest proportion of uncompensated cases, presumably 
reflecting some successful defenses in the litigation process.
While they show by far the lowest proportion of weekly 
compensation (because of the influence of lump-sums), they 
pay the highest weekly compensation rates and the longest 
average durations. This results in an average weekly compen 
sation figure that is about one-fourth higher than for the car 
rier segment. On the other hand, the big three appear to off 
set the remarkably high incidence of lump-sum payments 
with lower payments to each case. The net result is that the 
big three claimants receive the same average total indemnity 
per closed case as claimants in the carrier segment.
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Table 2-22 
Summary of Compensation by Insurer Type
Compensation summary
Other 
Carrier Big three self-insurers
Cases not compensated 
(Percent) 6.8 10.4 3.9
Cases with weekly compensation
(Percent)
Average weekly compensation rate
(Dollars per week)
Average weekly compensation duration
(Weeks)
Average total weekly compensation
(Dollars)
Cases with lump-sum payments
(Percent)
Average gross lump-sum payments
(Dollars)
Average net lump-sum payments
(Dollars)
Average total indemnity paid
(Dollars)





























Self-insurers other than the big three present a rather dif 
ferent picture. They have the highest proportion of weekly 
benefit payment cases and the lowest incidence of lump- 
sums. They also show the lowest proportion of uncompen- 
sated cases. The average weekly compensation rate for other 
self-insurers is 9 percent higher than for carriers, but they 
offset this with an 18 percent lower average duration; so the 
result is lower weekly indemnity costs. For lump-sum cases, 
they experience both a lower incidence and a lower average 
payment, yielding a substantial advantage in lump-sum pay 
ment costs. Summing all these elements, self-insurers other 
than the big three realize an average total indemnity figure 
that is 20 percent lower than both the carrier and the big 
three auto producer level.
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NOTES
1. Inflating the samples to represent one year's cohort of closed cases 
was judged to be potentially misleading to the reader.
2. It might also be pointed out that the more inclusive the list of injuries, 
the greater the value of the redemption to the insurer since it prevents 
future claims for these same disabilities under terms of the redemption 
agreement.
3. The problem derives predominantly from the wage-loss philosophy of 
the Michigan statute. Since benefits are normally to be paid as long as 
wage loss continues, there is no need to create a categorization of 
disabilities as permanent or temporary. This will only become clear as 
time passes and wage loss continues or comes to an end.
4. Michigan Statistical Abstract, 14th Edition, 1979, pp. 286-87.
5. There is a fuller discussion of benefit payments in chapter 4.
6. For 1978, minimum benefits for full-time workers (more than 25 
hours per week) ranged from $105 per week with no dependents to $120 
with five or more dependents. Maximum benefits varied from $142 per 
week with no dependents to $171 with five or more. Similar ranges apply 
to the cases originating in the other injury years represented in table 2-12.
7. There is a full discussion of this issue in chapter 4.
8. Of course, the chi-square test is not a test of differences between 
means, but rather of the overall distribution as represented in the con 
tingency table.
9. This procedure is the same one used in chapter 1 when comparing the 
MCCS to the NCCI Michigan Special Call sample.
LITIGATION
Introduction
As the term is used here, "litigation" refers to the filing of 
a formal, written request for a hearing with the Bureau of 
Workers' Disability Compensation. l It does not presume any 
outcome since many litigated cases do not even come to a 
hearing; 22 percent are withdrawn. So for the purposes of 
this discussion, "litigated" refers to the administrative treat 
ment accorded the case, not to any particular resolution of 
the dispute. This chapter will examine the correlates of litiga 
tion in the Michigan workers' compensation system as 
revealed in the Michigan Closed Case Survey. The analysis 
will use the weighted sample so as to preserve the correct 
relationship between litigated and unlitigated cases in the 
population of workers' compensation cases.
In Michigan, litigated cases have come to form a "second 
system" of workers' compensation, which operates with en 
tirely different procedures on very different types of claims. 
This examination of litigation in Michigan will prove to be 
frustrating because of the poor quality of information 
available. It will be necessary repeatedly to qualify factual 
statements, particularly involving litigated cases, due to the 
sources of the data. In most instances, all of the information 
available about a litigated case is the product of the litigation
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process. As such, it is intensely adversarial and of dubious 
validity.
Most litigated workers' compensation cases in Michigan 
enter the system with an attorney attached and no previous 
notice to the employer. It would be less common for a 
disability claim to "move over" to the litigated track because 
a dispute develops in the course of compensation. Most 
litigated cases end with a lump-sum redemption payment, 
i.e., a compromise and release agreement. It seems obvious 
in many cases that this was the objective all along. Thus the 
picture that emerges is of a weekly benefit system operating 
under the wage-loss principle for one set of claims, and a 
lump-sum compromise system operating informally as an 
impairment rating system for another set of claims. The lack 
of information about the basis for compensation in the latter 
cases prevents a clear judgment as to the adequacy or equity 
of the settlements. It also makes the description of those 
cases both difficult and unsatisfying. Nonetheless, it is im 
portant to make the attempt, even if the major result is to 
demonstrate how much is not known rather than how much 
is known.
First, a number of tables of bivariate results will be 
presented. These will examine the association of each of a 
number of case or claimant characteristics with the 
likelihood of litigation. This section will conclude with a 
multivariate analysis of the probability of litigation. The 
same basic variables used in the tabular analysis will all be 
considered simultaneously. The linear probability regression 
analysis will make possible the assessment of the impact of 
each variable on the likelihood of litigation, holding the 
other factors constant. This procedure, while suffering from 
some well-known technical flaws, reduces the errors 
associated with bivariate analysis when explanatory variables 
are intercorrelated.
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In addition, a general description of the litigated case 
population will be presented. This is over and above the 
comparative picture of litigated cases that emerges from the 
discussion of the correlates of litigation. The first objective 
of the chapter is to make clear which cases are litigated. This 
analysis will then provide the setting for the description of 
the litigated case population as it is represented in the 
Michigan Closed Case Survey.
The Likelihood of Litigation
The first table is actually a repeat of table 2-1, except the 
focus is in the other direction. In chapter 2 the emphasis was 
on analysis of general case characteristics by insurer type; 
one of those characteristics was litigation status. Here the 
emphasis is on analysis of the likelihood of litigation, and 
one of the important correlates of litigation is insurer type 
(table 3-1). As discussed earlier, there are very significant 
differences in the likelihood of litigation among the different 
insurer types. The big three auto producers have a litigation 
rate that is more than double that of other self-insurers or 
the carrier sector.
It is important to point out that this does not necessarily 
prove the auto industry employers are more likely than 
others to contest a claim of given quality. It simply means 
that the frequency of claims that involve an application for 
hearing relative to those that do not is much higher for the 
auto industry. Since the overwhelming majority of applica 
tions for hearing are filed by claimants, this is more a 
description of the claims process in the auto industry than 
anything else. Nevertheless, it does produce a considerable 
administrative burden for the Bureau, inasmuch as all the 
litigation machinery is invoked with each new petition.
Table 3-2 presents the bivariate analysis of the association 
between the nature of the injury and the likelihood of litiga-
Table 3-1 














































Chi-square (unweighted) = 118.21** with 2 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.
Rows may not add to total due to rounding.
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Chi-square (unweighted) = 750.48** with 11 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.





tion. Normally one would say the effect of the nature of in 
jury on the likelihood of litigation, but the direction of 
causation is confused in this case. It has become the general 
practice to list as many injuries or impairments as possible in 
the belief that this increases the probability of an award, or 
perhaps the size of award. Thus, in a very real sense, the fact 
of litigation can affect the nature of injury claimed. This is 
particularly clear in the case of the coded category "multiple 
injuries" in table 3-2. If the multiple injuries are claimed 
because the case is being litigated rather than vice versa, the 
normal direction of causation is reversed. Thus it would not 
be proper to say that multiple injury claims are more likely to 
be resisted by insurers.
The same effect is evident in table 3-3, Injured Part of 
Body by Litigation Status. The parallel to multiple injuries is 
multiple parts of the body. The category "body system" is 
also strongly correlated with litigation. This fact reflects a 
reporting anomaly for occupational diseases in the Michigan 
system. Since the Petition for Hearing form filed by the clai 
mant allows for the separate listing of a disablement due to 
occupational disease, this tends to be claimed as well. Again, 
this is a consequence of the adversary process, and not 
necessarily an unbiased assessment of the nature of the 
disabling condition. There is no unbiased review of the 
asserted facts before the hearing. For this reason, it is really 
not possible to accurately determine the incidence of occupa 
tional disease among Michigan's workers' compensation 
cases.
It is also impossible to determine the actual basis for the 
claim in most litigated cases in the MCCS. A review of the 
administrative record of the case, especially for redemptions 
where no transcript of the hearing is available, does not con 
vey an adequate understanding of the basis for the decision. 
Thus the results in tables 3-2 and 3-3 must be treated very 
cautiously. While the chi-square statistics indicate great
Table 3-3 




































































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 798.81** with 10 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.




statistical significance of the results, this is at least partially 
an artifact of the measurement of the actual characteristics 
of the case. All of the evidence available on some cases is 
generated by the adversarial litigation process itself, and this 
clearly affects the reporting of the "facts" in the case. Un 
fortunately, there is no way around this problem.
This measurement problem is also reflected in table 3-4 
which reports the litigated proportions according to whether 
the claimant had been hospitalized in connection with the in 
jury or illness. Over 90 percent of the cases where it could 
not be determined whether hospitalization had occurred 
were litigated cases. Among the cases where a determination 
could be made, table 3-4 indicates that when hospitalization 
occurred, the chance of litigation was higher. Regrettably, it 
cannot be reliably determined in which cases the insurer paid 
the cost of hospitalization, either through workers' compen 
sation benefits or general health insurance programs. No 
case by case accounting for medical benefit payments is re 
quired by the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation. 
Thus it cannot be ascertained which hospitalizations are con 
nected with directly compensable disabilities and which are 
connected with general conditions later determined, through 
the adversary process, to be compensable.
Table 3-5 indicates that the likelihood of litigation is in 
versely related to the reported weekly earnings. However, 
this is partly due to the closed case sampling design, combin 
ed with the long litigation delays in the Michigan system. The 
reported weekly earnings at the time of the injury will be 
lower for litigated cases simply because they are one to two 
years older at the time of closure, due solely to the litigation 
proceedings. Again in this instance, the fact that the null 
hypothesis of equality in earnings can be rejected is not a 
very meaningful result.
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Chi-square (unweighted) = 501.72** with 2 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.
Rows may not add to total due to rounding.
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Chi-square (unweighted) = 62.34** with 5 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.




There is more certainty about the numbers presented in 
table 3-6. They show the proportion litigated according to 
the geographic origin of the claim; the litigiousness of 
Detroit is readily apparent. In chapter 2 it was pointed out 
that Detroit cases made up 55 percent of all Michigan 
workers' compensation cases. But among litigated cases, 
Detroit accounts for over 70 percent. This results from a 36.6 
percent litigation rate among Detroit area cases, compared 
to 22.2 percent for the balance of the state. The least litigious 
areas according to table 3-6 are Muskegon, Kalamazoo- 
Portage, Grand Rapids, and Lansing. All experience litiga 
tion rates under 15 percent. The chi-square statistic shows 
that the sample evidence is strong enough to reject the 
hypothesis of no difference in likelihood of litigation among 
locations.
Turning to claimant characteristics, table 3-7 reveals that 
females appear to have a marginally higher litigation propor 
tion. But the chi-square statistic is not significant; meaning 
that the hypothesis of equality cannot be rejected. Table 3-8 
demonstrates that age of the claimant, however, is 
significantly correlated with the likelihood of litigation. The 
age distributions of claimants in litigated and unlitigated 
cases are markedly different, with the probability of litiga 
tion rising after age 50. This represents the effect of the 
"retiree problem" in Michigan workers' compensation. It 
may also reflect the incidence of occupational disease which 
tends to rise with age.
While the Michigan system is ostensibly a wage-loss 
system, claims from retirees have long been a serious prob 
lem. Virtually all retiree claims are redeemed, i.e., settled by 
compromise and release. Some allege that most of them are 
paid because of their "nuisance value"; it is cheaper to pay a 
few thousand dollars to redeem the case than to incur the 
cost of effectively defending against the claim. The redemp 
tion has the added value from the insurer's point of view of
Table 3-6 




































































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 90.55** with 10 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.










































Chi-square (unweighted) = 0.60 with 1 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.





































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 229.73** with 5 degrees of freedom.
Unlitigated cases are inflated by a factor of 3.583 to compensate for the smaller sampling ratio in the unlitigated sample.




forestalling any additional claim from the individual involv 
ed, providing the language describing the injury is sufficient 
ly broad to encompass any possible compensable injury.
For the litigated closed case sample, an attempt was made 
to determine the retirement status of the claimant from the 
information contained in the official case file. The coders, 
all experienced former Bureau of Workers' Disability Com 
pensation employees, found they were able to make a 
reasonably certain determination in about three-fourths of 
all litigated cases. The remainder were recorded as unknown. 
Table 3-9 shows that at least one-fourth of the litigated cases 
definitely did involve a retired claimant. If one assumes that 
the unknown category can be divided between retired and 
nonretired workers according to the proportions in the rest 
of the sample, the proportion of retirees rises to 35 percent.
The table also reveals very significant differences by in 
surer type. A minimum of 42 percent of litigated big three 
cases are from retirees (it would be 53 percent under the same 
allocative assumption about the unknowns). On the other 
hand, only 14 percent of litigated carrier claimants are 
retired (rising to 20 percent with allocation of unknowns). 
This means that the auto industry has up to three times the 
relative incidence of retiree claims. The other self-insurer 
group falls in between with an estimated range of 29 to 40 
percent retiree claims. So the evidence in the MCCS suggests 
that 40 to 50 percent of litigated claims in the auto industry, 
30 to 40 percent of litigated claims from other self-insurers, 
and 15 to 20 percent of litigated carrier claims are from 
retired employees.
Table 3-10 suggests that the results are similar for total in 
demnity costs. Approximately $9 million in indemnity was 
paid to the 1,224 litigated cases in the sample over the active 
span of those cases, i.e., before closure. At least one-fourth 
of this was paid to retirees; perhaps as much as one-third.
Table 3-9 























































Chi-square (unweighted) = 89.09** with 4 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to founding.
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For carriers, the range is again about 15 to 20 percent; for 
the big three, 50 to 60 percent; and for other self-insurers, 
from 33 to 45 percent.
Of course, these indemnity amounts would be less when 
expressed as a proportion of all indemnity, not just that paid 
to litigated cases. Using the minimum proportions from 
table 3-9, payments to retirees represent at least 18 percent of 
all indemnity payments reported in the MCCS. This propor 
tion ranges from a low of 10 percent for carriers to a high of 
40 percent for the big three. Other self-insurers as a group 
pay roughly 20 percent of their indemnity dollars to retired 
claimants.
Table 3-11 shows that these litigated retiree claims are 
almost all redeemed. Less than 4 percent are resolved in 
some other manner. This contrasts with about 65 percent 
redeemed among those litigated cases where the claimant 
could not definitely be identified as a retiree. Retirees are 
receiving at least 28 percent of all lump-sum payments to 
Michigan workers' compensation claimants.
These numbers are very striking; but they do tend to 
overstate the magnitude of the retiree problem somewhat 
because of the bias of the closed case design. Lump-sum 
payments will be fully valued in the present as they are com 
mitted. The nature of the closed case design means that the 
long term weekly benefit cases will be both underestimated in 
number and undervalued in cost. Thus the current lump-sum 
payments to retirees are overvalued relative to the total in 
demnity base. The size of this bias is unclear, but it is worth 
noting that it should be offset to some degree by the opposite 
bias produced by the difficulty of actually identifying 
retirees in workers' compensation cases. Nevertheless, the 
evidence from the closed case sample is sufficient to 
demonstrate that payments to retirees are a very important 
factor in Michigan workers' compensation.
Table 3-11














































































Chi-square= 146.8** with 8 degrees of freedom. 
Rows may not add to total due to rounding.
00-J
88 Litigation
Redemption payments to retirees are of interest because of 
their clear conflict with the wage-loss philosophy of compen 
sation. The major principle of wage loss is that income 
maintenance payments shall be made as long as wage loss 
continues. This can be contrasted with, an impairment 
philosophy where injured workers are compensated for the 
injury itself as well as, or instead of, the loss of wages atten 
dant upon the injury. In the case of a voluntarily retired 
claimant, it would seem fairly obvious that no wage loss is 
being suffered even though there may be an impairment of 
some kind. This is one reason for the assertion that the litiga 
tion system in Michigan can be regarded as a second 
workers' compensation system.
Multivariate Analysis
Table 3-12 presents the multivariate analysis of the cor 
relates of litigation. It reports the result of a simple linear 
probability regression with a dichotomous dependent 
variable, whether the case was litigated or it was not. The in 
dependent or explanatory variables are the same ones 
discussed in the tabular results above, with a few exceptions. 
The goal is to estimate the impact of each characteristic on 
the likelihood of litigation, holding all other factors included 
in the model constant.
In those instances where the independent variable is 
categorical, the linear probability regression measures the 
marginal impact of the presence of the characteristic as com 
pared to the alternative state of the world, namely the 
absence of the characteristic. Where the categories would ex 
haust all the alternatives, one category has been omitted and 
serves as the reference group. For insurer type, carriers are 
the omitted group and the marginal impact of the big three 
or other self-insurer is measured against that of carriers.
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Table 3-12
Probability of Litigation 
Linear Probability Regression
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Ordinary least squares estimation with a dichotomous 
dependent variable is known to produce heteroscedastic er 
ror terms. The estimates are unbiased, but not efficient. 2 
That is, the estimated coefficients are accurate, but the stan 
dard errors of those coefficients are biased upward. This 
means that the standard t-test of statistical significance of 
the coefficients is made more difficult; it is possible that 
statistically significant results will be incorrectly judged to be 
insignificant.
In the present application, this flaw was not judged to be 
serious enough to mandate the use of nonlinear techniques. 
The interest here is in a broad assessment of the association 
of various case and claimant characteristics with the fact of 
litigation. Linear probability is sufficient for that purpose, 
even though it is not the optimal estimation procedure in this 
situation. It is possible that some weak relationships will be 
judged to be insignificant as a result, but in the face of the 
measurement problems and causation problems discussed 
earlier, this is not too serious.
The regression was performed on a weighted sample of 
MCCS cases, but in this instance the weights are not the 
same as employed earlier. Here it is critical that the total 
number of actual observations not be overstated. This would 
make the overall regression appear more significant than is 
warranted. So the weights are chosen to make the total 
number of observations coincide with the actual, while at the 
same time preserving the relation between litigated and 
unlitigated cases. This necessitated weighting each 
unlitigated case by a factor of 1.680 and each litigated case 
by .469. The result is a weighted sample of 574 litigated and 
1,603 unlitigated cases. The litigated case population is 
thereby kept to 26 percent of the total, and the total number 
of weighted cases is held to 2,177 (actual was 2,178).
The left-hand column in table 3-12 reports the sample 
mean for each variable. In the case of dichotomous variables
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such as Detroit, where the variable takes on the value 1 if the 
claim is from Detroit and 0 otherwise, this mean is the pro 
portion of cases in the sample that have the characteristic. 
For Detroit the mean is .507, which indicates that just over 
50 percent of the cases originate in Detroit. The regression 
coefficient (£) then reports the marginal impact of the 
presence of this characteristic on the probability that the case 
will be litigated.
One of the advantages of linear probability estimates is 
that the coefficients are readily interpreted in straight pro 
bability terms. Thus in table 3-12 the estimated coefficient 
for Detroit, listed first in the table, indicates that the pro 
bability of litigation for a claim which originates in Detroit is 
.101 higher than one originating elsewhere in the state, 
holding other factors constant. In other words, Detroit cases 
are 10 percent more likely to be litigated than cases from the 
balance of the state. Furthermore, the t-test indicates that it 
is possible to reject the null hypothesis that a Detroit origin is 
not correlated with the likelihood of litigation at a 99 percent 
level of confidence.
It is important to emphasize that the coefficient measures 
the marginal impact, i.e., holding all other factors included 
in the estimated equation constant. It was reported earlier in 
this chapter that 36.6 percent of Detroit cases were litigated 
while only 22.2 percent of other cases were; implying that 
Detroit cases are 14.4 percent more likely to be litigated. This 
is a gross difference, however, and it does not hold any other 
factors constant. The measurement reported in table 3-12 is 
an estimate of the marginal or net impact of Detroit origin 
on litigation likelihood. It is lower than the gross because 
Detroit claimants are more likely to have other 
characteristics associated with litigation, e.g., work in the 
auto industry.
Similar observations can be made about the impact of the 
next variable in table 3-12, the big three. The estimated equa-
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tion indicates that cases from the big three have a probability 
of litigation that is .075 higher than those where a carrier 
handles the coverage (the omitted category). On the other 
hand, the coefficient for other self-insurers indicates that 
they are less likely (by .058) to experience litigation than are 
the carriers. In both instances these are marginal results, 
holding the other factors in the regression equation constant, 
and in both cases the null hypothesis of no relationship can 
be rejected by conventional statistical standards. The result 
for the big three means that the earlier results reported in 
table 3-1 seriously overstated the impact of the big three on 
the likelihood of litigation. Only about one-third of the gross 
difference shown in table 3-1 was actually due to the insurer 
type. The other two-thirds was due to other factors, such as 
the greater incidence of retiree claims.
The next variable is designed to measure interaction be 
tween location and insurer. It tests for the possibility that 
there is a synergistic, or interactive, litigation effect on a 
claim from the big three that originates in the Detroit area. 
The hypothesis is that the presence of both these factors 
leads to a higher tendency to litigate than the simple sum of 
the previous coefficients. This variable takes the value 1 if 
the claim is from the Detroit area and is against one of the 
big three auto producers and 0 otherwise. The mean value at 
the left indicates that 11.4 percent of all closed cases do share 
these two characteristics. But the coefficient for this variable 
is not significantly different from zero, which indicates that 
the hypothesis of interaction can be rejected.
The variable labeled "Age 55 or over" serves as a proxy 
for the retiree issue. Since retirement status was not gathered 
for the unlitigated cases, it was necessary to approximate this 
variable. Age 55 was chosen as the lower terminus of the 
"early" retirement age group. Clearly, this amounts to a 
dilution of the influence of retired status since there are 
many active workers between ages 55 and 65. However, due
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to the "30 years and out'* possibility in the auto industry, 
there are a fairly significant number of retirements that oc 
cur in the mid to late 50s.
The coefficient for age 55 or over indicates that this age 
group has a rate of litigation that is about 10 percent higher 
than for younger workers. Even measured as imperfectly as 
it is, this factor appears to be as important as a Detroit origin 
in producing litigation. It is relatively more influential than 
being employed in the auto industry, at least as estimated in 
this equation. In addition, there is another interaction term 
in the equation which tests whether there is a synergistic ef 
fect between the big three and older workers. In other words, 
is the probability of litigation even higher when the claimant 
is an older auto worker? The results in table 3-12 do not con 
firm this. While the coefficient appears to be positive, the 
t-test shows that it is not significantly different from zero. 
Thus the interaction hypothesis has to be rejected. These 
results reinforce those presented earlier in this chapter. Older 
workers are much more likely to be involved in litigated 
claims. One can only speculate that if retirement status were 
more adequately measured, the relationship would be even 
stronger than revealed here.
The last variable in the group of background variables is 
the gender of the claimant. The female variable measures the 
differential probability of litigation as a correlate of the sex 
of the claimant. Table 3-12 reveals that there is no significant 
difference between men (the omitted category) and women in 
terms of litigation of workers' compensation claims.
The second group of independent variables refers directly 
to the workers' compensation case itself rather than to the 
claimant or the insurer. In a sense, these variables attempt to 
measure the elements of the claim that are associated with an 
elevated tendency to litigate. The first of these is the level of 
indemnity payments for the claim. Since the sample is com-
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posed of closed cases, the indemnity cost is known with cer 
tainty, subject only to the possibility of reopening at some 
future date. The level of indemnity is measured in units of 
one thousand dollars, so the estimated coefficient indicates 
that for each thousand dollars of indemnity paid, the pro 
bability of litigation increases by .024. The t-statistic in 
dicates that it is possible to reject the hypothesis of no rela 
tionship between the likelihood of litigation and the level of 
indemnity paid.
What the t-statistic cannot do is indicate the direction of 
causation. One can say that there is a relationship, it is not 
possible to say in which direction the causation flows. 3 In 
particular, it may well be that the process of litigation itself 
contributes to the level of indemnity. On the other hand, the 
litigation may be a normal outgrowth of the complications 
attending the more serious disability claims. Then one would 
find a relationship between the level of indemnity and litiga 
tion, even though they both are consequences of the 
seriousness of the disability. In the next chapter, multivariate 
results on the determinants of indemnity will be presented, 
but this issue of causation will still not be firmly laid to rest 
because of the general lack of unbiased information about 
litigated cases. One conclusion, however, is firm; there is a 
positive relationship between the amount of indemnity paid 
and the probability of litigation in Michigan's workers' com 
pensation system.
The variable for "multiple spells" represents an attempt 
to try to control for the difficult cases. This dichotomous 
variable takes the value 1 if there was more than one distinct 
period of disability associated with the claim. It should be 
noted that this includes the possibilities of a reinjury or an 
aggravation of a pre-existing injury, as well as a relapse or 
premature return to work. This variable is also subject to 
measurement problems in that it is possible that dubious 
litigated claims show a tendency to cite earlier periods of
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disability to increase the credibility of the claim. This could 
be analogous to the measurement problems with the nature 
of injury discussed earlier. A somewhat surprising propor 
tion of all closed cases do report more than one period of 
disability—over 5 percent according to table 3-12. However, 
this factor is not significantly related to the probability of 
litigation; the hypothesis of no relationship cannot be re 
jected in this case.
The rest of the independent variables relate to the asserted 
cause of the claim, the specific injury or illness that produced 
the disability. For litigated cases, this information comes 
from the claimant, generally with the assistance of an at 
torney. For unlitigated cases, the information comes from 
the employer. It is very clear that the nature of the injury and 
part of body reported in litigated cases are designed to in 
fluence the outcome of th litigation process. Thus the 
measurement problems complicate the interpretation of 
these results; it is once again prudent to emphasize associa 
tion rather than causation in this discussion.
According to the estimated linear probability regression 
equation reported in table 3-12, fatality claims are 
significantly more likely to be litigated than are non-fatality 
cases. While the mean indicates that only about 1 percent of 
all claims are for fatalities, the estimated coefficient shows 
that they are much more likely to be litigated. In fact, this 
coefficient is the largest discussed so far; a fatality claim in 
creases the likelihood of litigation by .169. Presumably these 
disputes are over the question of work-relatedness of the 
fatality. It will be shown later that most of these cases are 
settled with lump-sum payments.
The next six variables refer to the nature of injury 
categories reported earlier in table 3-2. The three categories 
with the highest litigation tendency (multiple injuries, other 
injuries, and inflammation of joints) and the three with the
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lowest (burns, cuts, and fractures) from that table are 
entered as dichotomous variables. In each instance the 
estimated coefficient measures the marginal contribution of 
that injury type to the probability of litigation. The com 
parison group consists of the omitted categories (amputa 
tion, bruise, dislocation, hernia, sprain or strain, and 
unclassified). It can be seen in table 3-12 that the burn, cut, 
and fracture categories all are associated with reduced pro 
bability of litigation. Inflammation of joints is not signifi 
cant, the hypothesis of no relationship cannot be rejected. 
Other injuries are positively correlated with litigation. All 
these coefficients are in the 5 to 10 percent range, a mean 
ingful level of association but smaller than those discussed 
heretofore.
The coefficient for multiple injuries, on the other hand, is 
very large. Table 3-12 indicates that a claim of multiple in 
juries is associated with an increase of .336 in the probability 
of litigation. This reflects the now familiar problem of the 
dependence of the observations of litigated cases on the 
litigation process itself. There is a high correlation between 
claiming multiple injuries and litigation because that is the 
way it is done in Michigan. Thus it may be not so much that 
multiple injuries lead to a contested claim as it is that a 
litigated claim asserts multiple injuries to increase the chance 
of a settlement.
The same is true of the remaining variables in the regres 
sion that refer to the part of the body involved in the injury 
or disease. Multiple body parts and body system involvement 
are almost synonymous with litigated claims in Michigan; 
the direction of causation is unclear here as well. "Back in 
juries" are also reported in table 3-12 to be correlated with 
an elevated probability of litigation. Back injuries were the 
single largest group in table 3-3 presented earlier. Here it is 
shown that an injury to the back is associated with an in 
crease of .112 in the probability of litigation. This result is
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apart from the tendency for back injuries to also be included 
among the multiple injury and multiple parts of the body. It 
is perhaps to be expected that there would be a greater 
tendency for litigation in back injuries because of the dif 
ficulty of establishing the fact of disability objectively.
In summary, it has been demonstrated here that a claim of 
multiple injuries is very strongly correlated with litigation in 
workers' compensation cases. But this may be more a conse 
quence of litigation than a precipitator of litigation. There is 
a certain stylized way of pursuing a redemption settlement in 
Michigan, and the claim of multiple injuries is a part of it. 
The same holds true for an injury involving an entire body 
system, since this covers the circulatory system (heart cases), 
the respiratory system (lung cases) and other occupational 
disease claims. Again, it has become conventional to claim 
these kinds of involvements in litigated claims.
In a more productive sense, it has been determined that 
fatalities are more prone to litigation than other cases; that 
Detroit claims are more likely to be litigated, as are those 
originating from claimants 55 or more years of age, and 
those from employees of the big three auto producers. 
Higher indemnity levels are associated with greater litigation 
probability and so are back injuries. On the other hand, 
straightforward injuries like burns, cuts, and fractures are 
less likely to lead to litigation. It was also shown that self- 
insurers other than the big three are significantly less likely to 
be involved in litigated cases.
Having described to the limits of the data base which cases 
are likely to be litigated, attention will turn now to a descrip 
tion of the litigated cases as a group.
The Litigation Process
This section will address the origin of litigated cases and 
some of their administrative characteristics. Questions such
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as who initiated the litigation, how many insurers and 
employers were involved, what sorts of injuries were claim 
ed, and what was the outcome of the litigation will be 
covered. The major benefit delivery issues, namely the 
amount of indemnity paid, in what form, and when it was 
paid will be deferred until the next chapter. For the re 
mainder of this chapter, the discussion will relate only to 
litigated cases. As before, the major discriminating variable 
will be the type of insurer.
Table 3-13 shows that almost all litigated cases 
"originate" with a petition from the employee. This does 
not mean that the employer has no role in precipitating 
disputes; the employer may reject the claim and then wait for 
the employee to take the initiative in pressing his or her claim 
further. The other category of table 3-13 that contains a 
significant number of cases, agreement to redeem, represents 
a slightly different approach. In these cases the parties have 
already come to an agreement on a compromise and release 
settlement. However, since the Bureau of Workers' Disabili 
ty Compensation must approve all redemptions, this agree 
ment requires a hearing and approval before it can take ef 
fect.
The question of the employer's knowledge and anticipa 
tion of litigated claims is a difficult one, especially with 
retired claimants. It is asserted by employers in Michigan 
that many litigated claims appear "out of the blue," and 
that in some cases it is a major challenge just to discover 
whether the claimant was ever an employee or not. Table 
3-14 lends some credence to these assertions. In Michigan, 
Form 100, Employer's Basic Report of Injury, is required 
for all injuries, including diseases, which arise out of and in 
the course of the employment and cause (1) an aggregate of 
seven or more days of disability; (2) death; or (3) specific 
losses as enumerated in the statute. This requirement is 
designed to insure that the Bureau is informed of every com-
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Chi-square (unweighted) = 20.08** with 8 degrees of freedom. 





pensable accident or illness. In the event that no subsequent 
report of compensation is received, the Bureau inquires as to 
the reason.
Table 3-14 shows that in the majority of litigated cases, 
Form 100 was never filed. Approximately 64 percent of car 
rier, 74 percent of other self-insurer, and 80 percent of big 
three litigated cases do not contain the Employer's Basic 
Report of Injury in the official case file. These numbers pro 
bably overstate the fact to some degree, since it is reasonable 
to suppose that mistakes in filing are made. This is especially 
true given the sketchy information about earlier injuries 
sometimes offered in an employee's Petition for Hearing. 
However, it does seem clear that the majority of litigated 
claims have not been previously reported to the Bureau.
There is no other way of determining what the employer's 
knowledge of the situation may have been before being serv 
ed with the Petition for Hearing. But the employer does have 
one powerful motive to report any incidents. In Michigan, 
the statute of limitations for workers' compensation cases 
does not begin to toll until the accident is reported to the 
Bureau. If an employer knows of an incident which might 
lead to a claim, it is in his or her interest to report it. Thus it 
seems reasonable to conclude that many of these claims do 
come as a surprise to the employer when no Form 100 has 
been filed.
This conclusion is further buttressed by table 3-15 which 
shows that in over 80 percent of litigated cases, the dispute 
comes first. That is, there are no weekly compensation 
benefits paid before the initiation of the litigation process. 
The litigated cases are not those where a dispute develops 
over the long-run consequences of a clearly disabling injury; 
they seem rather to be cases where the dispute is over 
whether there is any disablement at all, or over the cause of 
that disablement. In a sense, the dispute is over whether
Table 3-14 
Form 100 Status by Insurer Type
Insurer type
Form 100 status Total
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Chi-square (unweighted) = 49.48** with 8 degrees of freedom.






















































Chi-square (unweighted) = 53.80** with 2 degrees of freedom. 





there is a legitimate claim. Table 3-15 shows that this is even 
more true of the auto industry.
On the other hand, these claims sometimes are inherently 
complicated. Table 3-16 reports that about 10 percent of 
litigated claims involve multiple insurers, multiple 
employers, or both. These cases are naturally going to be 
more difficult because of the extra factual questions in 
troduced by the multiple liability possibility. In addition, 
table 3-17 shows that about one-fourth of the litigated cases 
involve more than one injury date. This too would con 
tribute to the potential for dispute as the facts are clouded by 
multiple causation or reinjury issues. The chi-square statistic 
indicates that these experiences are similar for all three in 
surer types.
Table 3-16

























Table 3-18, however, demonstrates that when the number 
of injuries is added to the table, the results are changed 
materially. Apparently the self-insurers experience a larger 
number of claimed injuries even though these do not occur 
on separate dates. A narrow majority of litigated cases for
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Chi-square (unweighted) = 3.18 with 4 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
Table 3-18 
Number of Injuries and Injury Dates by Insurer Type
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Two injuries, one date
Two injuries, two dates











































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 31.67** with 12 degrees of freedom. 




both the big three and other self-insurers involve either 
multiple injuries or multiple injury dates. Of course these 
results reflect the data gathering process, and they do 
substantially understate the actual number of injuries men 
tioned by the claimant on the Petition for Hearing. The 
figures reported here represent the best judgment of the 
coders as to what actual injury lay behind the claim. 
Therefore, they stand somewhere between established fact 
and simple transmittal of claimant assertions. As was 
discussed earlier, there is no way to review litigated cases in 
Michigan more adequately using official records. The exact 
nature of the injury, being the primary basis of contention, 
remains obscured by the litigation process.
Table 3-19 reports, for the same injuries tabulated in 
tables 3-17 and 3-18, the type of injury claimed, whether per 
sonal injury or occupational disease. This categorization is 
provided by the claimant and may be subject to some ques 
tion, since no review is conducted. The Petition for Hearing 
form provides separate lines for entering the date of occur 
rence of personal injury or occupational disease, and it is 
likely that this tends to elicit more occupational disease 
claims than would be forthcoming under other cir 
cumstances. Inasmuch as the line is on the form, some 
claimants probably are motivated to fill it in with the hope of 
increasing the likelihood of an award or compromise settle 
ment.
Analysis of the type of injury claimed, however, does 
show that about one-fourth of all litigated cases involve 
purely occupational disease claims. A total of nearly 60 per 
cent claim to suffer some occupational disease, while just 
over 40 percent claim personal injuries only. Furthermore, 
there are rather striking differences by insurer type. The pro 
portion of occupational disease claims is much higher among 
the self-insured population. Over 70 percent of the big three 
cases and over 60 percent of other self-insurer cases involve
Table 349 
























































Chi-square (unweighted) = 65.10** with 4 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
%
108 Litigation
some claim of occupational disease, compared to about 50 
percent of carrier cases.
While it is possible that self-insurers do experience higher 
rates of occupational diseases, it is more likely that their 
employees simply claim more occupational diseases. This 
could be either because they have better sources of informa 
tion about occupational diseases, or because they perceive 
that this strategy increases the likelihood of a successful 
claim. It will be shown later that the method of resolution of 
litigated cases is also associated with the type of claim. Those 
claims that allege some occupational disease are much more 
likely to be redeemed than those that involve personal in 
juries only.
One element of litigated cases that is concrete is the timing 
of the injury or injuries claimed. Table 3-20 shows the year 
of the last reported injury for this sample of closed litigated 
cases. A majority of the cases had a last reported injury in 
1976 or 1977. But the most interesting feature of table 3-20 is 
the tail of the distribution. Nearly 45 percent of these cases 
closed in late 1978 reported that the last injury occurred in 
1975 or earlier. Nor does this reflect a long period of weekly 
benefit payments before closure; most of these cases had 
their hearings during 1978, primarily in July and August. 
This table offers some insight into the magnitude of the 
delays attendant upon the litigation process in Michigan. 
This subject will be covered in more detail in the next 
chapter. For the purpose of describing the litigated case 
population in Michigan, it is sufficient to point out that these 
cases and the injuries involved in them are old when they are 
adjudicated and even older when they are closed.
Table 3-21 demonstrates that not all litigated cases actual 
ly come to a hearing. In fact, nearly 22 percent of the closed 
cases in the MCCS sample did not. The categories in table 
3-21 need some explanation for an understanding of the
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Column may not add to total due to Founding.
litigation process in Michigan. The "claim accepted" cases 
are those where the insurer decided to begin weekly 
payments to the claimant before the actual date of the hear 
ing, thus validating the claim. This could be due to the 
emergence of evidence during the preparation for hearing, 
the arguments of the claimant's attorney at the pre-trial con 
ference, a change in the circumstances of the case, or the in 
tervention of the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensa 
tion. Through this route some 3.4 percent of litigated cases 
essentially revert to unlitigated status and receive the benefits 
they would have been entitled to in the first place.
An additional group of 5.2 percent of cases are "dismiss 
ed" for lack of prosecution or various technical flaws. Most 
of these are cases where the claimant, or the claimant's at-
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Chi-square (unweighted) = 6.81 with 6 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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torney, does not show up or fails to respond at one of the re 
quired administrative stages in the litigation process. These 
cases essentially are dropouts from the litigation system and, 
presumably, are not seen again. The "withdrawn" category 
is somewhat different in that the petitioner, usually the 
employee, decides to terminate the litigation procedure 
before it comes to a hearing. Some of these cases will find 
their way back into the system again at some future date. 
Thus calling these cases "closed" may be somewhat 
premature.
Table 3-22 shows the outcome for the 78 percent of 
litigated cases that do come to a hearing. More than 90 per 
cent of the hearings for the cases in this sample were redemp 
tion hearings, and 99 percent of these were approved (831 
out of 837). It is obvious that the typical compensated 
litigated case is a lump-sum redemption. This is the basis of 
the judgment that Michigan really operates a two-tiered 
workers' compensation system. The wage-loss principle 
organizes the unlitigated system, while the litigated system is 
dominated by compromise and release settlements.
The other outcomes identified in table 3-22 generally in 
volve weekly benefit payments rather than lump-sums. The 
"benefits awarded" and "benefits denied" categories repre 
sent the hearing officers' decisions in cases that are litigated 
to conclusion. According to the MCCS, about 3.1 percent 
and 1.4 percent, respectively, of litigated cases fall into these 
categories. 4
Another 1.4 percent of litigated cases are "accepted" by 
the insurer during the hearing itself. This is in addition to the 
3.4 percent accepted prior to the hearing. Thus about 5 per 
cent of all litigated cases are finally accepted by the insurer. 
There is also a small group of about 2 percent of litigated 
cases that are labeled "stipulations." These are basically 
judges' awards that the parties have jointly agreed upon, 
therefore no appeal is to be expected in these cases. It is in-
Table 3-22 




































































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 18.76 with 14 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to founding.
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teresting to note that there is no statistically significant dif 
ference among the three insurer types in the outcomes of 
hearings in their litigated cases. This result was observed in 
table 3-21 as well. The conclusion is that while there are con 
siderable differences in the proportion of cases litigated, 
there are no significant differences in the types of outcomes 
observed for the three types of insurers.
This is borne out again in table 3-23, Appeal Status by In 
surer Type. Approximately 5 percent of all litigated cases are 
eventually appealed, with roughly an equal number of ap 
peals coming from the employees and the insurers. This table 
indicates that the likelihood of appeal is not related to the 
type of insurer. It also seriously understates the importance 
of the appeals process by relating the number of appeals to 
the total litigated case population. Table 3-24 reveals that 
most of the appeals come from cases involving judges' opi 
nions, as would be expected. Only about 2 percent of 
redemption settlements in the sample involved the appeals 
process (and of course the appeal could possibly have 
preceded the redemption). But over half of the judges' deci 
sions were appealed, with 24 percent appealed by the 
employee and 28 percent appealed by the insurer.
When the appeals results are presented in this way, the pic 
ture is very revealing. Only 5 percent of litigated cases are ap 
pealed, but these cases constitute 50 percent of the judges' 
decisions. This would seem to raise some serious questions 
about the adjudicative process in Michigan workers' com 
pensation. Ninety percent of the hearings are to approve 
redemptions. Only 1 percent of these are disapproved, so 
there is some question as to exactly what has been ac 
complished. Of the remaining 10 percent of the hearings, 
half are appealed anyway. This raises serious questions 
about the efficacy of the hearings procedure. It is difficult to 
see what has been gained by this administrative treatment, 
other than delay.
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Chi-square (unweighted) = 2.26 with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Chi-square = 347.03** with 8 degrees of freedom. 




The final element of this description of the litigation pro 
cess will be the method of resolution. In essence, this 
represents a summary version of tables 3-21 and 3-22 since it 
combines the outcomes, ignoring the question of whether a 
hearing actually took place. Table 3-25 indicates that about 
70 percent of all litigated cases end up as redemption set 
tlements. About 6 percent actually require a judge's opinion, 
either award or denial. Roughly 5 percent are accepted by the 
insurer somewhere along the litigation process; a similar 
number are dismissed by the law judge for various reasons. 
This leaves a group of about 13 percent of all litigated cases 
that are withdrawn by the petitioner before conclusion. 
While there are minor variations in these proportions among 
the insurer types, they are not significant. Therefore the con 
clusion, based on the evidence of the MCCS, is that the 
resolution of litigated cases does not vary across insurer 
types.
It does vary systematically with some other case 
characteristics, however. Table 3-26 shows that the method 
of resolution differs substantially with the type of injury. In 
particular, cases that involve claims of occupational disease, 
either alone or in concert with personal injury, have a 
markedly higher incidence of redemption settlements. 
Litigated cases that involve an occupational disease claim are 
redeemed nearly 80 percent of the time, whereas litigated 
personal injury cases are only redeemed about 60 percent of 
the time. Claims of occupational disease are also accepted by 
the insurer less often than are personal injury cases. Con- 
trarily, the number of "washouts" seems to be less in oc 
cupational disease claims. Table 3-26 reveals that over 25 
percent of personal injury cases are withdrawn or dismissed; 
this compares with only about 14 percent of cases alleging 
occupational disease. The reasons for these differences are 
not obvious, but it was shown in table 3-25 that there were 
no substantial differences by insurer type, so that factor does 
not offer a satisfactory explanation.
Table 3-25 









































































Chi-square (unweighted) = 9.35 with 8 degrees of freedom. 





















































































Chi-square = 62.84** with 8 degrees of freedom. 
Rows may not add to total due to Founding.
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Table 3-27 presents the results of another linear probabili 
ty regression analysis. This time the dependent variable is the 
conditional probability that a case is redeemed given that it is 
litigated. This regression equation was estimated on the 
litigated sample of 1,224 cases; no weighting was necessary 
in this instance. The list of independent variables is the same 
as used earlier in the chapter, except that the various injury 
categories are omitted. The occupational disease variable has 
been added as a replacement since the injury categories did 
not prove as useful in discriminating among litigated cases as 
they were in distinguishing litigated cases from unlitigated 
cases.
Table 3-27
Probability of Redemption for Litigated Cases 
Linear Probability Regression
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F(10, 1213) = 11.33**
R2 = .085
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There are only four coefficients in the estimated linear 
probability regression equation that are significantly dif 
ferent from zero. Claimants aged 55 and over appear to be 
13.5 percent more likely to be redeemed than their younger 
colleagues. Older auto workers (an interaction term) are an 
additional 14.2 percent more likely to be redeemed, over and 
above the contribution of age alone. Female claimants ap 
pear to be 6.3 percent more likely to be redeemed than male 
claimants. And litigated cases that involve some claim of oc 
cupational disease are 15.7 percent more likely to be redeem 
ed than if no occupational disease is claimed. As stated 
earlier, these four coefficients are significantly different 
from zero, but only these four. The insurer does not make a 
difference (as shown in table 3-25), Detroit origin does not 
make a difference, the number of earlier spells of disability 
does not make a difference, and fatalities do not show up as 
significantly different from other cases.
Perhaps the most interesting statistic in this instance is the 
coefficient of variation. The R2 statistic reported in table 
3-27 reveals that less than 9 percent of the variance in the 
probability of redemption is accounted for by the variables 
in the regression. Thus the most important conclusion of the 
regression analysis is that these factors are not very suc 
cessful in explaining the variation in outcome of litigated 
cases. In other words, they do not shed much light on the 
question of which cases are redeemed.
This review of litigation in Michigan's workers' compen 
sation system has proved to be somewhat mixed. The origins 
of litigated claims were described in some detail and 
specificity. Claims from the Detroit area, from auto 
workers, older workers, and those claims involving larger in 
demnity amounts were shown to be significantly more likely 
to be litigated. Fatalities and claims involving multiple in 
juries were also associated with litigation. Claims against
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self-insurers other than the big three and claims involving 
relatively straightforward injuries such as cuts, burns, and 
fractures were shown to be significantly less likely to be 
litigated.
The attempt to explain the outcome of litigation was less 
successful, however. Mostly this reflects the inadequate in 
formation available from the official record. It is clear that 
most litigated cases end up as redemptions. The fact that 
retiree claims and occupational disease claims are more likely 
to end up as redemptions is also of interest. The litigation 
process in Michigan's workers' compensation system ap 
pears from this review to function primarily as a forum for 
validating compromise and release agreements. Whether the 
resources devoted to this administrative system, or the delays 
introduced, are justified by these results seems to be a very 
relevant question in light of these findings.
NOTES
1. See chapter 1 for a fuller discussion of this procedure as it relates to 
the sampling design employed in this study.
2. D. R. Cox, Analysis of Binary Data (London: Methuen & Co., 1970), 
chapter 2. See also E. Malinvaud, Statistical Methods of Econometrics 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), pp. 254-8.
3. The specification implications of this question are rather unpleasant. 
However, in the descriptive spirit of this investigation, it does not seem 
appropriate to go beyond a simple analysis of variance approach to 
multivariate hypothesis testing.
4. But recall from chapter 1 that the MCCS sample is deficient in judges' 




This chapter will address two major questions; what is 
paid in indemnity benefits to workers' compensation 
claimants, and how soon is it paid? Thus the thrust of the 
chapter is the adequacy and timeliness of the income 
maintenance benefits paid to claimants in the Michigan Clos 
ed Case Survey samples.
As table 4-1 indicates, it will be appropriate to distinguish 
between the types of payment (weekly, lump-sum, both, or 
none) as well as the types of case (litigated or unlitigated) in 
this analysis. 1 For while unlitigated cases are only paid week 
ly benefits (except for occasional lump-sum advances), 
litigated cases show a very high incidence of lump-sum 
payments, as discussed in chapter 3. Obviously, lump-sum 
payments and weekly payments require different considera 
tion. In particular, it is not possible to calculate the propor 
tion of lost income replaced by a lump-sum payment unless 
one knows the specific term of income loss. Generally, in the 
lump-sum cases in the sample, this is not known.
It is also somewhat misleading to compare delays in pay 
ment for litigated cases and unlitigated cases. Of course, 
from the point of view of the injured worker, any litigation 


































































































































































cent of litigated claims are not compensated at all. 
Therefore, the process causing the delay did at least serve to 
separate the compensated from the uncompensated, even if 
this was primarily a claimant's decision. Whether the delay is 
worth it is a more difficult policy question, but at least it is 
clear that it is unfair to compare litigated and unlitigated 
cases in this regard.
One way in which litigated and unlitigated cases can be 
compared is in total dollars of indemnity received by the clai 
mant. Table 4-2 presents the distribution of indemnity 
payments by litigation status. It is obvious that these cases 
have very different outcomes. The average litigated case in 
the sample received nearly $6,000 in indemnity compared to 
less than $900 for the unlitigated. Further, this average in 
cludes the litigated cases that do not receive any indemnity at 
all. Excluding the uncompensated cases, the litigated average 
would be nearly $7,500.
As was discussed at great length in chapter 1, the distribu 
tion of indemnity for weekly payment cases is biased with a 
closed case sampling design. The long term weekly payment 
cases are derived from a smaller population than the short 
term ones. They are also characterized by the lower weekly 
benefit levels representative of earlier earning levels. Even 
accounting for this bias, however, the contrast between the 
distribution of litigated and unlitigated cases is very great. 
Whereas less than 10 percent of unlitigated cases are paid 
more than $2,000 in indemnity, nearly 60 percent of litigated 
cases receive this amount. Less than 1 percent of unlitigated 
cases receive more than $8,000 in indemnity compared to 
over 20 percent of litigated cases.
Table 4-3 shows that this result is not a consequence of the 
size of the lump-sum settlements in litigated cases. Table 4-3 
presents the distribution of weekly indemnity payments by 
litigation status. The category of no payments had to be
Table 4-2 












































































































Chi-square = 996.78** with 10 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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Chi-square = 353.44** with 8 degrees of freedom. 




eliminated from this table since it would swamp the results 
for the litigated sample, so the averages are not consistent 
with table 4-2. Table 4-3 shows that the mixture of payment 
types in table 4-2 did not distort the comparison between 
litigated and unlitigated cases. The litigated cases are much 
more expensive, whether measured in terms of total indemni 
ty or weekly payments only. What these measures cannot 
show is whether the cases are more expensive because they 
are litigated or whether they are litigated because they are 
more expensive. As discussed earlier, the MCCS data base is 
not sufficient to answer this critical question. Building on 
this judgment that litigated and unlitigated cases are very dif 
ferent, the analysis proceeds with the discussion of compen 
sation payments to unlitigated cases.
What Is Paid to Unlitigated Cases
Table 4-4 indicates the weekly compensation rate for 
unlitigated cases in the MCCS. As is shown in the table, two- 
thirds of all weekly payment cases received between $100 and 
$150 per week. The distribution of weekly compensation 
rates is very tight for two reasons. First, Michigan has very 
high minimum benefit levels. While these were never enacted 
by the legislature, the Michigan Court of Appeals in 1973 ex 
tended to minimum benefits the statutory provision that ad 
justed maximum benefit levels annually in accord with the 
change in the state average weekly wage. 2 The effect of shift 
ing both minimums and maximums up by a fixed dollar 
amount every year has been to compress the range within 
which the two-thirds statutory replacement rate operates.
In 1968, the minimum benefit for a disabled worker with 
three dependents was $36 per week. The maximum was $81 
per week, or a difference of $45 per week. As can be seen in 
table 4-5, the 1978 minimum for the same worker is $114 
while the 1978 maximum is $159, still an absolute difference 
of $45. But relatively speaking, the 1968 maximum was more
Table 4-4





































































Chi-square = 39.11** with 6 degrees of freedom. 































SOURCE: Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation, Michigan Department of Labor.
than twice the minimum, while the 1978 maximum is only 40 
percent greater than the minimum. So the range is con 
siderably reduced and a greater proportion of weekly benefit 
rates are compressed into a narrow interval.
The other element of Michigan law that served to com 
press the weekly compensation rate distribution was the so- 
called 25-hour rule. The statute (Sec. 418.371) specified that 
the workers' compensation weekly benefit should be based 
on at least 40 times the hourly earnings, unless the employee 
was employed "specifically and not temporarily on a part- 
time basis.'* In that event, the weekly earnings would be 
determined by multiplying the average wage rate by the nor 
mal hours. However, the statute went on to specify that if 
the employee worked an average of 25 hours per week or 
more, the 40-hour earnings rate should apply. In other 
words, the statute arbitrarily increased the compensation 
rate for those working more than 25 but less than 40 hours 
per week. This factor would also tend to compress the range 
of observed weekly benefit rates.
Table 4-4 demonstrated that the three insurer types (car 
rier, big three, and other self-insurers) have different weekly
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compensation levels. This point is made even more clearly by 
table 4-6 which shows the proportion of weekly benefit 
payments at the minimum, the maximum, or in between. 
This table is also an improvement over table 4-4 in that for 
each injury year, the actual weekly benefit paid is tested 
against the schedule in effect for that year, thus eliminating 
the bias introduced by the time trend in benefit levels. Table 
4-6 shows that all of the big three, 74 percent of other self- 
insurer, and 52 percent of carrier cases are compensated at 
the maximum.
On the other hand, 22 percent of carrier claims get the 
minimum benefit along with 9 percent of other self-insurer 
cases. This leaves a remainder of only one-fifth of all cases 
that actually receive the statutory two-thirds replacement of 
gross earnings when they are disabled. This is a most 
dramatic illustration of the impact of the maximum and 
minimum benefit structure in Michigan. Only a small 
minority of injured workers actually receive the specified 
replacement rate.
Table 4-7 reports the weekly income replacement rate 
calculated from the data in the official record of each case. 
The actual weekly compensation rate paid is divided by the 
employer-reported gross weekly earnings to determine the 
weekly wage replacement rate. There are a number of in 
teresting features to this table. In the first place, it 
demonstrates that over 4 percent of insurance carrier 
beneficiaries are receiving more than 100 percent wage 
replacement, i.e., they are getting more in tax-exempt 
workers' compensation benefits than they earned in pre-tax 
dollars before their injury. This reflects the operation of the 
minimum benefit level and the 25-hour rule reported earlier.
Over two-thirds of big three claimants are receiving less 
than 50 percent replacement of lost earnings. Nearly half the 
claimants from other self-insurers find themselves in the
Table 4-6
























































Chi-square= 114.67** with 4 degrees of freedom. 


























































































Chi-square= 134.93** with 10 degrees of freedom. 






same situation, as do one-fourth of carrier claimants. Ob 
viously, the operation of the Michigan benefit formula com 
bined with the wage differences in the state has produced 
some strange results. Some people, especially low-wage 
workers and part-time employees, are being compensated 
considerably above the statutory rate while the high-wage 
earners or those with fewer dependents are compensated at 
lower rates relative to their earnings.
The effect of the wage level on the replacement rate can be 
seen in table 4-8. It shows that as reported weekly earnings 
rise, the replacement rate declines. Workers earning over 
$400 per week at the time of disablement all received less 
than 50 percent replacement, because of the maximum 
benefit limitation. For workers earning less than $100 per 
week before injury, one-third experience more than 100 per 
cent weekly income loss replacement due to the operation of 
the minimum benefit and the 25-hour rule. 3
Turning from the weekly benefit amount to the other ma 
jor variant in weekly benefit cases, the duration of payment, 
table 4-9 shows durations by insurer type. It should be 
reiterated that there is a bias in table 4-9, introduced by the 
closed case sampling design, that causes long duration cases 
to be underrepresented. So the distribution shown in table 
4-9 is not perfectly representative of the durations experienc 
ed under a policy year format. 4 Nevertheless, these results do 
convey the essence of the duration distribution. There are a 
great many short duration disabilities, and relatively few 
long duration disabilities among the unlitigated case popula 
tion.
As shown in the table, about one-fifth of the compensated 
cases (uncompensated cases are not included in table 4-9) 
have durations of one week or less. Less than 2 percent of 
closed unlitigated cases show durations greater than one 
year. Furthermore, table 4-9 indicates that while there are
Table 4-8






















































































































Chi-square= 1,574.15** with 25 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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Table 4-9
Duration of Weekly Compensation Payments by Insurer Type 
Unlitigated Cases
Insurer type
Duration of weekly 
compensation payments
Up to 1 week
1 to 2 weeks
2 to 4 weeks
4 to 8 weeks
8 to 13 weeks
13 to 26 weeks
26 to 52 weeks
1 to 2 years



















































































































Chi-square= 13.78 with 18 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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slight differences in the average duration of unlitigated cases 
by type of insurer, these differences are not statistically 
significant.
There is another interesting element in table 4-9, and that 
is the dearth of one- to two-week duration cases. This results 
from the combination of the one-week waiting period before 
workers' compensation benefits begin and a two-week 
disability trigger for retroactive payment for the first week. 
In other words, if a worker is disabled and misses work for 
one week or less, he or she receives no compensation. Com 
pensation begins on the eighth day after the injury. But if the 
disability extends another full week, then payment is made 
for the first week as well.
Logically, therefore, disabled workers should be paid 
either for one week (or less) or for more than two weeks, 
since the extra week is triggered with the first day of the sec 
ond compensated week. This point is demonstrated in table 
4-10, which breaks the first four weeks of duration down in 
to greater detail. It is clear that the bulk of the one- to two- 
week duration cases are paid for exactly two weeks (14 days). 
Presumably the 15 cases that were paid more than one week 
but less than two weeks are either voluntary additional 
payments by insurers, errors in payment or errors in 
measurement of the payments.
Table 4-10 also speaks to those who argue that the poten 
tial reimbursement of the first week induces disabled 
workers to stay off the job longer than otherwise necessary. 
There is no sure way to determine when a worker could have 
returned to work, especially from the written record of a 
workers' compensation case. What can be observed is the 
behavioral result, namely, continued absence from work and 
qualification for additional days of compensation. In table 
4-10 this would be apparent in a declining number of cases as 
the trigger duration is approached and the reappearance of 
these cases on or just after the trigger point.
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Table 440 
Duration Detail for Short Term Unlitigated Cases
Number of short term 
Duration untitigated cases






1 to 2 weeks
8-13 days
14 days
































In the case of Michigan workers' compensation system, 
one would expect to find a declining number of cases as the 
duration of compensation nears one full week (two weeks of 
disability). This would be offset by a larger number of cases 
that were paid exactly two weeks of disability benefits. 
According to the evidence in table 4-10, this is a relatively 
minor problem. There were 37 cases with five days duration, 
49 cases with 14 days and 30 cases with 15 days. Further, the 
general shape of the duration distribution is quite smooth 
and regular; there is no enormous peak at the trigger dura-
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tion. It is quite possible that workers are not well enough in 
formed about their rights under the workers' compensation 
statute to play this retroactive compensation game. But the 
conclusion is that this is not a serious problem at the present 
time.
The product of the duration of payment (in weeks) and the 
weekly benefit amount is the total weekly compensation 
paid. This figure is reported in table 4-11 for unlitigated 
cases by insurer type. The distribution is quite similar to that 
of table 4-9 since the major variation is in duration. It is 
noteworthy that approximately three-fourths of the 
unlitigated weekly benefit cases involve less than $1,000 in 
total indemnity. Once again there is no significant difference 
by insurer type, even though the means do tend to parallel 
the wage and benefit levels reported earlier.
What Is Paid to Litigated Cases
Because of the wide diversity in the litigated case popula 
tion, it seems advisable to proceed with a disaggregated 
description. First a few characterizations of lump-sum as op 
posed to weekly benefit cases will be offered. Then the 
discussion will proceed with a description of weekly benefit 
cases. This will be followed by an examination of what is 
known about lump-sum payment cases. The final section will 
attempt to pull these disparate elements back together with a 
discussion of the total indemnity paid to litigated cases.
Table 4-12 reports the relationship between the final 
resolution of the case and the type of compensation paid. 
This should be helpful in establishing a general feel for the 
types of cases represented in the lump-sum payment and 
weekly payment groups. As would be expected, redeemed 
cases all show lump-sum payments. About 20 percent of the 
redemptions also received weekly benefit payments; general 
ly, this was during an earlier period of disability. The cases
Table 4-11








































































































Chi-square = 20.66 with 16 degrees of freedom. 





























































































Chi-square= 1,505.2** with 12 degrees of freedom. 
Rows may not add to total due to rounding. r
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that were withdrawn or dismissed either received no payment 
at all (over 80 percent) or weekly payments only; again, this 
would usually reflect a period of disability before the ap 
plication for hearing. The cases accepted by the insurer after 
the commencement of the litigation process tend to resemble 
the unlitigated cases described earlier. Less than 20 percent 
of these show any lump-sum payment.
The greatest variety in type of compensation occurs in the 
decision category. This reflects both the amount of discre 
tion the administrative law judges possess and the com 
plicated nature of the cases that finally require a hearing of 
ficer's determination. It should also be pointed out that there 
are probably more than 8.5 percent of the decisions that 
result in no award for the claimant. But since no distinction 
is made in table 4-12 between weekly compensation paid 
before the litigation and that paid after resolution, some 
cases that did not receive awards will fall into the weekly 
payment category by virtue of their earlier experience.
Table 4-13 looks at the question of type of compensation 
in a different way. It asks whether the type of compensation 
is influenced by whether the case originated from an occupa 
tional disease claim, a personal injury claim, or a claim 
asserting disability from both sources. As was shown in 
chapter 3, the table indicates that lump-sum payments 
(resulting from redemption agreements) are more prevalent 
in occupational disease claims. In fact, table 4-13 
demonstrates that only about 5 percent of litigated occupa 
tional disease claims ever received any weekly compensation. 
This rises to 20 percent if the occupational disease is coupled 
with a personal injury claim.
The conclusion seems clear that there is something very 
different about the occupational disease claims. Unfor 
tunately, it is not possible with the MCCS data base to ac 
curately enumerate the occupational disease claims among 
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unusual proportion of all occupational disease claims end up 
as redemptions. It is certainly indicative of problems in ob 
taining compensation for occupational disease claims, 
however. 5 In this regard it should be noted that the propor 
tion of uncompensated litigated cases is actually slightly 
lower for the occupational disease group, so there is no 
evidence that these claims are "less worthy" as a group than 
personal injury claims. The problem of securing compensa 
tion for occupational disease claims may be very real, but the 
present evidence is not sufficient to make any definitive 
statement. All that can be said is that they are compensated 
differently when litigated.
Table 4-14 returns the discussion to familiar ground; it 
reports the type of compensation payment by insurer type 
for litigated cases. According to the chi-square statistic, 
there is a significant difference among the insurer types in 
the form of their compensation payments. Workers' com 
pensation cases at the big three auto producers are 
significantly more likely to receive lump-sum payments only. 
They are much less likely to have received weekly payments 
at any time.
The major impact of table 4-14 is in demonstrating the 
overall dominance of the lump-sum payment in Michigan's 
workers' compensation dispute settlement system. It is fre 
quently argued that without the redemption and the lump- 
sum payment, the hearings process would be hopelessly clog 
ged with cases. Whether this is a justification or simply an 
apology for redemption settlements remains to be seen. But 
it is clear from the evidence presented in this monograph that 
litigation in Michigan workers' compensation system leads 
primarily to compromise and release settlements and lump- 
sum payments. Nevertheless, the weekly benefit payments to 
litigated workers' compensation cases will be explored first. 
Following this discussion, attention will return to a quan 
titative analysis of the lump-sum question.
Table 4-14


































































Chi-square = 71.46** with 6 degrees of freedom. 




The weekly benefit payments to litigated cases largely 
parallel the payments to unlitigated cases discussed earlier. 
Table 4-15 demonstrates that the same general picture 
emerges as in table 4-6. The bulk of the big three cases earn 
the maximum weekly benefit, while this is true for only 
about half the carrier cases. In general, the minimum benefit 
is only significant for the carrier segment as very few self- 
insurer cases involve the minimum benefit. For litigated 
cases, almost 30 percent are compensated at two-thirds of 
the gross wage compared to 20 percent of unlitigated. This 
would reflect the fact that litigated cases are considerably 
older on the average and thus do not show the same narrow 
ing of the effective range of the benefit formula as more re 
cent cases.
Table 4-16 compares the durations of weekly compensa 
tion payments to litigated cases by insurer type. In this in 
stance, the contrast with the unlitigated results must be em 
phasized. Whereas nearly 80 percent of unlitigated cases 
showed durations of less than eight weeks at closure, only 
about 25 percent of litigated cases fall below this level. On 
the other hand, while only 4 percent of unlitigated closed 
cases had durations of more than 26 weeks, table 4-16 
demonstrates that nearly half of the closed litigated cases ex 
ceeded this duration. It would seem that those litigated cases 
that do involve weekly compensation payments are con 
siderably more serious disabilities than are the unlitigated 
cases.
The last table dealing with weekly payments to litigated 
cases is table 4-17. It shows the distribution of total weekly 
payments to litigated cases by insurer type. It parallels table 
4-11 which reported the same information for unlitigated 
cases. As with the duration of payments, the litigated cases 
are revealed to be much more serious. The average amount 
of weekly compensation payments to litigated cases is nearly 
seven times that to unlitigated, even though the weekly com-
Table 4-15
























































Chi-square= 17.42* with 4 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to Founding. s"
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Table 4-16
Duration of Weekly Compensation Payments by Insurer Type 
Litigated Cases
Insurer type
Duration of weekly 
compensation payments
Up to 1 week
1 to 2 weeks
2 to 4 weeks
4 to 8 weeks
8 to 13 weeks
13 to 26 weeks
26 to 52 weeks
1 to 2 years






















































































































Chi-square= 15.78 with 18 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to founding.
Table 4-17





















































































































Chi-square = 16.01 with 16 degrees of freedom. 




pensation rates are lower due to the vintage of the cases. As 
before, the highest average amount is paid by the big three, 
over $8,000 per case according to table 4-17. In this measure 
ment, other self-insurers pay slightly less on the average in 
weekly compensation payments than do the carriers. The 
chi-square statistic reveals that these differences are not 
statistically significant, however.
Recapping the findings on weekly benefit payments to 
litigated cases, it was found that carriers are most likely to 
have made weekly payments to litigated cases, with the big 
three least likely. While over one-third of litigated carrier 
cases showed weekly payments, only 11 percent of big three 
cases and 28 percent of other self-insurer cases were compen 
sated in this form. When attention was directed to the ag 
gregate amounts of weekly compensation payments, it was 
found that the big three pay slightly more, primarily by vir 
tue of a higher average weekly compensation rate.
Lump-Sum Payments to Litigated Cases
Even though the average weekly benefit payments to 
litigated cases that receive such payments was shown in table 
4-17 to be quite high, weekly payments still constitute a small 
proportion of all indemnity payments ever received by closed 
litigated cases. This is because of the dominance of the lump- 
sum payments in the litigated claims resolution process in 
Michigan. Table 4-14 revealed that nearly 75 percent of all 
closed litigated cases received lump-sum payments, nearly 90 
percent of compensated cases. So for practical purposes, the 
litigation process is a venue for bargaining over the size of 
lump-sum payment. Accordingly, the major interest in in 
demnity paid to litigated cases lies in the magnitude of the 
lump-sum payments. 6
Table 4-18 shows the distribution of lump-sum payments 
by insurer type. There are very substantial insurer dif-
Table 448

































































































Chi-square = 78.87** with 12 degrees of freedom. 




ferences apparent in table 4-18, with big three lump-sum 
payments the smallest and carriers' the largest. One way to 
explain this is to cite the earlier results on the proportion of 
all workers' compensation cases that are litigated. It was 
shown in table 2-1 that the big three experienced more than 
double the carriers' incidence of litigation (48 percent as op 
posed to 22 percent of all cases), so perhaps it is not surpris 
ing to find that they pay only a little over half as much per 
redemption.
If a much higher incidence of litigation occurs, it may be 
reasonable to conclude that the "average" litigated claim is 
less serious in terms of the disability; or perhaps even "less 
worthy" as a claim. The conventional wisdom is that the big 
three are plagued by nuisance claims. This evidence does not 
contradict that hypothesis. In addition, it is suggestive that 
the distribution of lump-sum payments for the big three is 
very compact. Nearly two-thirds of big three lump-sum 
payments are between $2,000 and $8,000. Since only about 
40 percent of payments by other insurers fall in this range, 
this too is consistent with a routine redemption process. Un 
fortunately, the quality of information about the claimed 
disabilities that is available in the official record does not 
permit a detailed examination of the actual basis of the 
payments.
Table 4-18 examined the size of the gross lump-sum in 
demnity payment by the insurer. But this is not the sum ac 
tually received by the disabled claimant; it is subject to legal 
and medical cost deductions. Table 4-19 shows the average 
legal and medical costs by insurer type, both in raw numbers 
and as a percentage of the gross amount received. Attorneys' 
fees in redemption cases are set by rule of the Director of the 
Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation at not more 
than 15 percent on the first $25,000 and not more than 10 
percent on amounts exceeding $25,000. Table 4-19 reveals 
that almost 16 percent of lump-sum payments do go for legal
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expenses; 15 percent for the attorney, and nearly 1 percent 
for other legal costs. There is no significant difference 
among the insurer types, although the dollar amounts vary 
with the size of the lump-sums.
Table 4-19












































Medical costs in redeemed cases amount to about 7.6 per 
cent on the average, or one-half as much as the legal costs, 
according to table 4-19. This figure is difficult to interpret 
because it occasionally includes medical treatment of the 
claimant as well as the normal medical examination fees 
which would be regarded as a litigation cost rather than a 
medical benefit. Unfortunately, these component parts can 
not be split out, so the portion of the medical costs that 
could appropriately be assessed as a cost of litigation rather 
than treatment cannot be determined. On the assumption 
that it is about one-half of the total, the "cost" of litigation 
to the claimant would be about 20 percent of the gross lump- 
sum settlement. Assuming that the insurer incurs a similar
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cost in contesting the case, the burden of litigation costs in 
this no-fault system is revealed to be quite high.
There is another deduction that should be made from 
gross lump-sum payments to arrive at the actual indemnity 
payment received by the claimant. As shown in table 4-20, 
about 18 percent of all lump-sum payment cases have a 
specific dollar amount reserved for future medical benefits. 
It is paid to the claimant as part of the lump-sum settlement, 
but it is intended for medical care in the future. It is difficult 
to determine what this actually means; some assert that it is 
simply a way around the social security offset against 
workers' compensation income maintenance benefits. Ac 
cording to table 4-20, all three insurer types use this device, 
so it is impossible to ignore it.
Table 4-20
Lump-Sum Payments Reserved for Future Medical Care 
by Insurer Type
Insurer type
Reserves for future 
medical care Total Carrier Big three
Other 
self-insurers





total lump-sum .571 .477 .733






As the last two rows of table 4-20 show, these payments 
are very sizable. On the average, they amount to nearly 60 
percent of the gross lump-sum amount, somewhat more for 
the big three and less for carriers. Since these payments are 
ostensibly for medical care, and medical care benefits are ex-
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eluded in all other instances in the MCCS, it is appropriate to 
exclude these reserved medical payments from the net lump- 
sums received by claimants as well.
The indemnity amounts actually received by the claimants 
in lump-sum settlement cases are represented in table 4-21. 
The same basic conclusions that were drawn from the ex 
amination of the gross lump-sums in table 4-18 apply here. 
The big three pay a much lower average amount, but they 
pay it to a larger number of cases when compared to either of 
the other two insurer types.
Because of the interest in the variation in size of the lump- 
sum payments and the serious issues raised by a compromise 
and release settlement system within a workers' compensa 
tion system designed to prevent litigation, a regression 
analysis of the lump-sum payments is presented in table 4-22. 
It should be interpreted carefully because the fact remains 
that there is no way to determine from the record of a 
redeemed workers' compensation case just what was the 
basis for the payment. But this analysis attempts to look at 
the question in an indirect way.
Even if the specific basis of compensation cannot be deter 
mined for a particular case, perhaps the general association 
of case or claimant characteristics with the size of the lump- 
sum settlements could offer some insight into the process. 
This is analogous to the statistical evidence linking cancer to 
smoking. While the specific process by which an individual's 
smoking habits contribute to his or her risk of developing 
lung cancer cannot be fully explained, the statistical fact that 
smoking and the development of lung cancer are correlated 
within the general population can be very useful in decision- 
making by both individuals and society.
The meager facts available from the MCCS about the 
lump-sum payment cases are correlated with the size of the 
net lump-sum payment to the claimant in table 4-22. Most of
Table 4-21



























































































Chi-square= 59.54** with 10 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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Table 422 
Regression Analysis of Lump-Sum Payments









































































































F(21, 696) = 10.73**
R2 = .245
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the characteristics are entered into the regression in bivariate 
form, that is, they are either present or absent. Further, to 
avoid statistical over-determination of the system, there 
must be an omitted category in each instance where the full 
set of characteristics would exhaust the population. For ex 
ample, the first independent variable listed represents the big 
three as the insurer in the case; the second represents other 
self-insurers. Each reported coefficient measures the dif 
ference that the presence of that insurer type makes, on 
average across the sample, when compared to the carrier 
group (the omitted category).
In the case of the big three, table 4-22 shows that, on the 
average and when controlling for all the other characteristics 
listed as independent variables, the big three pay $2,551 less 
per lump-sum payment than do carriers. Furthermore, the 
t-statistic reported in the right-hand column shows that this 
number is judged, on the the basis of the variation in the 
sample, to be statistically significant. Thus, one can be 99 
percent sure that the big three really do pay less on the basis 
of the evidence of the MCCS.
The analogous conclusion for the other self-insurers is that 
they pay $1,538 less per case, when controlling for the other 
characteristics listed, than would a carrier. In this instance, 
the t-statistic indicates that one can be 95 percent certain that 
there is a difference between these two groups. It is very im 
portant to point out that this analysis does not say why the 
difference exists. Clearly, the specificity of the information 
about the cases is not very great, and it may very well be that 
carrier cases and self-insurer cases differ systematically in 
ways not measured adequately in table 4-22. That is why 
these results should be taken as suggestive rather than deter 
minative.
It is worthwhile pointing out that the multivariate analysis 
has reduced the average difference between carrier cases and
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big three cases from the $3,559 shown in table 4-21 to $2,551 
here. It is likely that the addition of more and better infor 
mation about the particulars of the case would reduce this 
"unexplained" differential still more.
The Detroit variable indicates that the litigation originated 
in one of the five counties making up the Detroit SMSA. 
Since this is a binary variable, the influence of Detroit as a 
location is measured against the balance of the state. 
According to table 4-22, even though Detroit lump-sum 
cases receive $962 less, when controlling for the other factors 
listed, this is not sufficient to reject the null hypothesis that 
the average payment is the same. In other words, on the basis 
of the evidence in the MCCS, it cannot be concluded that 
Detroit cases receive significantly smaller payments than 
cases from other parts of the state.
The same is true for the binary variable called age, which 
represents the influence on the size of the lump-sum if the 
claimant is 55 or older. The age 55 and over group receives 
$836 less on the average, but based on the sample evidence 
this is not sufficient to reject the hypothesis that they are 
paid the same. The female variable also fails the test of 
statistical significance and therefore the conclusion is that 
men and women are treated similarly in the redemption pro 
cess.
It is interesting to consider these results in combination 
with those reported in chapter 3 on the probability of litiga 
tion (table 3-12) and the probability of redemption given 
litigation (table 3-27). A Detroit origin was earlier shown to 
have a powerful influence on the likelihood of litigation, but 
not on the probability of redemption. Here it has been deter 
mined that Detroit cases are also not paid significantly less 
when they are redeemed. In the case of age, table 3-12 show 
ed that claims from older workers are significantly more like 
ly to be litigated. Further, table 3-27 demonstrated that age
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was one of the most powerful influences on the probability 
of redemption. The present analysis indicates that older 
workers do not receive significantly smaller settlements.
For females, an entirely different pattern has emerged. 
Women are no more likely than men to be involved in litiga 
tion. But once they are, table 3-27 reported that they are 
significantly more likely to experience a redemption than 
men. Table 4-22 indicates that there is no difference in the 
size of the redemption settlements, however. There is no easy 
explanation for these different patterns by demographic 
group.
The regression results for weekly earnings reported in 
table 4-22 are fortunately more understandable. The coeffi 
cient reports the average association between reported week 
ly earnings before disablement and the size of the lump-sum 
payment. It indicates that each dollar of weekly earnings 
produces an average of $11.43 in the redemption settlement. 
It is reassuring to find the coefficient is positive and signifi 
cant, since the indemnity under weekly payments would tend 
to be proportional to the earnings level.
The rest of the variables in table 4-22 represent the nature 
of the injury or disability in various ways. The results in 
dicate that the fact that the claimant was hospitalized at 
some point in the life of the case is associated with roughly 
$1,550 additional in lump-sum indemnity. If the claimant 
ever received weekly compensation payments in connection 
with the claimed disability, the coefficient for weekly com 
pensation shows that this yields $3,585 on the average in 
lump-sum payment when compared to those who had never 
received weekly payments. Further, if there were multiple 
spells of weekly compensation payments, table 4-22 reports 
that this is worth an additional $2,072.
These results could be interpreted in a way consistent with 
the earlier discussion of nuisance claims. The more signifi-
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cant claims may be those that have demonstrated their 
"worth" by previously qualifying for disability benefits. 
These might be regarded as the cases that genuinely required 
litigation. The remainder, what are regarded by insurers as 
less worthy claims, tend to be cashed out for relatively small 
amounts. Thus the case variables just reported may be 
associated with the "worthy" claims and have large positive 
coefficients as a result.
The last group of variables relates specifically to the type 
of injury reported or the part of the body injured. These 
variables have been reviewed before so little attention will be 
paid to them here. It is surprising that they performed so 
poorly in this regression, given their importance in 
associating with the likelihood of litigation. Only the back 
injury variable is significant in table 4-22. According to the 
regression, the average back injury receives an additional 
$3,223 in lump-sum payments. This result would seem to 
contradict the conventional wisdom about nuisance claims, 
which might lead one to expect a negative coefficient for 
back injury claims. Results in chapter 3 demonstrated that 
back injuries are significantly more likely to be litigated, but 
here it is shown that they receive larger settlements. This may 
reflect the evidentiary problems in back injury claims.
As indicated at the beginning of this discussion, one 
should not try to make too much of any of these results. The 
regression equation only explained one-fourth of the varia 
tion in the size of lump-sums to begin with. Yet, the lack of 
pattern to the results discussed here is troubling. The most 
important conclusion is simply that the lack of information 
available on these redemption settlements creates a very 
significant barrier to understanding. There is not enough in 
formation about the cases to perceive the patterns that may 
be present. As a result, this analysis must be regarded as 
somewhat speculative.
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The last task in describing the indemnity payments to 
litigated cases in Michigan* s workers* compensation system 
is to bring together the weekly payments and the lump-sum 
indemnity payments to get the total indemnity paid. As will 
be shown later, not all the weekly benefits were paid after the 
claim was contested; but from a closed case point of view 
this is the most complete way to look at indemnity payments.
Table 4-23 presents these data for the litigated cases in the 
MCCS. The dominance of the lump-sums is very clear when 
table 4-23 is compared to tables 4-21 and 4-11 which reported 
lump-sums and weekly payment amounts, respectively. The 
average indemnity payments in table 4-23 are very close to 
those of the lump-sum results. This reflects the fact reported 
earlier that about 75 percent of litigated cases had received 
no weekly payments at all.
It is also apparent from table 4-23 that the litigation pro 
cess does serve to screen out some cases. Roughly one 
litigated case in six comes out of the process with no compen 
sation at all. It is possible that these cases can come around 
again in some instances, but the conclusion must be that the 
litigation process does serve to disqualify some claims. 
However, without better information it is not possible to 
reach a judgment as to the efficacy of the screening.
It is noteworthy that the differences among the three in 
surer types in total indemnity are statistically significant ac 
cording to table 4-23. Further, it seems appropriate to ques 
tion why the rank ordering of the three insurer types should 
be the reverse of their wage levels and weekly compensation 
rates. Earlier in the chapter, it was speculated that perhaps 
the great incidence of litigated claims in the auto industry 
serves in effect to depreciate the value of the claims. This ex 
planation does not fit the other self-insured employers, 
however, since their incidence of litigation is lower than the 
carrier group.
Table 4-23




































































































































Chi-square = 83.29** with 20 degrees of freedom 




How Soon Is It Paid
The question of timeliness of benefits is a critical one in 
the evaluation of an income maintenance system. Adequate 
benefits that do not commence promptly do not accomplish 
the job. This is especially true in the case of workers' com 
pensation, since one of the reasons for the establishment of 
the system 70 years ago was dissatisfaction with the long 
delays inherent in the tort liability system. As this 
monograph has demonstrated, there are two very different 
workers' compensation systems in Michigan. The unlitigated 
cases are processed in a manner consistent with the original 
no-fault principles of workers' compensation. The litigation 
process in Michigan, however, is a reincarnation of tort 
liability with reduced monetary stakes. Because these 
systems are so different, they will be treated separately here. 
First the timeliness of payment to unlitigated cases will be 
assessed. Then the delays in the litigation process will be 
described.
Unlitigated
Table 4-24 shows the time elapsed from the injury date to 
the date of disablement by insurer type for unlitigated cases 
in the MCCS. In other words, this table addresses the ques 
tion of how long it is from the injury until the worker is forc 
ed off his or her job by the consequences of that injury. 
While table 4-24 makes it clear that a majority of claimants 
are disabled immediately by their injuries, there are a sur 
prising number of instances where this is not the case. In 
fact, nearly 20 percent of the time the first day of disability is 
reported to be more than one week after the injury. This is 
true for almost 30 percent of the big three cases.
This result is confirmed by table 4-25, which measures the 
same basic interval by a different method. Table 4-25 reports 
the number of days between the injury and the last day of
Table 4-24
Injury Date to Date of Disablement by Insurer Type 
Unlitigated Cases
Insurer type
Injury date to 
date of disablement
0 or 1 day
2 to 7 days
8 to 14 days
15 to 30 days
31 to 60 days



















































































Chi-square=34.00** with 12 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
Cfti I
Table 4-25 
Injury Date to Last Day of Work by Insurer Type
Insurer type
Injury date to 
last day of work
None 
1 to 7 days
8 to 14 days
15 to 30 days
31 to 60 days




















































































Chi-square = 33.90** with 12 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
Benefit Delivery 167
work. In two-thirds of these unlitigated cases, the injury date 
was the last day of work. But that means that in one-third of 
the cases, the claimant continued at work after the injury. 
The significance of this result from the point of benefit 
delivery is unclear, but it is a very important observation 
from an analytical perspective. If a large proportion of 
claimants continue to work after the injury, the injury date 
cannot be the most useful point to regard as the origin of the 
case.
Accordingly, table 4-26 reports the difference between the 
last day of work and the date of the first compensation pay 
ment for unlitigated cases by insurer type. Since the first 
seven days of disability are not compensable, one would not 
expect payments to be made within the first week. Table 4-26 
basically confirms this, even though there are a few cases 
reported as being paid within seven days. Over one-third (37 
percent) of the compensated cases are paid within the first 
week after eligibility is established (nearly one-half for the 
big three). An additional 42 percent are paid within the next 
two weeks, that is, within the second or third week after 
eligibility. Less than one claimant in five must wait as long as 
30 days for the first benefit check. For the self-insured 
population, it is only one in ten.
This measure of timeliness could be regarded as somewhat 
unfair by insurers, since the waiting period is counted as a 
payment delay in table 4-26, when the insurer may not know 
that the claim is compensable until the seven days have pass 
ed. Table 4-27 shows that there is even less delay when the in 
terval is measured from the first day that was actually com 
pensated until the date of the payment. By this criterion, 
about 85 percent of unlitigated cases are paid within 30 days.
Analysis by insurer type shows that 80 percent of carrier 
cases and 92 percent of self-insured cases meet this test of 
timeliness of payment for unlitigated cases. Presumably the
Table 4-26
Last Day of Work to Date of First Payment by Insurer Type 
Unlitigated Cases
Insurer type
Last day of work
to date of
first payment
1 to 7 days
8 to 14 days
15 to 30 days
31 to 60 days

















































































Chi-square = 43.25** with 10 degrees of freedom. 










0 to 7 days
8 to 14 days
15 to 30 days



































































Chi-square = 40.83** with 8 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.




extra layer of bureaucracy involved in notification to the car 
rier by the employer accounts for the extra delay in cases 
from the carrier sector. There is no information in the case 
records about when the carrier was notified of the injury, so 
this cannot be investigated with the present data base. There 
is also no way of determining what the source of delay may 
be in the slower cases, nothing in the case records suggests 
any particular cause. In any event, the conclusion is that for 
unlitigated cases the payment delays are not intolerable. The 
bulk of the cases are processed and paid without major inci 
dent. Unfortunately, litigated cases are another matter en 
tirely.
Litigated
The important dates are not the same for litigated and 
unlitigated cases, and it will not be possible to reach such a 
quick judgment on the timeliness question. But the same 
basic philosophy of dividing the delay into that portion due 
to recognition or manifestation of the disability and actual 
payment delay will be followed. In addition, for the litigated 
cases the administrative delays will be highlighted since this 
is an area where policy could have a significant impact.
As was pointed out in chapter 3, nearly half of all litigated 
cases involve claims of multiple injuries; one-quarter show 
multiple injury dates. Thus the question of when the injury 
occurred, or exactly what the injury was, is not easy to 
answer in many litigated cases. For the purposes of analysis, 
the last injury date reported will be used. This may distort 
the timeliness measures somewhat, particularly since the 
Michigan statute defines the last day of work as the injury 
date for occupational diseases and injuries not attributable 
to a single event. Relative to the magnitude of litigation 
delays, however, this will not be a major problem.
Table 4-28 shows the elapsed time from the last injury date 
to the date of application for hearing by insurer type. For
Table 4-28 
Last Injury to Application for Hearing by Insurer Type
Last injury to 
application for hearing
To 1 month
1 to 3 months
3 to 6 months
6 to 12 months
1 to 2 years
2 to 4 years












































































Chi-square= 12.77 with 14 degrees of freedom. 




nearly 25 percent of litigated cases, there is a gap of more 
than two years from the injury date to the initiation of the 
litigated claim. Over half the litigated cases are initiated 
within one year of the injury date, but only 11 percent within 
one month. Of course there is no way of telling directly what 
was happening in the interim. It is possible that the claimant 
was trying to establish his or her claim throughout the period 
and only resorted to the litigation procedure as a last resort. 
It is safe to assume in other cases that the first the employer 
or insurer ever hears of the injury is when the application for 
hearing is served. Whatever the reason, it is astonishing that 
these litigated cases are already so old at their origin. The 
average litigated case is already 550 days old when the claim 
is initiated. It is also worth noting that there is no statistically 
significant difference among insurer types in this application 
delay.
Table 4-29 shows that the application delay is less pro 
nounced when measured from the last day of work. Over 30 
percent of the litigated cases involve a gap of more than one 
year from termination of employment to claim initiation. 
Presumably this reflects claims from retirees and occupa 
tional disease and cumulative trauma cases. Clearly, the first 
important delay in compensation for litigated workers' com 
pensation claims in Michigan arises at the claimant level. The 
claims for compensation themselves are certainly not timely. 
On the average, exactly one year has elapsed since the last 
day of work when a litigated workers' compensation claim 
enters the system.
Table 4-30 makes it clear that the system also contributes 
to delays, however. According to the sample cases in the 
MCCS, only about 26 percent of all litigated cases reach a 
hearing in less than 12 months from application. More than 
15 percent of the litigated cases take over 24 months to come 
to a hearing. There are significant differences by insurer type
Table 4-29 
Last Day of Work to Application for Hearing by Insurer Type




1 to 3 months
3 to 6 months
6 to 12 months
1 to 2 years
2 to 4 years



































































Chi-square = 23.87* with 14 degrees of freedom. 
Columns may not add to total due to rounding.
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18 to 24 months














































































Chi-square = 40.34** with 10 degrees of freedom. 






with the carrier segment showing less delay than the self- 
insured. Nevertheless, the overwhelming impression is of 
very considerable delays in adjudication with an average of 
540 days from application to hearing date.
These long delays are the consequence of an overburdened 
adjudicative system, but they also serve to reinforce the 
duality in Michigan's workers' compensation system. Such 
delays make it impossible for a disabled worker who requires 
income maintenance immediately to resort to the system. 
Thus the original function of the hearings process is 
frustrated and it is converted even more completely to a 
lump-sum impairment system inhabited primarily by 
claimants with another source of income.
In addition, the structure of attorneys' fees in the 
Michigan system does not reward swiftness. In cases where 
weekly benefits are awarded, attorneys are allowed up to 30 
percent of the accrued liability. The incentives here are too 
obvious. The interesting question is what would be the delay 
in reaching a hearing if the large number of cases that do not 
go to a full hearing of the facts (i.e., redemptions) were not 
present to clog the adjudication system.
Table 4-31 adds the application delay and the ad 
ministrative hearing delay together to measure the total time 
elapsed from the last day of work to the date of the hearing. 
Recalling the distinction developed earlier between the date 
of application for hearing and the last injury date, this table 
provides a measure of the evidentiary problems in ad 
judicating these claims. Less than 10 percent of litigated 
claim hearings involve parties who have been in an employer 
to employee relationship in the last year.
Almost half of the cases involve parties who have not been 
associated with each other for the last two years. Earlier 
evidence made clear that this does not reflect a long period of
Table 4-31 
Last Day of Work to Hearing by Insurer Type
Last day of work 
to hearing
To 1 month
6 to 12 months
1 to 2 years
2 to 4 years

































































Chi-square = 23.33** with 10 degrees of freedom. 






disability with weekly compensation payments, but rather a 
severance of the employment relationship for the duration of 
the delay in most cases. The litigation system is attempting to 
cope with very old injuries in disputes among employers and 
employees who probably have trouble remembering each 
other. For the average litigated case, it is 943 days since the 
last day of work at the time of the hearing. This is truly an 
impossible burden.
The last table relating to timeliness of benefits measures 
the total administrative life of litigated cases from the 
perspective of the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensa 
tion. Table 4-32 shows the time from the application for 
hearing to the report of Stopping of Compensation 
Payments (Form 102), which signals the Bureau that all 
payments have been completed and the case is ready to be 
retired. This measure should not be taken to represent a pay 
ment delay, since it includes the administrative delays plus 
any weekly benefit payment duration that results from the 
litigation process. But it does represent the tracking burden 
on the Bureau resulting from the litigation rate. Over 80 per 
cent of litigated workers' compensation cases are in the 
system more than a year, 20 percent for more than two years. 
This is quite astonishing when it is realized that most of them 
are simply compromised out anyway. This is a tremendous 
administrative burden to pay for very little return in terms of 
actual claims adjudication.
Table 4-32 
Application for Hearing to Form 102 by Insurer Type
Insurer type
Application for 
hearing to Form 102
To 1 month
1 to 3 months
3 to 6 months
6 to 12 months
1 to 2 years
2 to 4 years






























































































Chi-square=31.47** with 14 degrees of freedom. 





Conclusions to this examination of the timeliness of 
benefits for litigated cases seem anticlimactic. The applica 
tion delays are so massive as to make the whole question of 
delays irrelevant. Obviously the litigation process in 
Michigan's workers' compensation system bears little 
resemblance to a no-fault system. As has been suggested 
earlier, it looks remarkably like a tort liability system. The 
major difference is that the sums in contention in these pro 
ceedings are quite modest.
NOTES
1. There is some overlap with material discussed in chapter 2, where the 
overview of compensation payments was presented. There will be a good 
deal more detail presented here, however.
2. Jolliff v. American Advertising, 49 Mien App 1. This was recently 
reversed in Gussler v. Fairview, Michigan Supreme Court, No. 63538, 
December 30, 1981.
3. The Michigan legislature saw fit in 1980 to completely revise the 
benefit formula. Almost all workers will now receive 80 percent of after 
tax pay.
4. See chapter 1 for the discussion of this issue and the comparison of 
empirical results under the two alternative sampling strategies.
5. See Peter S. Barth with H. Allan Hunt, Workers' Compensation and 
Work-Related Illnesses and Diseases (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1980), for an analysis of the occupational disease problem in workers' 
compensation.
6. For an earlier study of lump-sum payments in Michigan, see James N. 
Morgan, Marvin Snider, and Marion G. Sobol, Lump Sum Redemption 
Settlements and Rehabilitation: A Study of Workmen's Compensation 




This monograph began with the technical description of 
the data base, the Michigan Closed Case Survey, because 
that is really what the monograph is about. This volume is 
not a guide to the Michigan workers' compensation system; 
it makes no pretense of being a complete review of the way 
workers' compensation functions in Michigan. What the 
monograph does try to do is use one special kind of data 
source, a closed case survey, to measure the adequacy and 
timeliness of benefits for Michigan workers disabled by ac 
cidents or illnesses arising out of their employment.
The question of sampling design takes on special impor 
tance in the context of this descriptive approach. If the data 
base does not adequately represent the workers' compensa 
tion system, a description of the data base is not very 
valuable. For this reason, extensive attention was given to 
the various strategies for sampling from a dynamic workers' 
compensation population in chapter 1. Each sampling 
strategy was found to have its strengths and weaknesses.
The closed case strategy adopted here tends to produce a 
picture of the workers' compensation system that under- 
represents the long disability duration cases. The advantage 
of the closed case strategy is that it minimizes uncertainty 
about the outcomes; the sample can be collected at one point
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in time without waiting for straggler cases to be resolved. 
The discussion in chapter 1 also made the point that in 
Michigan there is very little alternative to a closed case design 
if one must depend on the state's records of the workers' 
compensation cases. There simply was no other feasible way 
to sample from the population in the actual situation that 
presented itself in 1978.
Examination of the completed sample and comparison to 
other sources of information about the Michigan workers' 
compensation case population showed that the actual biases 
of the closed case design were much less than feared. There 
was an apparent deficit of long duration weekly payment 
cases, but when durations were imputed for the lump-sum 
settlements, the Michigan Closed Case Survey (MCCS) ac 
tually showed more cases with duration over four years than 
the insurance industry found using the opposite 
methodology.
Comparison of the MCCS to official Bureau of Workers' 
Disability Compensation case statistics for 1978 showed that 
the sample appropriately represented the insurer population 
as well. Insurance carriers and self-insurers were represented 
in correct proportions and the large individual insurers also 
seemed to be represented in the appropriate numbers in the 
data base. There was one problem revealed by the com 
parison to Bureau statistics, though. The MCCS does not 
contain enough judges' opinions or cases withdrawn before 
adjudication or dismissed by the judge.
This apparently reflected an unexpected seasonality prob 
lem. While these cases were retired by the Bureau in October 
and November of 1978, the decisions had come primarily 
from the month of August. It is assumed that the problems 
with the sample reflect the incidence of summer vacations 
for the administrative law judges. Nevertheless, the conclu 
sion was that, overall, the MCCS provided an adequate em-
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pirical representation of Michigan's workers' compensation 
case population in 1978.
Chapter 2 presented an empirical overview of the 
Michigan workers' compensation experience.' It employed a 
weighted combination of the litigated and unlitigated 
samples to report statistics on claimant characteristics, the 
origin of the claim, and the amount and duration of compen 
sation. The primary conclusion from this examination was 
that commercial workers' compensation insurance carriers 
and self-insured employers are quite different in almost 
every dimension of workers' compensation experience.
This result highlights the major contribution of the 
MCCS, the ability to compare different insurer types. To 
take maximum advantage of this fact, most analyses have 
been organized by type of insurer. Throughout the 
monograph, the fact repeatedly emerges that carriers and 
self-insurers demonstrate very different workers' compensa 
tion experiences. This is most striking for the big three auto 
producers. In the proportion of cases litigated, for instance, 
the big three experience a 48 percent litigation rate while car 
riers only show 22 percent and self-insurers other than the 
big three 19 percent. These differences are very highly 
significant statistically.
Chapter 2 also demonstrates that despite the degree of 
contention, the voluntary payment cases are still dominant. 
Nearly three-fourths of Michigan workers' compensation 
claims are voluntarily paid by the insurers. Nevertheless, ma 
jor attention is directed to the issue of litigation in this 
monograph. There are three reasons for this. First is the 
question of the role of litigation in a workers' compensation 
system designed 70 years ago to eliminate litigation. It was 
dissatisfaction with the litigious approach to compensating 
injured workers early in this century that led to the no-fault 
principle upon which workers' compensation programs were 
built.
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Second, in a theoretical context, the wage-loss principle 
and lump-sum settlements are generally regarded as mutually 
exclusive. Yet in Michigan these are two of the main 
characteristics of the workers* compensation system. This 
calls for some explanation. Last, a major share of the 
Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation administrative 
burden arises from the litigated case population. For this 
reason alone, the extent of litigation and the function of 
litigation in the workers' compensation system in Michigan 
are worthy of study.
Analysis in chapter 2 shows that the method of resolution, 
geographical location, nature of injury, part of body in 
jured, level of disability, reason payments ended, gender and 
age of claimant, number of dependents, weekly earnings, 
and the weekly benefit amount all differ significantly by in 
surer type. These results represent the working of a number 
of influences, including the wage levels, the worker popula 
tion covered, and the extent of litigation among the different 
insurer groups.
The extent of litigation plays a strong explanatory role 
because litigated cases are so different from unlitigated 
cases. In general, the data available in the MCCS come from 
different sources for litigated and unlitigated cases. In both 
samples the collection of the data was oriented to the ad 
ministrative reports to the Bureau of Workers' Disability 
Compensation. Since most of the information about 
litigated cases originates in the process of litigation itself, it is 
very strongly tainted by the process.
This may be best illustrated in the seemingly simple 
descriptions of the nature of the injury claimed and the part 
of the body affected. For unlitigated cases these data come 
from a report filed by the employer at the time of the injury. 
For litigated cases, they come from the Petition for Hearing, 
which is the form that originates a litigated case. Inasmuch
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as this document establishes the scope of the claim (and 
eventually the scope of the settlement) and since it is usually 
written by the claimant's attorney, the description of the 
nature of the injury and the part of the body affected take on 
a rather special mission. This culminates in the claim for 
what has come to be called by some critics of the system "an 
injury to the skin and its contents." The boiler-plate ap 
proach to describing the source of a worker's claimed 
disability makes it very difficult to determine from the of 
ficial case documents just what the injury really was.
From the point of the statistical tests of significant dif 
ferences among insurer types in chapter 2, the approach also 
produces a possibly spurious result. Since the proportion of 
litigated cases differs by insurer type, the stylized litigation 
process itself strongly affects the comparisons. Because of 
the boiler-plate approach to the claimed injuries in litigated 
cases, they are frequently coded as multiple injuries. But if 
the incidence of litigated cases is much higher for the big 
three, the incidence of multiple injuries is also much higher. 
This leads to the conclusion that the proportion of different 
types of injuries varies systematically with insurer type. 
What cannot be determined is whether there is more litiga 
tion because there are more multiple injuries, or whether 
there are more multiple injuries reported because there is 
more litigation.
The incidence of litigation and the consequent incidence of 
lump-sum settlements (called redemptions in Michigan) com 
bined with the wage-loss philosophy of the Michigan statute 
produce another problem in describing workers' compensa 
tion in Michigan. It is not possible to divide Michigan cases 
into the traditional disability categories of fatality, perma 
nent total, permanent partial, temporary total and medical 
only. Since the disability category cannot be determined in a 
lump-sum case, the results in chapter 2 showed that over 20 
percent of all cases could not be allocated. In addition, since
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the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation in 
Michigan does not require reporting on medical expenses for 
individual cases, there are no medical only cases included in 
the data base.
The review of the actual compensation paid to the 
claimants represented in the MCCS revealed a number of in 
teresting facts. First and foremost, the restricted scope of the 
statutory two-thirds income replacement rate was shown. In 
1978 only 20 percent of weekly payment cases actually 
received a benefit that equaled two-thirds of their earnings. 
This result reflects a complex interaction between Michigan's 
maximum benefit, the dependency allowance, and the 
minimum benefit. 2
The maximum weekly benefit in Michigan is set at two- 
thirds the previous year's state average weekly wage. But to 
receive that amount, a disabled worker must have both a 
weekly earnings level at or above the state average and the 
maximum of five or more dependents. With fewer 
dependents, the maximum benefit is reduced. Thus a disabl 
ed worker with no dependents would only be eligible for a 
maximum benefit that represents 55 percent of the state 
average weekly wage. If such a worker happened to earn ex 
actly the state average wage, he or she could not attain the 
two-thirds replacement rate specified in the statute because 
of the maximum benefit limitation. In essence, the maximum 
benefit is reduced to less than two-thirds the state average 
weekly wage for most injured workers. As a result, nearly 64 
percent of the weekly payment cases receive the maximum 
weekly compensation rate for their dependency classifica 
tion.
On the other hand, Michigan has very high minimum 
benefits. This results from an appeals court decision tying 
the minimum benefit to the same absolute annual dollar ad 
justment as provided by statute for the maximum benefits. 3
Summary 187
The effect of this adjustment has been to narrow the relative 
gap between minimum and maximum benefit levels very 
significantly over the years. It is shown in chapter 4 that for a 
disabled worker with three dependents the 1968 minimum 
was 44 percent of the maximum benefit level. But by 1978 
the minimum had risen to 72 percent of the maximum. In 
1978 some 15 percent of all weekly benefit cases received the 
minimum benefit, as did over 20 percent of the cases closed 
by insurance carriers.
It was demonstrated in chapter 4 that this benefit structure 
provides widely varying income replacement proportions. 
About 15 percent of unlitigated workers' compensation cases 
in Michigan receive less than 40 percent gross wage replace 
ment. On the other end of the scale, 3 percent achieve over 
100 percent and another 10 percent get from 70 to 100 per 
cent replacement of their weekly gross earnings. The most 
logical conclusion is simply that the benefit structure got out 
of adjustment over the years since 1969 with no legislative at 
tention. 4
Turning to the duration of weekly benefit payments, it was 
seen that here the experience did not differ by insurer type. 
Weekly payment cases closed by carriers and self-insurers 
showed similar duration distributions. This was true for both 
litigated and unlitigated cases and represents one of the few 
areas of the study where no significant differences among in 
surer types could be found.
It is well-known that most workers' compensation cases 
are of rather short duration. The MCCS demonstrates that 
half the weekly payment cases in Michigan have durations of 
less than four weeks. Less than 10 percent show durations 
over 26 weeks, although this result is affected by the closed 
case sampling bias and should be treated more carefully. In 
chapter 4 an attempt was made to determine the impact of 
the waiting week reimbursement provision of Michigan law.
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Since the first, or waiting, week is only compensated if the 
disability lasts two weeks or more, one might expect 
claimants would be increasingly loath to return to work as 
they near the end of their second week of disability. If there 
is such an effect, it is not obvious in the disability distribu 
tion examined here. The conclusion is that the malingering 
claimed by some cannot be demonstrated to be a major 
problem.
The product of the weekly compensation rate and the 
duration of weekly benefits is of course the total weekly 
compensation paid. The results of the analysis of total week 
ly compensation paid by insurer type were very interesting. 
While the durations of payment did not differ significantly 
by insurer, the weekly compensation rates did, so the total 
weekly payments were expected to show significant dif 
ferences as well.
In fact, there was a statistically significant difference in 
total weekly compensation when all cases were considered in 
chapter 2. But this resulted from the differences in the pro 
portions of litigated cases for different insurer types. Since 
those litigated cases that received weekly payments got about 
seven times as much on the average as unlitigated cases, the 
differing proportion of litigated cases produced significant 
differences when all cases were considered together. In 
chapter 2 it was shown that the big three pay 26 percent more 
and other self-insurers 10 percent less than carriers in weekly 
compensation to the average case.
But the analysis in chapter 4, which separated litigated and 
unlitigated cases, did not disclose statistically significant dif 
ferences between the insurer types. The big three were shown 
in chapter 4 to pay 18 percent more than carriers in total 
weekly compensation to the average unlitigated case and 35 
percent more to the average litigated case. Other self-insurers 
pay about 6 percent more to unlitigated and 7 percent less to
Summary 189
litigated cases than do carriers. However, these differences 
were not statistically significant when considered separately 
for the litigated and unlitigated populations.
As mentioned earlier, there were also a large number of 
cases in the MCCS that never received any weekly compensa 
tion payments at all. In fact, it was shown in chapter 2 that 
over 20 percent of all Michigan closed cases fell into this 
category. This group consisted of 7 percent washouts (never 
received any indemnity payments), and 15 percent that had 
received lump-sum payments only. Reflecting the litigation 
experience, there were very striking differences in these pro 
portions by insurer. Nearly one-third of all the big three 
cases received lump-sum payments only, while this was true 
for only 11 percent of carrier and other self-insurer cases.
Virtually all of these lump-sum payments are the result of 
litigation; only a handful represent payments for scheduled 
losses or advances on future weekly benefits. In the ag 
gregate workers' compensation picture in Michigan, lump- 
sum payments loom very large. The MCCS indicates that 60 
percent of all the compensation paid over the lifetime of 
these closed cases was paid in lump-sums rather than weekly 
payments. This proportion varies by insurer type from 53.6 
percent for self-insurers other than the big three to 66.8 per 
cent for the big three auto producers; carriers fall in between 
at 60.7 percent. Thus all insurer types pay out more dollars 
in lump-sum payments than in periodic payments, according 
to the evidence presented here. 5
It was shown in chapter 4 that the average size of the 
lump-sum payment also varies widely among insurer types. 
The average gross lump-sum payment ranged from a high of 
$10,529 for carriers, to $8,493 for other self-insurers, to 
$5,659 for the big three. These differences were highly 
significant statistically. The unique thing about the big three 
lump-sum distribution is that it has much lower variance
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than the others. This is hypothesized to be the result of the 
"routine redemption" in the auto industry.
Many of these routine redemptions involve retired 
claimants. While it was not possible to identify the retire 
ment status of all claimants, it was estimated in chapter 3 
that from 25 to 35 percent of all litigated cases were filed by 
retirees. Estimates by insurer type were 15 to 20 percent for 
carriers, 30 to 40 percent for other self-insurers, and 40 to 50 
percent for the big three. Further, these retired claimants 
received a minimum of 18 percent of all the indemnity 
payments reported in the MCCS. This proportion ranged 
from 10 percent for carrier claims, to 20 percent for other 
self-insurers, and an incredible 40 percent for the big three.
When attention is turned from the cost of lump-sum 
payments (gross amount) to the lump-sum benefit actually 
received by the claimant (net amount), there are a number of 
adjustments required. Clearly, the costs of litigation must be 
deducted since they are not received as benefits by the claim 
ant. The MCCS showed that these costs run between 20 and 
25 percent of the gross lump-sum. This covers the attorney's 
fee, medical examination and deposition, and other legal ex 
penses.
In addition, 18 percent of all lump-sum payment cases 
show a designated amount "reserved for future medical 
care." It is paid to the claimant at the time of settlement but 
is supposed to be used to pay for future medical costs arising 
from the disability. This apparently is an adaptation to avoid 
the objections some have to compromise and release set 
tlements when future medical costs are no longer provided 
for. For those lump-sum cases showing such medical cost 
designations, the average amount is 57 percent of the gross 
lump-sum. These payments are excluded from the net lump- 
sum figure in the analysis here on the grounds that no other
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medical costs are included, so these should not be counted as 
benefit payments either. 6
The average gross lump-sum payment to the cases in the 
MCCS was $8,551. After deducting the litigation expenses 
and the funds reserved for future medical costs, the average 
lump-sum received by the claimant (net lump-sum) was 
$5,944. As with the gross lump-sum amounts, there were 
significant differences by insurer type. The average lump- 
sum received by a big three claimant was $3,777, while other 
self-insurer's claimants realized $6,186 and carrier's 
claimants, $7,336.
When a multivariate regression analysis was done on the 
net lump-sum payments, it was found that the size of the net 
lump-sum varied directly with the previous earnings level 
and the amount paid earlier in weekly compensation. Self- 
insurers were shown by this regression to pay significantly 
smaller lump-sums than carriers. There was also a positive 
relationship between the size of the lump-sum and previous 
repeated spells of disability, a record of hospitalization, or a 
claim of a back injury. It is hypothesized that a previous 
demonstrable disability lends some credence to a litigated 
claim. Thus earlier weekly payments or hospitalization tend 
to indicate legitimacy of the claim and hence are correlated 
with higher lump-sum payments. Unfortunately, the data 
were not detailed enough to warrant additional analysis, so 
these conclusions must be regarded as somewhat tentative.
In profiling average total compensation payments by in 
surer type, some interesting patterns emerge. In comparison 
to insurance carriers, the big three pay more than twice as 
many lump-sum cases, but they pay only about half as much 
to each. The big three pay relatively fewer weekly compensa 
tion cases, but they pay a higher weekly rate. When all is said 
and done, the average indemnity received by each carrier
192 Summary
claimant in the MCCS was $2,319. For big three claimants it 
was $2,303.
Self-insurers other than the big three paid a similar pro 
portion of weekly cases to that of carriers, but they paid 
them a slightly higher weekly rate for a slightly shorter 
period of time. In lump-sum payment cases, they paid fewer 
dollars on the average to relatively fewer cases. Thus the 
average total indemnity received by other self-insurers' 
claimants was $1,921, or about 17 percent less than that for 
carriers or the big three.
When all indemnity payments are measured in terms of 
disability duration, through imputing durations to lump-sum 
cases by dividing the net lump-sum payments by the mean 
weekly compensation rate for the corresponding insurer 
type, much the same result is found. The average successful 
workers' compensation claim against insurance carriers 
receives 23.6 weeks worth of benefits. The average big three 
claimant receives 23.7 weeks. The average claim against self- 
insurers other than the big three receives 16.9 weeks worth of 
benefits, nearly 30 percent less.
This advantage derives primarily from the litigated case 
experience. Self-insurers other than the big three actually 
demonstrate slightly higher average compensation totals 
than carriers for unlitigated cases. But they have both a 
lower incidence of litigation and a lower average cost for 
litigated cases when compared to carriers. Unfortunately, 
the MCCS does not contain sufficient detail to carry this 
comparative analysis any further, but the differences are cer 
tainly large enough to give these self-insurers a considerable 
advantage in workers' compensation costs.
When the issue of the timeliness of benefit payments was 
addressed in chapter 4, it was shown that in 80 to 85 percent 
of unlitigated cases in Michigan, the claimant receives a 
benefit check within 30 days. Depending on the specific
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measurement used, from 40 to 50 percent have checks within 
14 days. No matter how timeliness is measured, the big three 
do the best job, followed by other self-insurers, and the car 
riers coming in consistently last. As an example, when the 
measurement is from the last day of work to the date of in 
itial payment, in 50 percent of their cases the big three get a 
check out within 14 days. The corresponding figures are 40 
percent and 36 percent for other self-insurers and carriers, 
respectively.
Turning to litigated cases, the question of timeliness really 
loses its meaning in Michigan's workers' compensation 
system. The delays are so massive, it is obvious that 
timeliness is not regarded as an important criterion by those 
involved in the system—beginning with the claimant. It was 
shown in chapter 4 that the average time elapsed from the 
date of last injury to the application for hearing is over 500 
days. Almost 25 percent of litigated claims are filed more 
than two years after the injury; almost 10 percent are not 
filed until more than four years following the injury.
It is unlikely that this reflects the incidence of long latency 
occupational diseases, since in such cases Michigan law dic 
tates that the last day of work shall be designated as the day 
of injury. Yet when the application delay is measured from 
the last day of work, the average delay remains over 350 
days. Presumably the long application delays reflect a com 
bination of circumstances.
Some occupational diseases and cumulative trauma condi 
tions do take substantial periods of time to manifest 
themselves. In addition, in the presence of such potentially 
disabling conditions, workers frequently have some option 
as to when they choose to file. As long as one can continue to 
do the work, perhaps it is better to wait until there really is 
no alternative before going through the hassle of a workers' 
compensation claim. This is particularly clear if the worker
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expects to encounter resistance from the employer, and an 
ticipates that once the claim has been filed, there is little 
chance of going back to work. Under these circumstances, it 
might be possible that a worker could delay filing the claim 
for some time, possibly even until a separation occurs for 
other reasons.
On the other hand, it may be (as many employers believe) 
that workers encounter a workers' compensation plaintiff at 
torney somehow and become bewitched with the prospect of 
easy money. This may also be more likely if the employment 
relationship is already severed. The attorney takes the case 
on a contingency fee, and all the claimant has to do is submit 
to two physical exams and possibly a few hours at a hearing 
some time in the future. Under this scenario, the statute of 
limitations does not provide an effective bar to claims 
because in Michigan the time under the statute of limitations 
does not begin to toll until the employer has notified the 
Bureau of the injury. Obviously, if the employer is not aware 
of the injury, the statute of limitations does not come into 
play. Both of these scenarios are consistent with litigated 
claims that are old when they are filed. No doubt there are 
others as well.
The timeliness results presented in chapter 4 for litigated 
cases made it clear that the administration by the Bureau of 
Workers' Disability Compensation contributes to the delays 
as well. The average time elapsed between the application for 
hearing and the actual hearing itself for the cases in the 
MCCS was also well over 500 days. Only about 25 percent of 
litigated cases come to a hearing within one year of initiation 
of the claim. Then, after all this delay, fully 70 percent of 
these cases are redeemed with a compromise and release set 
tlement that involves only a pro-forma approval of the 
agreement. Whether the hearings process contributed to this 
resolution in any substantial way is not clear. It is obvious
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that the whole process is enormously inefficient by the stan 
dards of a no-fault insurance system.
Chapter 3 contained a rather extensive analysis of the cor 
relates of litigation. While it was disappointing overall due to 
the lack of information on litigated cases that was not 
tainted by the litigation process, a number of interesting 
results were obtained. First, as mentioned earlier, multiple 
injuries and multiple parts of the body were very strongly 
correlated with litigation. This reflects the boiler-plate ap 
proach to injury allegations on the application for hearing. 
There was also a high correlation of litigation with impair 
ment of entire body systems, i.e., respiratory, circulatory, 
etc.
Since the Petition for Hearing contains a separate line item 
for occupational disease claims, some have alleged that this 
encourages adding any potential occupational disease to a 
litigated claim no matter what the claim is really about. But 
in 26 percent of the litigated cases, only occupational disease 
is claimed. The different insurer types show very significant 
differences in this regard also, with the proportion of 
straight occupational disease claims ranging from 19 percent 
for carriers to 23 percent for other self-insurers and 37 per 
cent for the big three.
This examination stops well short of alleging that the 
litigation problem in Michigan's workers' compensation 
system is strictly an occupational disease problem, however. 
This is due both to the data problems discussed earlier, and 
to the judgment that the occupational disease problem is not 
of sufficient magnitude to account for the amount of litiga 
tion present in the Michigan system.
The analysis in chapter 3 also showed that back injuries 
were significantly more likely to be litigated, while simple in 
juries like burns, cuts, and fractures were significantly less
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likely than other injuries to become enmeshed in the litiga 
tion process. It was also shown that fatality claims were 
much more likely to be litigated. These factors taken 
together are indicative of the evidentiary problems that 
plague the workers' compensation system. The facts are 
quite clear in a fracture case; the accident happened and it is 
either compensable or not, depending primarily on where 
and when it happened. Even though workers' compensation 
is a no-fault system, there is little chance that an employee 
would claim benefits for a fracture that occurred at home. 
The system only protects workers' incomes against injuries 
and diseases arising out of and in the course of employment.
Occupational diseases, cumulative trauma injuries, and 
some fatalities can present a different aspect, however. The 
specific etiology of the disabling condition can be quite 
obscure. 7 In addition, a liberal interpretation of the workers' 
compensation statute (particularly through the contributory 
factor or acceleration of the disease process areas of the 
definition of disability) would make it possible to bring near 
ly all the ordinary diseases of life suffered by employees into 
the system. So the employers react by contesting what they 
regard as dubious claims. One is then presented with the 
anomaly of a no-fault system devoting a great deal of time to 
fighting over what is covered and what is not. The old tort 
liability disputes over who is at fault are simply replaced by 
disputes over what is at fault.
Another important influence on the likelihood of litiga 
tion developed in chapter 3 is insurer type. Results there 
showed that cases from the big three are significantly more 
likely and cases from other self-insurers significantly less 
likely to be litigated than are insurance carrier cases. This 
phenomenon has been discussed repeatedly through the 
monograph. It should be noted that this result comes from a 
multivariate analysis; thus it represents the correlation of in 
surer type with litigation holding constant other factors such
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as type of injury, age and sex of the claimant, indemnity 
level and location.
The MCCS cannot prove what caused the litigation, but 
merely notes its presence as a demonstrable fact. In this in 
stance, it cannot be shown conclusively whether the big three 
are more likely to contest a claim of given "worthiness," or 
whether the employees of the big three are inclined to file 
claims that are less "worthy" on the average than other 
employees. On the other hand, self-insurers other than the 
big three experience less litigation. It is tempting to say that 
they are doing a better job of claims management (in the 
large sense, i.e., including preventing claims from reaching 
the litigious state), but the MCCS cannot prove this either. It 
will therefore have to be sufficient to conclude that the big 
three experience more litigation and other self-insurers less 
litigation than the carrier sector. This issue clearly warrants 
further study.
There are two more case characteristics that demonstrated 
association with litigation in chapter 3. Cases from Detroit 
and cases involving claimants age 55 or over were shown to 
be significantly more likely to be litigated than others. The 
impact of the large industrial urban center on the tendency to 
litigate is well-known; this turns up in most analyses of in 
come maintenance systems. Things are done differently in 
Miami, Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit or New York than in 
smaller places. There is what Monroe Berkowitz twenty 
years ago dubbed a greater "claims consciousness" in highly 
industrialized urban environments. 8 Whether due to more at 
torneys, stronger unions, better information networks, or 
some kind of socio-psychological differences, it is not a sur 
prise that it turns up in the Michigan workers' compensation 
system as well.
The higher tendency to litigation among older workers is 
not a surprise either. Nearly everyone has heard about the
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"retiree problem" in Michigan's workers' compensation 
system. According to results presented earlier, between one- 
fourth and one-third of all litigated cases are filed by 
retirees; these cases receive nearly 20 percent of all indemnity 
payments in Michigan.
The magnitude of retiree claims in the litigated case 
population seems to make a mockery of the wage-loss princi 
ple of indemnity, supposedly the philosophical foundation 
of the Michigan workers' compensation law. This is not to 
say these claimants are undeserving, but by definition a 
worker who is voluntarily retired from the workforce cannot 
be suffering wage loss as a result of a disability. The "oppor 
tunity" to suffer a wage loss has been foregone in the elec 
tion of retirement.
Redemptions are popular with most, if not all, par 
ticipants in the system. The claimants appreciate getting the 
money in a lump-sum, even if it takes two to three years to 
get it. The claimant's attorney prefers it since the fee comes 
off the top of the settlement and collection costs for profes 
sional services are minimized. The insurers seem to like 
redemptions because they eliminate uncertainty by cashing 
out disability claims with a fixed dollar figure and by pro 
hibiting future claims from the same source. Finally, the 
Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation seems to like 
redemption settlements because they minimize the ad 
ministrative burden of the litigation system.
The major requirement for securing a redemption settle 
ment in Michigan is probably the source of income to make 
it possible to wait out the long delay until the case is settled. 
This is one of the reasons so many retiree claims are flooding 
the system. Retirees have the time and usually the income 
support to make a try at a workers' compensation settlement 
possible. In addition, they can be expected to show some 
physical impairment after a lifetime of work in the industrial
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world; plus they are often no longer in need of maintaining 
the goodwill of their employer.
This is not to question whether a lifetime of work and ex 
posure to industrial hazards is not worth a bonus of a few 
thousand dollars. It is to ask whether that is the function of 
the workers' compensation system. It also raises the issue of 
the impact on an administrative system that does not have 
the resources to cope with its other responsibilities. 
Michigan's litigation system is littered with too many 
dubious claims waiting in line for their redemption settle 
ment. Because of this, more legitimate dispute settlement 
functions are frustrated. How could an injured worker who 
needed a weekly paycheck wait through the delays described 
here? In addition, scarce resources are drained from 
rehabilitation and other more productive functions to handle 
the paper deluge. Both the workers' compensation system 
and the administration of it end up with a serious misalloca- 
tion of resources.
This study has illuminated, perhaps only dimly, two 
separate workers' compensation systems in Michigan. The 
unlitigated system operates much as the theory of workers' 
compensation would suggest. It is not perfect, of course. It 
does not provide sufficient support for reemployment ef 
forts. It can be somewhat slow in generating income replace 
ment benefits in some cases. It clearly provides an inade 
quate level of income replacement for a great many workers. 
But it looks like a workers' compensation system.
The litigated system resembles a miniature tort liability 
system; miniature in that the dollar amounts at stake are tiny 
fractions of those represented in individual tort liability in 
jury claims these days; miniature in that the quality and 
quantity of proofs required bear only a distant relation to 
those in a real tort liability action; but full-size in the 
litigiousness and interminable delays characterizing the pro-
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cess. After 70 years of workers' compensation in Michigan, 
it is time once again to get tort liability out of the workplace. 
It is time to turn again to a no-fault wage-loss system of 
workers' compensation, with administrative procedures 
designed to meet the needs of the victims of industrial acci 
dent and disease; swift medical care, adequate income 
maintenance, rehabilitation and retraining where required, 
and most of all, an early return to the ranks of productive 
society for those workers unfortunate enough to have been 
disabled by their work.
As mentioned in the first chapter of this monograph, 
substantial changes have been made in Michigan's workers' 
compensation system since the data reported here were col 
lected. Many of the flaws discussed have been addressed but 
the full impact of the changes has yet to be felt. The function 
of this publication is to provide a standard against which the 
new system can be measured. Hopefully, when the next 
study of the Michigan system is undertaken, all these prob 
lems will have been resolved.
NOTES
1. There have only been a few published works dealing with the 
Michigan system. See James N. Morgan, Marvin Snider, and Marion G. 
Sobol, Lump Sum Redemption Settlements and Rehabilitation: A Study 
of Workmen's Compensation in Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for 
Social Research, University of Michigan, 1959) for an early description 
of the redemption system in Michigan. Another early study dealing with 
the cost issue is John F. Burton, Jr., Interstate Variations in Employers' 
Costs of Workmen's Compensation: Effect on Plant Location Ex 
emplified in Michigan (Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, 1966). See also the report of the Governor's 
Workmen's Compensation Advisory Commission, Workers' Compensa 
tion in Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI: The Commission, 1975).
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2. These issues are discussed more fully in chapter 4.
3. Jolliffv. American Advertising, 49 Mich App 1.
4. This is confirmed by the fact that the 1980 reforms totally scrapped 
the old benefit structure.
5. This conclusion may be subject to qualification due to the closed case 
bias, since it was pointed out earlier that long duration weekly payment 
cases will have lower weekly compensation amounts (reflecting wage 
levels in the past). The downward cost bias for weekly payments in 
troduced by this factor may or may not be matched in the lump-sum 
payments; there is not enough information available from the litigated 
cases to tell. So it may not be strictly correct to say that all insurer types 
pay out more dollars in lump-sums than in periodic payments. The point, 
however, is that lump-sum payments are very significant in Michigan's 
workers' compensation system, and any analysis that ignores them starts 
out with a fatal omission.
6. This procedure was followed even though some have asserted that the 
"reserved for future medical" category is used simply as a device to 
avoid social security offset of lump-sum payments.
7. See Barth with Hunt, chapter 3.
8. This is discussed in Workmen's Compensation: The New Jersey Ex 




Michigan Closed Case Survey
Instructions - Unlitigated Case Sample
I. General Comments 
A. Coverage
It is intended that all potentially compensable cases should be 
included in the sample whether actually compensated or not. 
There are some cases for which the employer filed Form 100 
even though no lost time (or insufficient lost time) occurred. 
In such cases there is no liability for wage replacement 
benefits and the case should not be included in the sample. 
Aside from these "mistakes" however, all cases are to be 
abstracted.
B. Organization of Instrument
The data gathering instrument for the unlitigated case sample 
is strongly oriented to Bureau of Workers' Disability Com 
pensation Forms 100, 101, and 102. Page one generally cor 
responds to Form 100 and seeks to identify the injured party, 
the injury, the employer and insurer. Page two will contain 
the information about actual compensation paid while page 
three probes the termination of the case. Thus the organiza 
tion is chronological and is designed to follow file organiza 
tion as closely as possible. In Part II below, specific com 
ments about individual items will be presented.
C. Missing Data
The instrument we are using is oriented to Bureau forms in 
the interest of easing the abstracting and coding process. 
However, the questions ultimately are about the cases, not the 
forms. As you know there are frequently items missing from 
these forms. In circumstances where they have an important 
bearing on the case, Bureau personnel will generally have 
followed up to ascertain the facts. In these instances you 
should record the correct information as determined by the 
Bureau.
In other cases a determination may be possible utilizing infor 
mation recorded elsewhere in the file. But please note that it is
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not a tragedy to have a missing item for a particular case. You 
are encouraged to use your judgment in walking this fine line. 
If you are reasonably confident that you know the facts, 
record them as you understand them. If you are not, leave the 
item blank and we will take it to be missing.
D. General Format Instructions
1. Dates
All dates are to be entered in month-day-year format in the 
three pairs of boxes allowed. For instance, January 17, 
1978 would be recorded as 01-17-78.
2. Dollar Amounts
Except in the case of the hourly wage rate, all dollar 
amounts are to be rounded to the nearest dollar. Amounts 
of less than 50C should be dropped while amounts of 50* or 
more will be raised to the next higher integer. Thus $176.31 
would be 176 while $38.90 would be 39.
3. Duration
Compensation duration is to be expressed in weeks and 
days as on Form 102. Where it is necessary to add two or 
more separate durations for total compensation duration 
(all periods), you should follow Bureau practice of assum 
ing a six-day work week. Thus compensation durations of 
10 weeks, 4 days and 3 weeks, 3 days should be recorded as 
a total of 14 weeks, 1 day.
4. Indented Sections
Indented sections are those that are contingent upon the 
answer to the proceeding question. For example, the date 
of death on page 1 is only relevant if the case was a fatality. 
These items are to be skipped where not relevant, simply 
drop down to the next non-indented item.
E. Case Order
It is vital that completed forms be kept in numerical order 
according to case identification number. This will make it 
possible to check back to source later if anomalies develop.
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II. Comments on Specific Items
Page 1
1. Case identification #
This is the number stamped on the back of the green sheet
at retirement.
* Name of injured employee
As entered on Forms 100 and 101, last name first.
25. Date of injury
If there should be multiple dates of injury that pertain to 
the same compensable disability, record the earliest.
31. Last day worked
Where the injured employee may have returned to work 
subsequent to first disability period, record the last day 
worked before original disability.
37. Fatality
If injured employee should die after Form 100 is filed it is 
still a fatality case. Is Form 106 present?
44. Place of injury
Code county of injury from item 9 on Form 100.
46. Hospitalization
If name and address of hospital entered for item 12, Form 
100, answer is yes; if not, answer is no. For old format 
Form 100, answer unknown.
47. Nature of injury
Follow directions in codebook.
50. Part of body
Follow directions in codebook.
53. Hours regularly worked per week 
From Form 100, item 16.
55. Straight time hourly wage rate
Either from Form 100, item 16, or from Form 101, item 7. 
Do not calculate from weekly earnings unless it is clear that 
these do not include overtime or other special items.
59. Combined average weekly earnings
From Form 100. This is to be based on the payroll record 
calculation. The earnings specifically used for calculating 
the compensation rate will be collected from Form 101.
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62. Self insured number
From Form 100 or code from insurer list in codebook. It is 
necessary to add 0 where blank, dash, or letter appears in 
the Bureau's self insurer code number. Code all 8's if self 
insured and no code number can be located.
70. Insurance Company number
From Form 100 or code from insurer list in codebook. 
Note State Accident Fund is number 999. Code 888 if car 
rier given but code number cannot be found.
Page 2
1. Date disability commenced 
From Form 101, item 5.
7. Combined weekly earnings (for compensation rate)
Record the earnings actually used to determine the com 
pensation rate from Form 101. In some cases this will be 
the same as combined average weekly earnings recorded 
above. In other cases it will be 40 times the hourly wage 
rate.
10. Number of dependents
Form 101, item 8, or as determined by the Bureau.
11. Date first payment made
As reported on initial Form 101.
17. Date of initial Form 101
This and the items following it refer to the first period of 
disability following the injury.
23. Initial weekly compensation rate
Weekly rate paid for first period of disability following in 
jury. Rounded to nearest dollar.
26. Beginning date for compensation
Record the "From" date on Form 102 for the first period 
of compensation following injury.
32. End date for compensation
Record the "To" date on Form 102 for the first period of 
compensation following injury.
38. Compensation duration
From Form 102, in weeks and days, for the first period of 
compensation following injury.
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42. Kind of disability
Classification of the first period of disability.
43. Number of separate compensation periods
As indicated on Forms 101 and 102. Separate periods to be 
differentiated either by a return to work or a change in 
compensation rate (other than for dependency change).
44. Final weekly compensation rate
This and the next 4 items all refer to the last period of com 
pensation following injury.
47. Beginning date for compensation
Record the "From" date on Form 102 for the last period 
of compensation before retirement of case.
53. End date for compensation
Record the "To" date on Form 102 for the last period of 
compensation before retirement of case.
59. Compensation duration
From Form 102, in weeks and days, for the last period of 
compensation before retirement of case.
63. Kind of disability
Classification of the last period of disability.
64. Total compensation duration (all periods)
Sum of durations of separate compensation periods; not 
calendar elapsed time.
68. Total weekly compensation paid (all periods)
Sum of dollars paid in weekly benefits over all periods of 
disability reported for case.
Page 3
1. Reason payments stopped
As indicated on final Form 102 or from other documents 
present in file. Dispute refers specifically to insurer filing 
Form 107 (Notice of dispute). Physician's report refers to 
those cases where same is not accompanied by Form 107. 
Benefits expired refers to specific loss or fatality cases, or 
others where a definite term of weekly benefits was 
specified.
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2. Date of final return to work
As indicated on final Form 102. If no return to work is in 
dicated, leave this blank.
8. Date of final Form 102
Date on last Form 102 filed before retirement of case.
14. Form 107 filed?
Was a Notice of Dispute filed at any time during the life of 
the case?
15. Date of Form 107
If more than one, record the date of the last 107.
21. Reason for dispute
The options are designed as a hierarchy here.
1. Injury or disability denied means that the insurer denies 
the existence of any disability.
2. Work relatedness of disability denied means that while 
the insurer does not dispute the existence of disability, 
he denies it arose out of and in the course of employ 
ment.
3. Liability of insurer denied covers situations where the 
insurer does not deny the disability or its work related 
origins, but specifically denies his liability. This could 
be due to lack of notice, multiple employer liability, 
jurisdiction problems, etc.
4. Continued disability disputed refers to situations where 
benefits have been paid but insurer now asserts that in 
dividual has recovered.
5. Degree of impairment disputed refers to situations 
where insurer claims that injured party is being over- 
compensated for present degree of disability. Insurer 
seeks reduction from total to partial disability rating.
22. Mediation applied?
Was a Compensation Consultant involved in the resolution 
of the dispute?
23. Outcome of mediation
Were payments ultimately continued as a result of the 
mediation effort?
24. Case referred for vocational rehabilitation? 
Letter of referral for VR in the file?
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25. Vocational rehabilitation program instituted?
Is there any record on 110s of any VR program being 
established for this individual?
26. Encoder
To identify the individual abstracting the information 
from case files. To be assigned.
Specific Items - Litigated Case Sample
Page 1
1. Case identification number
Drop the leading zeroes and record the last 7 digits. Where 
case has been retired before, take the latest case number.
17. County
County stamped at upper right hand corner of summary 
sheet inside folder.
19. Self insured number
Check final 102 for coding of insurer. Generally not coded 
for self insurers. Look up employer in coding book and 
record number. Substitute zero for dashes, blanks, letters 
or other non-numeric characters.
27. Insurance company number
Generally coded on final 102. Otherwide proceed as above.
* If multiple insurer liability
This is meant to cover the situation where one employer 
is insured by two or more different carriers over the 
course of a disablement as well as the situation where 
two or more employers are involved. If more than 2 in 
surers, record those against whom the largest compensa 
tion liability is eventually assessed.
41. Total number of employers involved
Simply count number of employers listed on summary 
sheet.
42. Date of AFH
As listed on summary sheet, date application for hearing 
received by Bureau.
48. Served and Set
As recorded on summary sheet.
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54. Pre-Trial Conference Date
As recorded on summary sheet.
60. Claimant Birthdate
Generally these items identifying the characteristics of the 
claimant will come from the 104. Do not hesitate to use 
other sources if it seems advisable.
68. Weekly earnings at time of disablement
Generally from 104. If not available use other sources. 
Preferred to daily wage measure on 104.
71. Daily wage at time of disablement
Alternative to weekly earnings on 104 if they are not 
reported.
Page 2
1. Last day worked
Sometimes listed on 104; sometimes noted on summary 
sheet (if taken as date of injury); sometimes mentioned in 
medical reports. If no Form 100 this may be difficult. The 
intent is to gather the last day worked before disablement.
7. Date of injury or disablement
According to Form 104. Space is available for three 
separate personal injuries or occupational diseases. These 
will rarely be easy to choose or code since the tendency is to 
claim everything that might be work-related. Use your 
judgment in choosing those that are of major significance. 
There is no way of telling precisely which injury ends up 
being compensated. Some guidance is available in medical 
reports for some cases.
13. Type
According to whether it is listed as a personal injury or oc 
cupational disease on Form 104.
46. Form 100 filed on any of these injuries?
This is to check for overlap with Form 104 which will 
generally produce the injuries listed above.
47. Date of Form 100
Date on the form itself. Take the earliest Form 100 if these 
were multiples.
53. Fatality?
Listed on 104 or 100. Check for Form 106.
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60. Hospitalization?
From Form 100, or medical reports. May be difficult.
Page 3
1. Form 107 filed?
Was a Notice of Dispute filed during the life of the case? If
more than one, report on the last 107.
8. Reason for dispute
See comments on unlitigated case sample for explanation 
of hierarchy.
9. Mediation applied?
Was a Compensation Consultant involved in attempting to 
resolve any disputes in the case?
11. Reason for hearing
There will usually be an application for hearing so this item 
is designed to discover who filed first, the employee or the 
insurer.
12. Date of agreement to redeem 
Record the date of Form 18.
18. Was hearing held?
Include redemption hearings as yes. If no hearing held in 
dicate whether due to voluntary acceptance of claim, 
dismissal, or other reason.
19. Date of hearing
As indicated on Form 200 or 113.
25. Outcome of hearing
According to judge's order. Accepted voluntarily means 
hearing took place but no order was issued.
Page 4
26. Appealed?
Was there a Form 19 filed with Appeals Board? If so by 
whom?
33. Date of appeal hearing
As indicated on transcript.
39. Outcome of appeal
According to who appealed.
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40. Case referred for vocational rehabilitation? 
Is there a record of referral?
41. Vocational rehabilitation program instituted? 
What was result of referral?
42. Second Injury or Dust Disease Fund involved?
Any record of involvement by either special fund?
PageS
As used in unlitigated case sample. If weekly compensation 
benefits paid on this claim, record information here. 
Otherwise, skip to page 6. For reason payments stopped 
record the proximate reason: i.e., (1) employee did in fact 
return to work, or (2) dispute developed (insurer filed 
notice of dispute or petition for determination of rights or
(3) Form 102 filed with MD statement of fitness, or
(4) specific loss payments completed or (5) other.
Page 6
1. Reason for lump-sum
If any lump-sum payment made to claimant other than for 
catch-up of weekly benefits, indicate reason.
2. Total amount
Give total dollar amount of lump-sum payment as in 
dicated on Form 200, 113 or 108.
8. Legal fees
Record portion of total allocated to Attorney's fees.
13. Medical Expenses
Record portion of total allocated to medical expenses.
18. Net to plaintiff
Record amount claimant actually received, net of above 
expenses and free from reservation below.
24. Award for medical expenses
Record here any amount of award specifically reserved or 
tagged for past, present or future medical expenses.
29. Is claimant retired?
This will be difficult as there is no specific question on any 
form. Best source for this information will be judge's 
salmon sheet or medical report. Do not guess, if there is
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not a reasonable certainty given case records, record 
unknown.
30. Has claimant returned to work?
Also difficult. May be indicated on Form 102. Again check 
salmon sheet and medical reports for statements.
31. Date of final return to work 
Final return if known.
37. Date of final Form 102
There should be a 102 for every case where compensation 
was paid. Record date on the form.
43. Encoder
As in unlitigated case sample.
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W. E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research
Litigated Cases
MICHIGAN CLOSED CASE SURVEY
If I [ I I I Case identification #
_______________________________ Name of injured employee
Social Security Number
1 [ I County (see codebook)
Employer
Self insured number
I I I I Insurance Company number 
If multiple insurer liability:
Employer #2
30
II I_I Self insured number
Insurance Company number
41 I I
(_| Total number of employers involved
42 [ [ | - | | | - | | | Date of AFH 
48 I I I - I I I - I I I Served and Set
54 m-m-m Pre-Trial Conference Date
[ I J - I I I - I I I Claimant Birthdate (month-day-year)
66 II Sex (1) Male 
(2) Female
67 I I
|_1 Number of dependents
I I I I Weekly earnings at time of disablement ($} 
| I I Daily wage at time of disablement ($)
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- 2 - 
Card 2
I I I - I I I - I I I Last day worked
I I I - I I | - I I I Date of injury or disablement
I_I Type (1) Personal Injury (2) Occupational Disease
Nature of injury or illness (see codebook) 
Part of body (see codebook)
201—I—I
I I I - I I I - | I I Date of injury or disablement
2fi I——I
I_I Type (1) Personal Injury (2) Occupational Disease
27
Nature of injury or illness (see codebook) 
Part of body (see codebook)
I I I -1 I | - I | I Date of injury or disablement
39 I—II_| Type (1) Personal Injury (2) Occupational Disease
Nature of injury or illness (see codebook)
46 n Part of body (see codebook)Form 100 filed on any of these injuries?
(1) No
(2) Yes, first injury
(3) Yes, second injury
(4) Yes, third injury
(5) Yes, multiple 
((6) Unknown
47 | | | - [ | | - | | | Date of Form 100 (earliest if multiple)
53 I—I
I_I Fatality? (1) No 
(2) Yes
54 I—I—I I——I——I I I I
I | J - I | I - | I I Date of death




- 3 - 
Card 3
'D




(1) Injury or disability denied
(2) Work relatedness of disability denied
(3) Liability of insurer denied
(4) Continued disability disputed
(5) Degree of impairment disputed
(6) Other, Specify _______________
LJ Mediation applied? (1) No 
(2) Yes
I_I Outcome of mediation
(1) Dispute resolved without hearing
(2) Dispute maintained
(3) Other, Specify ___________
I_I Reason for hearing
(1) Petition for hearing by employee (Form 104)
(2) Petition for hearing by insurer (Form 104)
(3) Agreement to redeem (Form 18)
(4) Application for advance (Form 108)
(5) Other, Specify _______________
I2m Date of Agreement to redeem
18 I—1
(_I Was hearing held?
(1) Yes
(2) No, accepted voluntarily - petition withdrawn
(3) No, dismissed for lack of prosecution
(4) No, Other, Specify _________________
19 1 I I - I I I - I I I Date of hearing















(2) Yes, by employee (Plaintiff)
(3) Yes, by insurer (Defendant)
27 ED-ED- QH Date of Fon. 19
|__1__J - I I I - I I | Date of appeal hearing






(6) Other, Specify _______________












Card 4 - 5 - 
If weekly compensation benefits paid:
II—I—!
_J_I Combined weekly earnings (from Form 101)
4 1 1 I - I I I - 1 I I Date first payment made
10 | | 1 - | | 1 - | | | Date of initial Form 101
I I I I Initial weekly compensation rate ($)
I | I - | | I - | | I Beginning date for compensation
I I I - 1 1 | - I | I End date for compensation
I I I | - I_j Compensation duration (weeks-days)





If more than one compensation period:
I_I Number of separate compensation periods
371—r~
Final weekly compensation rate 
I I I - I I | - | II Beginning date for compensation 







- |_| Total compensation duration (all periods) 
| | I | | | I Total weekly compensation paid (all periods--$)67 n Reason payments stopped




(5) Other, Specify __
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Card 5 " 6 " 
If lump-sum payment made:
I_j Reason for lump-sum
(1) Redemption (Form 113)
(2) Decision (Form 200)
(3) Advance (Form 108)
(4) Other, Specify ___________
Total amount ($)
I I 1 I I 1 Legal fees ($)
13 I I I I I I Medical expenses ($)
18 I I 1 I I I I Net to plaintiff ($)
I I I I I I Awarded for medical expenses {$)
29 I—I









I | I - I I I - I I I Date of final return to work 
37 | | I - | | 1 - | | 1 Date of final Form 102 
I__I Encoder
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W. E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research
Unlitigated Cases
MICHIGAN CLOSED CASE SURVEY
Case identification










J__( - I I I - | I 1 I I Social Security Number 
I I I - j__I I - I I I Birthdate (month-day-year)
LJ Sex (1) Male
(2) Female
I I 1 - I II - I I I Date of injury 
I I I - I I I - 1 I I Last day worked
I__| Fatality? (1) No
(2) Yes
38 ^_^_^ 
I I I - LJ__I - I I I Date of death
I I I Place of injury (county—see codebook)
j_J Hospitalization? (1) No
(2) Yes
(3) Unknown
I I I I Nature of injury (see codebook)
j I I I Part of body (see codebook)
I I I Hours regularly worked per week
I I I I | I Straight time hourly wage rate (S)
I | I [ Combined average weekly earnings ($)
Self insured number
[ I I I Insurance Company number
I I I - I I I - I I j Date of Form 100
_Employer
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- j j I - j j I Date disability commenced
Combined weekly earnings (for compensation rate) 
| __ I Number of dependents
j I I - I I | - I I I Date first payment made 
I I I - I | | - I [ I Date of initial Form 101
Initial weekly compensation rate ($) 
- i i i Beginning date for compensation 
I j I End date for compensation 
- j__j Compensation duration (weeks-days)





If more than one compensation period:
Number of separate compensation periods 
Final weekly compensation rate
- I I I Beginning date for compensation 
I [ | - |__I I - I I I End date for compensation 
- I__I Compensation duration (weeks-days)






- I__I Total compensation duration (all periods) 




I__I Reason payments stopped
(1) Returned to work




I I I - I I I - I I | Date of final return to work 
[ I I - I I I - I I I Date of final Form 102
I__I Form 107 filed? (1) No
(2) Yes 
15 r——r—i
I I I - I I I - | I j Date of 107 
21__
|__I Reason for dispute
(1) Injury or disability denied
(2) Work relatedness of disability denied
(3) Liability of insurer denied
(4) Continued disability disputed
(5) Degree of impairment disputed
(6) Other, Specify____________________
22
I__I Mediation applied? (1) No 
(2) Yes
23
|__| Outcome of mediation
(1) Benefits continued or resumed
(2) No further benefits paid
24__




j__I Vocational rehabilitation program instituted?
(1) No
(2) Yes 
26
|__I Encoder
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